ORDER OF REVERSAL AND REMAND
This is an appeal from a district court order denying an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Gloria Sturman, Judge.
Respondents Fransisco Silva Reyes, Lucina Elizabeth Silva, and NVFS Multimedia (collectively, NVFS) sued appellant Andres Mendoza and others, alleging generally that Mendoza and others posted negative comments on Mendozas Facebook page regarding NVFS. Mendoza and two other defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that each comment was a “[c]ommunication made in direct connection with an issue of public interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum” and was “truthful or [was] made without knowledge of its falsehood.” NRS 41.637(4). The district court granted the motion with respect to the two other defendants but denied it with respect to Mendoza. In doing so, the district court reasoned that Mendoza had an “[o]bligation to make sure that the comments posted on his public news Facebook page are legitimate.”
Reversal is warranted. As a threshold matter, if the other defendants’ comments were entitled to anti-SLAPP protection, Mendoza should have likewise been entitled to such protection regardless of the applicability of 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (part of the Communications Decency Act). To the extent that the district court based its decision on comments that were not identified in NVFSs complaint, this was also error. See Spirtos v. Yemenidjian, 137 Nev. 711, 715, 499 P.3d 611, 616 (2021) (observing that an anti-SLAPP analysis should be premised on the communications alleged in the plaintiffs complaint). Finally, to the extent that NVFSs complaint alleged that Mendoza directly posted objectionable comments, NVFS did not and has not explained how those comments survive the anti-SLAPP statutes two-prong analysis. Stark v. Lackey, 136 Nev. 38, 40, 458 P.3d 342, 345 (2020) (explaining what the analysis under NRS 41.660(3) entails).
We caution the district court that findings and analysis are important to our appellate review. See Boonsong Jitnan v. Oliver, 127 Nev. 424, 433, 254 P.3d 623, 629 (2011). But despite the lack of findings and analysis in the district courts order, the record dictates our conclusion that Mendozas anti-SLAPP motion should be granted. Accordingly, on remand, we direct the district court to enter an order granting Mendozas anti-SLAPP motion. Consistent with the foregoing, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.
Herndon, J.
Lee, J.
Bell, J.