MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] Christopher R. Hale was convicted of seven offenses stemming from an automobile accident, including level 6 felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) with a prior conviction within seven years. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of two years of jail time and imposed a two-year suspension of his driving privileges. He appeals the suspension and challenges the constitutionality of a related statute. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the suspension and that Hales constitutional challenge is waived, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At 11:00 a.m. on November 7, 2020, a neighbor of Hales father reported to the Gibson County Sheriffs Department (GCSD) that an individual driving an SUV had backed into the fathers mobile home, appeared intoxicated, was wearing “black underwear and shorts[,]” and was “talking and yelling at himself[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 81. Deputy Zachary Lienemann responded to the dispatch, and as he approached the reported location, he saw an SUV with no license plate “leaving the area[.]” Id. at 82. The deputy initiated a traffic stop, and the SUVs driver, later determined to be Hale, “tried ducking” the deputy by pulling into a driveway. Id. The deputy maneuvered his vehicle behind Hales, approached Hales vehicle, and saw that Hale was wearing “just a pair of boxer-style underwear” and flip-flop sandals. Id. at 84. Hale, “incoherent” and “talking nonsense[,]” identified himself as “Charles Leak.” Id. When Deputy Lienemann asked Hale if he “had his license, registration, and insurance[,]” Hale replied, “I wish I could produce those” and then began “digging around in the vehicle.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
[3] Deputy Lienemann ordered Hale to exit the vehicle and then read Hale his Miranda rights and handcuffed him. The deputy obtained Hales true identity from the SUVs vehicle identification number and the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) record, and he discovered that Hales drivers license was suspended. Deputy Lienemann told Hale that he believed that Hale was “under the influence of some intoxication” and offered Hale a field sobriety test. Id. at 87. Hale replied that “there was no question that he was intoxicated[,]” and he admitted that he was “under the influence[.]” Id. The deputy read Hale Indianas implied consent law and offered him a chemical test, which Hale refused.
[4] Deputy Lienemann placed Hale in the back of his police cruiser, and he and another deputy who had arrived at the scene searched Hales vehicle per the GCSD impound procedure. The deputies found small bottles of whisky, beer cans, THC edibles, syringes, rolling papers, a digital scale, and what later testing confirmed to be 5.36 grams of marijuana.
[5] Deputy Lienemann transported Hale to a hospital, again read Hale the Indiana implied consent law, and offered him a second chance to submit to a chemical test. Hale “still refused.” Id. at 122. After a doctor medically cleared Hale, Deputy Lienemann transported Hale to jail.
[6] On November 9, 2020, the State charged Hale with level 6 felony OWI under Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-2(a) (providing that “a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Class C misdemeanor”) and Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-3(a)(1) (providing that OWI is a level 6 felony if “the person has a previous conviction of operating while intoxicated that occurred within the seven (7) years immediately preceding the occurrence of the violation of section 1 or 2 of this chapter”). The State alleged that Hale had been previously convicted of OWI in April 2014.
[7] Hale was also charged with level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe, class A misdemeanor driving while suspended with a prior conviction, class A misdemeanor dealing in marijuana, class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, class B misdemeanor criminal mischief, and class C misdemeanor refusal to identify, as well as infractions for operating a motor vehicle without financial responsibility, operating a motor vehicle without a license, improper display of license plate, operating with an expired plate, failure to signal, and failure to provide vehicle registration certificate. Later, the State charged Hale with class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana with a prior conviction.
[8] At the initial hearing held on November 10, 2020, the trial court suspended Hales driving privileges for refusing to submit to a chemical test following the November 7 automobile accident and traffic stop (the First Suspension). That same day, the court issued an order stating in relevant part that
[t]he Court has found probable cause that [Hale] has committed a crime in violation of IC 9-30-5, [concerning offenses involving OWI] ․. Therefore, at this initial hearing, pursuant to IC 9-30-6-8(c), [concerning the suspension of driving privileges,1] the Court recommends to the [BMV] the immediate suspension of [Hales] driving privileges, such suspension to take effect this date.
Appellees App. Vol. 2 at 2.
[9] Following a bench trial held on December 5, 2023, the trial court found Hale guilty of OWI with a prior conviction, possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana with a prior conviction, refusal to identify, improper display of license plate, failure to signal, and failure to provide vehicle registration certificate. Hale was found not guilty of the remaining charges. The State dismissed the operating a vehicle without financial responsibility charge. At sentencing, held on January 4, 2024, the court merged the marijuana convictions, finding one to be a lesser-included offense of the other. Hale was sentenced to jail time, specifically, concurrent terms of two years for OWI with a prior conviction, one year for possession of marijuana, and sixty days for refusal to identify. The court also ordered an additional two-year suspension of Hales driving privileges, effective January 4, 2024 (the Second Suspension). Hale now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Hale contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed the Second Suspension because the Second Suspension and the First Suspension were ordered to be served consecutively with no credit time awarded. The State counters that the trial court “was required to impose [the Second Suspension] at sentencing without any credit for ․ and consecutive to his [First Suspension]” because Hales First Suspension was for the refusal to submit to a chemical test, and he had been convicted at trial of OWI with a prior conviction. Appellees Br. at 12.
