OPINION
Police searched Tommy Kirtdolls house with a warrant that was largely accurate. Nonetheless, Kirtdoll argues the warrants few mistakes rendered the search unconstitutional. The district court disagreed, and so do we.
I.
In southwest Michigan, detectives on a multijurisdictional task force were investigating Tommy Kirtdoll. They believed he was leading a drug-trafficking organization. While an undercover detective facilitated drug deals with Kirtdoll and his girlfriend, other task force members followed the pair as they traveled to and from the deals.
After each sale, Kirtdoll or his girlfriend returned to the same house. Once the task force had witnessed several deals, the undercover detective sought a search warrant for that house. The warrant application contained a detailed physical and geographic description. It explained that the house was the first one on the north side of Lizzi Street—a light blue, single-story home with white trim, bordering Carberry Road to the west. The front door faced south, and the driveway extended in the same direction toward Lizzi Street. A red star decorated the houses west side. The detective also explained that the house was “commonly referred to as 893 Carberry Road,” and he included the houses tax identification number. R. 38-1, Pg. ID 75. Finally, the application noted the property owners name was Ruthie Cross.
A Michigan judge authorized the warrant. When officers executed it, they found drugs and distribution equipment. Based on that evidence, a federal grand jury indicted Kirtdoll on multiple drug offenses relating to methamphetamine, cocaine, and cocaine base.
Kirtdoll moved to suppress the evidence, citing three errors in the warrant. First, Kirtdolls address was not 893 Carberry Road. That address belonged to a house adjacent to Kirtdolls. Second, the tax identification number in the warrant transposed two digits. That mistaken number corresponded to the actual 893 Carberry Road. And third, Ruthie Cross owned the property at 893 Carberry Road, not Kirtdolls house. In Kirtdolls view, those mistakes created an unreasonably high likelihood that 893 Carberry would be searched instead of his own property. Thus, he argued, the warrant lacked particularity. See U.S. Const. amend. IV.
The district court denied Kirtdolls motion. It held that the warrants other accurate descriptors were particular enough to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. Kirtdoll then pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district courts denial.
II.
We review the warrants particularity de novo. United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Fourth Amendment requires search warrants to “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. That means they need enough detail for the executing officer to “ascertain and identify the place intended” with “reasonable effort.” Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, 69 L.Ed. 757 (1925). This requirement doesnt mandate perfection. See United States v. Wagoner, 836 F. Appx 374, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2020); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). Instead, we ask whether the warrant was so flawed that it created a “reasonable probability” officers would search the wrong premises. See United States v. Abdalla, 972 F.3d 838, 846–47 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that the mere possibility of a mistaken search doesnt violate the Fourth Amendment). That will almost never be the case when the warrant contains some information that “indisputably applie[s]” only to the target premises, even if “many descriptors in the warrant” are inaccurate. * Wagoner, 836 F. Appx at 379.
A.
Kirtdoll argues that the warrants incorrect address, tax number, and ownership information rendered it insufficiently particular. His challenge fails. The warrant sufficed because it contained three descriptors that indisputably applied only to Kirtdolls house and clearly identified it as the premises to be searched.
First, the warrant unambiguously described the houses geographic location. It explained that the house was “the first structure on the north side of Lizzi Street” and was on the “east side of Carberry Road.” R. 38-1, Pg. ID 75. The warrant also noted that Kirtdolls front door faced south, and his driveway ran the same direction from the house to Lizzi Street. As Kirtdoll himself pointed out, that description couldnt have applied to 893 Carberry. Thats because 893 Carberry “does not have a driveway accessible off Lizzi[ ] Street.” R. 38, Pg. ID 70. Thus, the warrant contained “detailed directions” to Kirtdolls house that couldnt have led officers anywhere else. See Abdalla, 972 F.3d at 846–47.
