DISSENTING OPINION
Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed May 16, 2024.
In this appeal the question is raised concerning the Marin category of “[w]hether evidence of statements by [appellant] should be suppressed for failure to comply with various parts of Family Code 51.095.” The majority correctly states that the supreme court has applied the Marin analysis to civil proceedings under the Juvenile Justice Code. See In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Tex. 1999) (discussing Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 278–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). And the majority answers the question. But where is the analysis?
The majority does cite two cases to support that conclusion—Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312–13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) and In re A.A.M., 414 S.W.3d 387, 389–90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). However, neither of those cases performs a Marin analysis, let alone cites Marin.
Although it is tempting to assume that the Resendez or A.A.M opinions impliedly performed a Marin analysis, we cannot logically make such an assumption. The Marin analysis may not have been raised in those appeals by the parties. Or perhaps, those courts simply did not recognize a need to conduct the analysis. In any event, we simply dont know what those courts were thinking other than what we can read in their opinions.
We write an appellate opinion to explain why we rendered the judgment. When the explanation is missing, that portion of the opinion cannot serve as precedent for what isnt there. This is the logical fallacy of “argument from silence.” See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Railroad Commn of Tex., 660 S.W.2d 112, 122 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ refd n.r.e.). Not surprisingly, advocates still routinely make the argument that the appellate court silently considered issue x and reached an unstated conclusion that would justify the courts judgment.
Its our job to write opinions that explain our judgments, and I reach a different conclusion about such a purported absent analysis, i.e., I believe an appellate court fails to follow Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1 in issuing opinions that dont address every issue raised and necessary to the disposition of the appeals.
The majority has failed to hand down a proper written opinion. This court can—and should—write an opinion that analyzes the Marin classification issue.
I dissent.
Charles A. Spain Justice