MEMORANDUM DECISION
Statement of the Case
[1] Kurt Banter violated the terms of his probation by failing to report a change in his address and by committing a new criminal offense. Consequently, the trial court revoked his probation. Banter now appeals and raises a single issue for review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the revocation of his probation.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On February 1, 2022, in Cause Number 32D01-2108-F6-148 (“Cause 148”), Banter pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony, and the trial court sentenced him to 730 days executed at the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”), with 365 days suspended to probation. As a condition of his probation, Banter agreed to “not commit any other criminal offense”; “at all times, [to] keep the Probation Department advised of [his] current address”; to “notify the Probation Department within twenty-four (24) hours of any change in address”; and to “not use drugs or controlled substances unless prescribed by a physician.” Appellants App. Vol. II at 58–59. Banters probation was set to end on February 24, 2023.
[4] Banter had reported to his probation officer Todd Miller, that his address was 11261 West 900 North, Montpelier, Indiana. In January 2023, Miller received information from law enforcement that Banter was staying at 195 East Liberty Street, Pennville, Indiana. Banter had not reported his change in address to the probation department. On January 24, 2023, Miller went to check whether Banter was staying at the Liberty Street property. That same day, law enforcement searched the Liberty Street property and found methamphetamine and marijuana.
[5] Two days later, based on the discovery of those drugs, the State charged Banter with one count of possession of methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony and one count of possession of marijuana as a Class B misdemeanor, in Cause 38D01-2301-F6-16 (“Cause 16”). After a jury trial in Cause 16, Banter was convicted of possession of methamphetamine as a Level 6 felony.
[6] On February 2, 2023, while the charges in Cause 16 were pending, the State filed a petition to revoke Banters probation in Cause 148, alleging that Banter violated the terms of his probation by committing a new criminal offense, not notifying his probation officer of his current address within 24 hours, and testing positive for illegal drugs. At the evidentiary hearing on that petition, which occurred after the Defendant was convicted in the jury trial in Cause 16, Banter admitted that he had stayed overnight at the Liberty Street property once, more specifically, he admitted to staying at the residence four days before the search. He also admitted to being at the residence the day before the search “to get my clothes.” Tr. Vol. II at 13. John Bartlett, the owner of the Liberty Street property, testified that Banter had worked with him “off and on,” id. at 20, and that he had seen Banter at the Liberty Street property after hours “a time or two,” id. at 22. Bartlett believed that Banter “mostly lived” with his mother, because Bartlett had picked up and dropped off Banter there “quite a few times.” Id. at. 21. Banters mothers address did not match the address Banter had provided to his probation officer either. Also at the hearing, the trial court took judicial notice of Cause 16.
[7] The trial court found that Banter “failed to behave well and not to commit any other criminal offense and failed to notify probation of his current address.” Appellants App. Vol. II at 84. The trial court revoked Banters probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in Cause 148 in the DOC. Banter now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Support the Revocation of Banters Probation
[8] Banter argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support the trial courts decision to revoke his probation. We review a trial courts probation revocation decision for an abuse of discretion, which “occurs ‘where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.’ ” Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). “A probation hearing is civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995)). A trial court may revoke a persons probation for a single violation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1); Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)), rehg denied (July 11, 2023), trans. denied, 220 N.E.3d 54 (Ind. 2023). When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the States evidence at a probation revocation hearing, “we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment—without regard to weight or credibility—and will affirm if ‘there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial courts conclusion that a probationer has violated any condition of probation.’ ” Murdock, 10 N.E.3d at 1267 (quoting Braxton, 651 N.E.2d at 270).
[9] Banter specifically argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support the trial courts findings that he violated the terms of his probation by failing to report his change of address and by committing a new criminal offense. We address each argument in turn.
[10] First, Banter contends that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he failed to notify probation about his change of address. The evidence most favorable to the trial courts judgment shows that Banter had reported his residential address to be 900 North in Montpelier. However, Banter was staying at 195 East Liberty Street in Pennville, which he had not reported to the probation officer. Banter admitted that he had stayed overnight at that location on January 20. On more than one occasion, Bartlett found Banter at the Liberty Street property after hours. Additionally, Bartlett testified that he believed Banter “mostly lived” at his moms house because Bartlett had picked up and taken Banter there “quite a few times.” Tr. Vol. II at 21. In light of these facts, we conclude that there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial courts conclusion that Banter violated his probation by failing to notify the probation department of his change of address.
[11] Second, Banter claims that if his conviction in Cause 16 is reversed on appeal, then it cannot be used to support the trial courts revocation of his probation. Where, as here, “the State alleges that the defendant violated probation by committing a new criminal offense, the State is required to prove—by a preponderance of the evidence—that the defendant committed the offense.” Hammann, 210 N.E.3d at 833 (quoting Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179, 1183 (2021)).
A criminal conviction is prima facie evidence of a violation and will alone support a revocation of probation. Gleason v. State, 634 N.E.2d 67, 68–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Subsequent criminal convictions have frequently supported probation revocation. See, e.g., Sheron v. State, 682 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). In Gleason v. State, although we reversed on other grounds, this court found a conviction in Michigan would have been sufficient to support revocation of probation. Gleason, 634 N.E.2d at 68.
Williams v. State, 695 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
[12] It is unnecessary for us to review whether the State presented sufficient evidence in proving the new criminal conduct occurred because Banters conviction in Cause 16 has already been affirmed by another panel of this court. See Banter v. State, No. 23A-CR-2922, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. June 5, 2024) (mem.). Banter appealed his conviction in Cause 16 based only upon the fact that he was convicted by a five-member jury after the sixth juror left midway through the trial; he did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction. Id. ¶¶ 4–8.
[13] Based on the foregoing, the State presented sufficient evidence to show that Banter committed two violations of his probation rules, and either one of these violations was enough for the trial court to revoke his probation, see Hammann, 210 N.E.3d at 833 (quoting Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d at 582). Therefore, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Banters probation, and we affirm that decision.
[14] Affirmed.
Felix, Judge.
Riley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.