ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
This is a pro se appeal of an order enforcing John Lucketts vexatious litigant status and an order setting aside entry of default, denying Ceasr O. Acostas (erroneously identified as Cesar OAcosta, Sr. and Cesar Acosta, Jr.) motion for attorney fees, and denying a post-judgment motion for sanctions. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge.
Our review of the documents submitted to this court pursuant to NRAP 3(g) reveals a jurisdictional defect. Specifically, it appears that the orders designated in the notice of appeal are not substantively appealable. See NRAP 3A(b). This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court rule. Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984). No statute or court rule provides for an appeal from a post-judgment order enforcing vexatious litigant status, a post-judgment order setting aside entry of default, or an order denying a post-judgment motion for sanctions. See Peck v. Crouser, 129 Nev. 120, 124, 295 P.3d 586, 588 (2013) (holding vexatious litigant orders are not independently appealable under NRAP 3A(b)); Gumm v. Mainor, 118 Nev. 912, 913-14, 59 P.3d 1220, 1221 (2002) (defining appealable special orders after final judgment as orders affecting the rights of some party to the action, growing out of the judgment previously entered). Further, appellant lacks standing to challenge the portion of the order denying Ceasr O. Acostas motion for attorney fees. See NRAP 3A(a). Accordingly, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction, and we
ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.
Stiglich, J.
Pickering, J.
Parraguirre, J.