The defendant below, University of Miami d/b/a University of Miami Hospital (“the University”), petitions this Court for a second writ of certiorari,
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seeking to quash the trial courts order denying its motion to dismiss the plaintiff, Shanay Hall Joness (“Jones”) ,complaint for failure to comply with the pre-suit requirements of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes. For the following reasons, we deny the petition.
As an initial matter, the University contends that certiorari relief is warranted because the trial court adopted Joness proposed order verbatim. “At a minimum, [section 766.206(1)] require[s that] the trial court make an express finding as to [the claimants] compliance with the presuit requirements.” PP Transition, LP v. Munson, 232 So. 3d 515, 516 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). Thus, the University alleges that the trial court could not adopt Joness proposed order outright.
Trial courts are not precluded from adopting a partys proposed order, so long as the order does not “substitute for a thoughtful and independent analysis of the facts, issues, and law by the trial judge.” Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383, 388–390 (Fla. 2004). Here, the record reflects that the trial judge did not adopt Joness proposed order without thought or analysis. The trial court permitted both parties to call and question witnesses at the evidentiary hearing and to submit proposed orders, several days before ruling. As such, the court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law.
Next, the University cites to Otto v. Rodriguez, 710 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), to argue that its failure to provide medical records did not waive all of Joness pre-suit requirements under section 766.106, Florida Statutes (2023).
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The University is correct in that regard, yet, in Otto, the claimant provided no notice whatsoever. Otto, 710 So. 2d at 2–3. In contrast, here, Jones afforded the University with notice. “[Chapter 766] does not require any particular form for the notice or any ‘magic words.’ Any manner of written notice which describes the occurrence underlying the claim should suffice.” Tracey v. Barrett, 550 So. 2d 558, 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Here, the trial court found that the notice was sufficient given the limited information available,
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and concluded that Jones complied with the pre-suit notice requirements. The trial court did not depart from the essential requirements of the law in making these findings.
Accordingly, we deny the petition.
FOOTNOTES
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. In University of Miami v. Jones, 338 So. 3d 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022), this Court quashed the trial courts December 8, 2021 order because it failed to make an express finding on Joness compliance with the statutory requirements. Id. at 403. Here, the University seeks review of a subsequent order, entered after the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter.
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. Chapter 766 contains several prerequisites to filing a medical malpractice action. See, e.g., § 766.104(1), Fla. Stat. (2023); § 766.106(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023); § 766.203(2), Fla. Stat. (2023).
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. The University failed to comply with Joness requests for medical records, waiving the requirement for a corroborating medical expert opinion. See § 766.204(2), Fla. Stat. (2023).
PER CURIAM.