[11] “Sentencing is a discretionary function of the trial court, which we review only for an abuse of discretion.” Scott v. State, 162 N.E.3d 578, 581 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “A trial court abuses its discretion if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. at 582 (citation and quotation marks omitted). To the extent that this case rests upon statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. See Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind. 2010).
Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the Second Suspension that was ordered to be served consecutive to and not current with the First Suspension with no credit time awarded.
[12] Hales First Suspension was imposed under Indiana Code Section 9-30-6-9(b) (2015), the statute applicable to a person who refuses to submit to a chemical test. His Second Suspension was imposed under Indiana Code Sections 9-30-16-1(c) (2020) and 9-30-16-2, which apply to the suspension of driving privileges for OWI. Indiana Code Section 9-30-16-1(c) provides in relevant part:
Except as specifically provided in this chapter, a court may suspend the driving privileges of a person convicted of any of the following offenses for a period up to the maximum allowable period of incarceration under the penalty for the offense:
(1) Any criminal conviction in which the operation of a motor vehicle is an element of the offense.
(2) Any criminal conviction for an offense under IC 9-30-5[, the OWI chapter.]
(Emphasis added); see Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b) (setting maximum sentence for a level 6 felony at two and one-half years). Indiana Code Section 9-30-16-2(a) provides in relevant part that “[t]he court shall order that the driving privileges of a person are suspended for a period of at least one (1) year for a person convicted of ․ [a]n offense under IC 9-30-5 when the person has a prior conviction for an offense under IC 9-30-5.” (Emphasis added).
[13] Hale does not contest the trial courts authority to suspend his driving privileges or the length of the suspension imposed. Indeed, he acknowledges that the trial court was required to suspend his driving privileges for at least one year because he has a prior conviction for OWI. See Ind. Code § 9-30-16-2(a); see also Appellants Br. at 17. Instead, he argues that the First and Second Suspensions should have been served concurrently and that the courts imposition of consecutive suspensions with no credit time awarded violated Indiana Code Section 9-30-16-1(d).
[14] Indiana Code Section 9-30-16-1(d) provides that “[m]ultiple suspensions of driving privileges ordered by a court that are part of the same episode of criminal conduct shall be served concurrently[,]” and a court “may grant credit time for any suspension that began before the conviction, except as prohibited by section 6(a)(2) of this chapter.” (Emphases added.) Indiana Code Section 9-30-16-6(a)(2) provides that “[a] person whose driving privileges are suspended under section 1(c) of this chapter may not receive any credit for days during which the persons driving privileges were suspended under IC 9-30-6-9(b)[, concerning the refusal to submit to a chemical test].” (Emphasis added.) Section 6(b) provides that “a period of suspension of driving privileges imposed under section 1(c) of this chapter must be consecutive to any period of suspension imposed under IC 9-30-6-9(b).” (Emphasis added.)
[15] Thus, the crux of Hales argument is that the Second Suspension was imposed per Indiana Code Section 9-30-16-2(a) and not per Section 16-1(c), and therefore the Section 16-6(a)(2) exception that prohibits applying credit time “is inapplicable in his case.” Appellants Br. at 22. In other words, according to Hale, the two suspensions should have run concurrently, and the trial court should have awarded him credit time for the days his driving privileges were suspended under the First Suspension. We cannot agree.
[16] Under Section 16-2(a), the trial court was required to suspend Hales driving privileges for at least one year, based on his conviction of OWI with a prior conviction. And based on that conviction, the court had the discretion under Section 16-1(c) to suspend Hales driving privileges up to the “maximum allowable period of incarceration” for his offense, that being two and one-half years. Ind. Code § 9-30-16-1(c); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). The court ultimately determined that the Second Suspension would run for two years, consecutive to the First Suspension, and with no credit time awarded, as the court lacked the authority to award any credit for the days during which Hales driving privileges were suspended for refusing to submit to a chemical test. See Ind. Code §§ 9-30-16-6(a)(2), -(b). The court did not err in making its determination.
