OPINION
Under the well-established Batson framework, “once a prima facie showing of discrimination is made, the nonmovant must come forward with a race-neutral explanation,” and if the nonmovant fails to “meet this burden, an equal protection violation is established” (People v. Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d 418, 422, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239, 786 N.E.2d 1275 [2003], citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 [1986]). “[T]he job of enforcing Batson rests first and foremost with trial judges” who are supposed to “operate at the front lines of American justice” (Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 302, 139 S.Ct. 2228, 204 L.Ed.2d 638 [2019]). A single violation of Batson “mandates automatic reversal” (People v. Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d 625, 661, 917 N.Y.S.2d 39, 942 N.E.2d 248 [2010]).
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Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree and second-degree robbery and sentenced to an aggregate of 12 years’ imprisonment, followed by five years of postrelease supervision. The Appellate Division affirmed (208 A.D.3d 799, 173 N.Y.S.3d 336 [2d Dept. 2022]). A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal (39 N.Y.3d 1078, 184 N.Y.S.3d 293, 204 N.E.3d 1074 [2023]). Defendant claims, as he did below, that the prosecution failed to provide any explanation, much less a race-neutral explanation, for its peremptory strike of prospective juror K.S. and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial. We agree.
Here, it is undisputed that defendant established a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the prosecutions exercise of a peremptory challenge against K.S., an African–American female, and that the burden then shifted to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral basis for its peremptory strike. The People failed to do so entirely (see People v. Bridgeforth, 28 N.Y.3d 567, 576, 69 N.E.3d 611 [2016]). Rather, the court stepped in to provide an explanation, speculating that the prosecution had gotten a “bad vibe” from K.S. regarding whether her prior jury service resulted in an acquittal. The prosecution remained silent. The court nevertheless ruled that the prosecution had “given a legitimate race neutral reason” for the strike.
This serious departure from the Batson framework was an error of the highest order. When the court supplied a race-neutral reason for the peremptory strike, it failed to hold the prosecution to its burden and instead, effectively became an advocate for the prosecution, thus abandoning its Batson-specific duty to “consider the prosecutors race-neutral explanations in light of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, and in light of the arguments of the parties” (Flowers, 588 U.S. at 302, 139 S.Ct. 2228 [emphasis added]). It is the nonmovants expressed explanation for its peremptory challenge—and whether such explanation is mere pretext for a race-based motive—not simply whether a race-neutral reason could theoretically exist—which is the focus of the Batson framework at steps two and three (see Batson, 476 U.S. at 97–98, 106 S.Ct. 1712; Flowers, 588 U.S. at 298, 302, 139 S.Ct. 2228; Smocum, 99 N.Y.2d at 422, 757 N.Y.S.2d 239, 786 N.E.2d 1275). The courts speculation as to the prosecutions basis for the strike was irrelevant and deprived defendant of any meaningful way to demonstrate pretext in the face of the prosecutions silence.
Based on our decision, we have no occasion to address defendants other arguments (Hecker, 15 N.Y.3d at 661, 917 N.Y.S.2d 39, 942 N.E.2d 248). Accordingly, the Appellate Division order should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
Order reversed and a new trial ordered.
RIVERA, J.:
Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Garcia, Singas, Cannataro, Troutman and Pritzker concur. Judge Halligan took no part.