Katherine Belcastro-Gonzalez sued the city of Omaha and the chief of police of the Omaha Police Department, alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury found in favor of Belcastro-Gonzalez. The district court
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awarded attorneys fees to Belcastro-Gonzalez and entered judgment. The defendants appeal, and we affirm.
I.
Belcastro-Gonzalez was a police officer for the city of Omaha. In July 2010, she filed a complaint with the police department alleging sexual harassment by a coworker. In 2017, Belcastro-Gonzalez learned that her complaint was not properly investigated. On that basis, she submitted a new complaint to the mayors office alleging that the City improperly investigated her previous complaint. The Citys human resources director investigated and issued a report in September 2017. The report explained that the investigation did not prove or disprove Belcastro-Gonzalezs allegations and that no further action would be taken.
In March 2018, Belcastro-Gonzalez filed a charge of discrimination with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission. She claimed, among other things, that the police department denied her application for the position of acting deputy chief because she had complained about sex discrimination.
Belcastro-Gonzalez applied for two more deputy chief positions later in 2018. She ranked first out of eight candidates based on training, experience, and performance in a simulation exercise. The police chief, however, did not select Belcastro-Gonzalez for either position and instead chose the candidates who ranked second and fifth. Belcastro-Gonzalez brought a second charge of discrimination with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission and received a notice of her right to sue.
Belcastro-Gonzalez then brought this action alleging that the City retaliated against her for the protected activity of filing discrimination complaints. The district court denied the Citys motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial. A jury found in favor of Belcastro-Gonzalez and assessed $700,000 in damages. The court denied the Citys motion for judgment as a matter of law and awarded attorneys fees to Belcastro-Gonzalez.
II.
The Citys first argument seeks reversal of the district courts order denying the Citys motion for summary judgment. A district courts order denying summary judgment, however, is not reviewable after a trial on the merits. Eaddy v. Yancey, 317 F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2003). An unsuccessful movant must present the issues in a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and appeal from any denial of that motion. Dahlin v. Lyondell Chem. Co., 881 F.3d 599, 602-03 (8th Cir. 2018).
After Belcastro-Gonzalez filed her appellees brief, the City moved to amend its opening brief to restate the issue on appeal as a challenge to the district courts order denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law. The substance of the opening brief, however, challenges the denial of the Citys motion for summary judgment. The motion to recast the appeal comes too late. A change in course at this point would require a new round of briefing by both parties after the case has been fully briefed. We deny the motion to amend and reject the Citys challenge to the pretrial order denying a motion for summary judgment.
The City next argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence from proceedings before the Nebraska Employment Opportunity Commission. We review the courts ruling for abuse of discretion. Gruttemeyer v. Transit Auth., 31 F.4th 638, 643 (8th Cir. 2022).
During proceedings before the Commission, the City submitted a document that gave reasons for declining to promote Belcastro-Gonzalez. The City moved in limine to exclude that evidence at trial. The district court decided that evidence relating to the Commissions proceedings is generally inadmissible, but that some aspects of the proceeding could be admissible to rebut the Citys contention, or for impeachment purposes. The court reserved ruling on admissibility in this case.
At trial, the court admitted evidence that discussed the police chiefs response to the Commission on behalf of the City. When the police chief advanced reasons at trial that were not presented to the Commission, Belcastro-Gonzalez argued that the Citys new justifications for declining a promotion were not credible. The court did not preclude the City from offering its entire set of reasons for the promotion decision or from explaining why certain reasons may not have been presented to the Commission. The court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of the Citys potential inconsistency as a ground for impeachment of the police chiefs explanation at trial.
The City also challenges the amount of the attorneys fees award to Belcastro-Gonzalez. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), a court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorneys fees. We review the amount of fees awarded for abuse of discretion. Id. at 649.
The City maintains that plaintiffs counsel charged an unreasonable hourly rate, spent too much time on the case, and overbilled for certain tasks. The district court, however, permissibly concluded based on familiarity with rates in the area and counsels experience that the hourly rates were reasonable. See Miller v. Dugan, 764 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2014). The court found that the number of hours expended was reasonable for a case that “involved several thorny evidentiary issues,” as well as “extensive motion practice, discovery, and trial where the defendant mounted a vigorous defense.” We conclude that the courts determination was within the range of its discretion. After examining the timesheets, the court found that the tasks were identified with sufficient specificity and were appropriate uses of time by lawyers, paralegals, and law clerks. While it is debatable whether the plaintiffs legal team proceeded with maximum efficiency, we are not convinced that the district court abused its discretion by deeming the billing reasonable.
The City also contends that fees incurred during the administrative proceedings should not be included in the award. But because the work performed during the administrative proceedings was both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to pursue a retaliation claim under Title VII, the court properly included those fees. Bobbitt v. Paramount Cap Mfg. Co., 942 F.2d 512, 514 (8th Cir. 1991).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.
COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.