[17] Furthermore, we are unpersuaded by Hales argument that Sections 16-2(a) and 16-1(c) are ambiguous and thus subject to judicial interpretation. In construing statutes, the primary goal is to give effect to the legislatures intent. D.P. v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1210, 1216 (Ind. 2020). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, and the words in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated by the statute. Erkins v. State, 13 N.E.3d 400, 407 (Ind. 2014); State v. Oddi-Smith, 878 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Ind. 2008). If the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is not subject to judicial interpretation and must be held to mean what it plainly says. D.P., 151 N.E.3d at 1216. This Court presumes that the legislature intended for the statutory language to be applied in a logical manner consistent with the statutes underlying policy and goals. Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind. 2010). Statutes concerning the same subject should be read together and harmonized to give effect to each. Clippinger v. State, 54 N.E.3d 986, 989 (Ind. 2016).
[18] Here, Sections 16-2(a) and 16-1(c) address the same subject matter within the context of drivers license suspension penalties for OWI, among other offenses, and are sequentially listed in the same chapter. Reading the two statutes together, we conclude that the sections are not ambiguous and can be harmonized and reconciled. Section 16-2(a) requires that the trial court suspend an offenders driving privileges for at least one year upon a conviction of OWI with a prior conviction, a more serious offense than an OWI. Section 16-1(c), on the other hand, gives the court discretion to suspend an offenders driving privileges upon any conviction of OWI, as well as other listed offenses, up to the maximum sentence allowed for the particular offense. Thus, it is apparent that the legislature intended under Section 16-2(a) that a conviction for OWI with a prior conviction result in a mandatory suspension of the offenders driving privileges for at least one year. And the legislature also intended to provide the trial court discretion under Section 16-1(c) to impose a longer suspension where appropriate.
[19] Moreover, reading the two sections as mutually exclusive, as Hale suggests, results in an illogical application of the exceptions found in Sections 16-6(a) and -(b), such that a suspension based on the more serious offense of OWI with a prior conviction would run concurrent with a prior suspension and be eligible for credit time, whereas less serious offenses would be subject to consecutive suspensions ineligible for credit time. We do not presume that the legislature intended for language used in a statute to be applied illogically or in a way that brings about an unjust or absurd result. State ex rel. Hatcher v. Lake Super. Ct., Rm. Three, 500 N.E.2d 737, 739 (Ind. 1986). We find that Sections 16-2(a) and 16-1(c) are clear and unambiguous. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the Second Suspension that was ordered to be served consecutive to and not current with the First Suspension with no credit time awarded.
2
Section 2 – Hale has waived his argument that Indiana Code Section 16-6 is unconstitutional.
[20] Hale contends that Section 16-6s prohibition against awarding credit time for suspensions due to the refusal to submit to a chemical test is unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution because it explicitly applies to Section 16-1(c) but not Section 16-2. The State argues that Hale failed to preserve his claim regarding the statutes constitutionality by not presenting this argument to the trial court. Generally, “failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute at trial results in waiver of review on appeal[.]” Plank v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013). Indeed, “appellate review presupposes that a litigants arguments have been raised and considered in the trial court.” Id. Here, Hale did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute before the trial court. Therefore, his constitutional challenge is waived. See id. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Indiana Code Section 9-30-6-8(c) (2020) provides in relevant part that “if it is determined under subsection (a) that there was probable cause to believe that a person [operated a vehicle while intoxicated],” at the initial hearing, “the court shall recommend immediate suspension of the persons driving privileges to take effect on the date the order is entered” and “forward to the [BMV] a copy of the order recommending immediate suspension of driving privileges.”
2
. Hale further argues that Sections 16-2(a) and 16-1(c) should be viewed as mutually exclusive because Indiana Code Chapter 9-30-16 is “replete with drafting errors” evidenced by the language in Indiana Code Sections 9-30-16-2(b) and -(c). Appellants Br. at 29. Section 16-2(b) provides: “A person whose driving privileges are suspended under subsection (a) is eligible for specialized driving privileges under section 3 of this chapter. (Emphasis added.) Section 16-2(c) provides:(c) If a person is convicted of an offense that includes the element of causing the death of another person and the offense involved the operation of a motor vehicle or was an offense under IC 9-30-5, the court shall order that the persons driving privileges are suspended for a period of at least two (2) years and not more than the maximum allowable period of incarceration of the criminal penalty for the offense. A person whose driving privileges are suspended under this section is not eligible for specialized driving privileges under section 3 of this chapter.(Emphasis added.) According to Hale, these two subsections contain “conflicting language” regarding which offenders are eligible for specialized driving privileges, and Hale argues that this is one more example of Section 16-2s ambiguity. Appellants Br. at 29. We disagree and are unpersuaded that the language in the subsections supports Hales argument that Sections 16-2(a) and 16-1(c) should be viewed as mutually exclusive and that his Second Suspension could not run consecutive to the First Suspension with no credit time awarded.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Crone
Judges Bradford and Tavitas concur.