Second, the warrant gave a detailed description of Kirtdolls house. It described the house as a “one-story, single-family dwelling” painted light blue with white trim. R. 38-1, Pg. ID 75. Weve repeatedly pointed to layout and color when upholding otherwise faulty search warrants. See, e.g., Abdalla, 972 F.3d at 846 (“white double wide trailer with a green front porch and a black shingle roof”); United States v. Pelayo-Landero, 285 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he warrant describes the particular trailer by color, by a certain exterior trim, and by a wooden deck.”); Bucio-Cabrales, 635 F. Appx at 332–33 (“[s]ingle-family, two-story residence with tan brick and tan siding”). As in those cases, the warrants inclusion of layout and color gave officers on the ground a clear picture of the target house. Thats especially true here, as the only incorrect house Kirtdoll thinks officers couldve searched—893 Carberry—is white, not blue. Thus, the warrants description of Kirtdolls house rendered the likelihood that officers would mistakenly search 893 Carberry “practically nil.” Abdalla, 972 F.3d at 846.
Finally, the warrant included a unique, unmistakable identifier. It stated that Kirtdolls house had a red star affixed to its west side. Unique identifiers like decorations are especially informative; geographic directions can be unclear, and multiple houses in a neighborhood might look similar. Cf. United States v. Durk, 149 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 1998). But a unique decoration or lawn feature sets otherwise similar houses apart. Thats why, for example, we upheld the warrant in Durk. There, the warrant both misstated the targets address and gave the wrong geographic location. See id. at 465–66. The warrant did describe the house as a “single family red brick ranch home,” but “brick, ranch style homes” were “common” in the neighborhood. Id. Despite those inaccuracies and ambiguities—far more severe than the ones here—the propertys unique metal storage shed left executing officers no doubt about which property to search. Id. at 466; see also Abdalla, 972 F.3d at 846 (explaining that a “unique sign” helped distinguish the target property). Just so here. The red star identified Kirtdolls house with pinpoint precision.
The warrant for Kirtdolls house was amply specific to clear the Fourth Amendments particularity hurdle. Accordingly, the district court properly denied Kirtdolls motion to suppress.
B.
Kirtdolls only counterargument relies on Knott v. Sullivan. 418 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2005). There, we held that a search warrant lacked particularity when “virtually every descriptor” of the vehicle to be searched was inaccurate. Id. at 569. Far from a slight error like “the mere transposition of digits,” the make, model, vehicle identification number, and license plate number were all wrong. Id. at 569–70. Indeed, the warrants only correct information was the cars general location in a sheriffs offices garage. But even that information was flawed; it could have easily referred to another vehicle owned by a member of the defendants family. Id. Kirtdoll argues that the warrant here is just as flawed as the one in Knott.
Not so. The numerous descriptors accurately identifying Kirtdolls house—and only his house—stand in stark contrast to the circumstances in Knott. There, the warrant was devoid of any accurate information beyond the targets general location in a garage—hardly a limiting descriptor. Whats more, the warrant in Knott could have been referring to either of two vehicles belonging to the family under investigation. So not only did the warrant lack detail, but the information it did include created an unreasonable likelihood the wrong car would be searched. Here, by contrast—given the accurate, detailed appearance and location descriptors the warrant included—the inaccurate tax identification number and owner were unlikely to lead executing officers astray. Thus, Kirtdoll finds no support in Knott.
* * *
We affirm.
FOOTNOTES
FOOTNOTE
. Ordinarily, we limit our review of a warrants constitutionality to its four corners. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 81 F.4th 640, 646 (6th Cir. 2023). But our particularity cases routinely consider a warrants context. See, e.g., Abdalla, 972 F.3d at 846–47 (highlighting the officers role as both executing officer and affiant); Wagoner, 836 F. Appx at 379 (contrasting the warrants description of target property with “other structures on the property” to show particularity); United States v. Bucio-Cabrales, 635 F. Appx 324, 332 (6th Cir. 2016) (explaining why the target apartment was “readily distinguishable” from incorrect property listed in the warrant). Thats for good reason. The particularity inquiry focuses on the executing officers perspective, asking whether the officer could accurately identify the target property with the information he had. Its often difficult to answer that question without considering context. For example, a warrant for a blue house would be crystal clear in a neighborhood of red apartments but insolubly ambiguous in a neighborhood of blue houses.
THAPAR, Circuit Judge.