MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] Lawrence C. Dent appeals the four-year sentence that was imposed following his guilty plea to domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony. Dent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him because it failed to identify mitigating factors that were supported by the record and found improper aggravating circumstances.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On July 31, 2022, A.L. took her cousins—fifteen-year-old D.W. and eleven-year-old R.W.—to a restaurant in Pike County. During the meal, the children told A.L. about several disturbing incidents of physical and emotional abuse that involved Dent, who was engaged to their mother, Tina Bartley. Both children lived with Bartley and Dent—who had been together for about five years—and they considered Dent their stepfather.
[4] R.W. related an incident to A.L. that occurred about a week earlier when he called Dent a “dude.” Appellants Appendix Vol. II at 22. Dent became angry about the comment, grabbed an airsoft gun, and shot R.W. multiple times in the thigh, back, and buttocks. R.W. also told A.L. about instances when Dent physically and verbally abused Bartley throughout the course of their relationship. R.W. told A.L. of an occasion where Dent physically confined Bartley and told her that he was going to have his father rape her and described incidents during which Dent choked Bartley and shoved her into the walls. R.W. also reported to A.L. that Dent had beaten the family dog with a piece of wood. D.W. told A.L. about Dents abuse of Bartley that included instances where Dent held a knife to Bartleys throat and threatened to kill her.
[5] Following the conversation with D.W. and R.W., A.L. messaged her mother, Brandi Loveless, and told her that the children needed to talk with her about Dent and the incidents of abuse. Loveless subsequently picked up R.W. and D.W. and drove them to the Pike County Sheriffs Department to be interviewed. When they arrived at the Sheriffs Department, Loveless advised Deputy Clint Bogar that the children were initially scared to discuss the incidents involving Dent because they were afraid that he would hurt them if he discovered that they had reported the abuse.
[6] During the interview, R.W. told Deputy Bogar and another officer about the airsoft gun episode. R.W. displayed the week-old bruises to the deputies and told them that they were extremely painful. The children also recounted the incidents to the officers that they had described to A.L.
[7] Following the interview, Deputy Bogar reported the matter to the Indiana Department of Child Services and commenced an investigation. Deputy Bogar obtained a search warrant for Dent and Bartleys residence, and while executing the warrant, the sheriffs deputies seized an airsoft gun, which was the same make and model that police departments typically use for training officers to experience the feeling of being shot by an actual bullet.
[8] The State charged Dent with Count I, domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony, as follows:
[On] or about one week prior to July 31, 2022 in Pike County, State of Indiana, LAWRENCE CURTIS DENT did knowingly or intentionally touch R.W., a household member, in a rude insolent or angry manner by shooting him in the thigh and buttocks; said touching being committed with a deadly weapon, an airsoft gun, and all which is contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided by I.C. 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) and I.C. 35-42-2-1.3(c)(2) and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
Appellants Appendix Vol. II at 19. Dent was also charged with Count II, domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a person less than fourteen years of age, a level 5 felony:
On or about a week prior July 31, 2022 in Pike County, State of Indiana, LAWRENCE CURTIS DENT, a person at least eighteen (l8) years of age, to-wit: 38 years old, did knowingly or intentionally touch R.W., a person who is eleven (11) years old and a person who was a household member, in a rude insolent or angry manner by shooting R.W. with an airsoft gun resulting in bodily injury, causing bruising to the thigh and buttocks, all of which is contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided by I.C. 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1)and I.C.35-42-2-1.3(c)(5)(A) and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana.
Id. at 20.
[9] On September 5, 2023, Dent pled guilty to Count I, pursuant to a plea agreement that capped the sentence at four years of executed time. The State dismissed Count II.
[10] The trial court reviewed the presentence investigation report that included Dents criminal history. Dent had amassed seven misdemeanor convictions and two felony convictions. The felony convictions were for sexual misconduct with a minor, a Class B felony, and domestic battery, a Level 5 felony.
[11] At the sentencing hearing on November 13, 2023, the trial court identified the following aggravating factors:
--The harm, injury or damage suffered by [R.W.] was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.
--[Dent] has a history of criminal or delinquent behavior.
--[R.W.] was less than twelve (12) years of age ․ [when Dent] committed the offense.
--[Dent] was in a position of having care, custody, or control of [R.W.], the victim of the offense.
Id. at 73.
[12] At the hearing, Dent proffered the following as mitigating factors: his cooperation with police, his one and one-half year of sobriety, his difficult childhood, the lack of a juvenile record, the hardship that incarceration would have on his dependents, and his employment. The trial court rejected those proposed mitigators and identified Dents decision to plead guilty as the sole mitigating circumstance. The trial court then sentenced Dent to serve four years
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at the Wabash Valley Community Corrections Work Release Facility.
[13] Dent now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[14] In general, sentencing decisions are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial courts decision only for an abuse of discretion. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on rehg, 875 N.E.2d 218.
[15] A trial court may abuse its discretion by: (1) failing to enter a sentencing statement at all; (2) entering a sentencing statement that includes aggravating and mitigating factors that are unsupported by the record; (3) entering a sentencing statement that omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record; or (4) entering a sentencing statement that includes reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91. The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491. Generally, a single aggravator is sufficient to support an enhanced sentence. See Trusley v. State, 829 N.E.2d 923, 927 (Ind. 2005).
II. Mitigating Circumstances
[16] Dent argues that he must be resentenced because the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider his proposed mitigating circumstances. The determination of mitigating circumstances is within the trial courts discretion, and it is not obligated to accept the defendants argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor. Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The trial court is also not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant. Id. An allegation that the trial court failed to find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. The trial court is not required to explain why it does not find a proffered factor to be mitigating. See id.
[17] Although Dent contends that the trial court overlooked his proposed mitigating factors, the record shows that the trial court indeed considered them at the sentencing hearing and rejected them. Moreover, Dent has failed to make any argument establishing the significance of most of his proposed mitigators, and he has not established any nexus between the suggested mitigating factors and the charged offense. Thus, those claims are waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a); see also Wingate v. State, 900 N.E.2d 468, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a party waives an issue when he fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority and portions of the record).
[18] Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court is not required to consider a defendants period of sobriety as mitigating. Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Furthermore, Dent did not present any independent evidence of his alleged sobriety tenure; nor did he claim that he had entered and/or successfully completed any recovery programs for his alcohol or drug abuse. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to identify Dents alleged sobriety as a mitigating factor.
[19] There is also no requirement that a trial court must identify a defendants cooperation with police as a mitigator. When the decision to cooperate comes after arrest or apprehension, it is a pragmatic decision. Smith v. State, 929 N.E.2d 255, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
[20] Additionally, the trial court is not obligated to identify a defendants employment as a mitigating factor, as “many people are gainfully employed.” See Holmes v. State, 86 N.E.3d 394, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. And because Dent was employed at his current job for less than six months before he was sentenced, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in not considering Dents employment as a mitigating factor. See id. (observing that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the defendants employment “for only a couple of months” prior to the commission of the offense was not a mitigating factor).
[21] Although Dent claims that the trial court should have identified his alleged troubled childhood as a mitigating circumstance, the record does not establish any nexus between his difficult upbringing and the charged offense. Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that evidence of a difficult childhood warrants little, if any, mitigating weight. Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Ind. 2024).
[22] Dent also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not identifying the hardship that his family members would endure if he was incarcerated. As many individuals convicted of serious crimes have one or more children, courts are “not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship,” absent special circumstances. Dowdell v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1146, 1154 (Ind. 1999). Here, it was established that Dents son, B.B., has medical issues; however, Dent does not have custody of B.B. Moreover, the evidence showed that B.B.’s mother had arranged for childcare even before Dent was incarcerated. Dent worked from forty to sixty hours per week and on occasion, he would travel out of state for weeks at a time. Given these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to identify as a mitigator the undue hardship that Dents incarceration would have on his family.
[23] Finally, although Dent maintains that the trial court should have identified his lack of a juvenile record as a mitigating circumstance, Dent has a lengthy adult criminal history that includes convictions for battery, intimidation, and sexual misconduct with a minor. Dent has continued to reoffend, despite having been granted leniency from the courts on previous occasions. He has been placed on probation seven times, and he successfully completed probation only twice. In light of these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to identify Dents lack of juvenile history as a mitigating circumstance.
III. Aggravating Factors
[24] Dent claims that the trial court abused its discretion in identifying aggravating factors other than his criminal history. Dent contends that the aggravating factors that the trial court relied upon to enhance his sentence were improper and “not supported by the evidence.” Appellants Brief at 9.
[25] The focus of Dents argument is that the trial court improperly identified the elements of the offense as an aggravating factor. As a general principle, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to use an element of the offense as an aggravating circumstance to justify an enhanced sentence. Salhab v. State, 153 N.E.3d 298, 304 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). The nature and particularized circumstances of a crime is, however, a valid aggravating factor. Buford v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1074, 1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
[26] At the sentencing hearing, the trial court pointed to the evidence establishing that Dent—whom R.W. regarded as his stepfather—shot eleven-year-old R.W. multiple times with an airsoft gun that caused intense pain and bruising. The trial court further observed that Dent was in a position of care, custody, or control of R.W. when he committed the crime, and that R.W. was afraid to demand that Dent stop out of fear that Dent would continue to shoot him. The trial court also pointed out that the gun was of a type that is used during police officer training to show rookie officers how it feels to be shot with an actual bullet.
[27] Dent pled guilty to Count I, domestic battery pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-42-1.3(a)(1)(c)(2), which makes it a criminal offense to knowingly or intentionally “touch a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or anger manner by means of a deadly weapon.” As the statute dictates, one element of the offense is that the victim is a family or household member. The victim is not required to be of a particular age or under the care, custody, or control, of the defendant. The aggravators that the trial court identified were not elements of the charged offense. Rather, the trial court properly considered the particularized circumstances of the crime. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion.
[28] Judgment affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is from one to six years with an advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6.
Altice, Chief Judge.
Bailey, J. and Mathias, J., concur.