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Solomon Evans, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2024)

Court of Appeals of Indiana.2024-07-24No. Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-CR-247

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] After following Lan Nguyen around a casino and observing her collect her winnings, Solomon Evans, Jr., followed her home and robbed her at gunpoint of her winnings, her purse, and the jewelry that she had been wearing. Evans was subsequently charged with and convicted of Level 3 felony armed robbery. Evans challenges his conviction, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence at trial and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] During the overnight hours of September 6 into September 7, 2021, Nguyen gambled at the Hard Rock Casino in Gary. After winning approximately four or five thousand dollars, Nguyen cashed out, left the casino, and drove along the Indiana Toll Road (the “toll road”) to her home in South Bend. Upon arriving at and parking in front of her home, Nguyen was robbed by two men at gunpoint. The men, both of whom were armed, pointed their guns at Nguyen and hit her on the head with the guns, causing her to fall on the curb and break a rib. After taking her purse, which included her winnings and her cellular telephone, and the jewelry that she had been wearing, the men fled in a black pickup truck, traveling in the direction from which Nguyen had just come. Nguyen eventually woke a neighbor, who called 911. Nguyen informed police that both of her attackers had been “black,” one had been taller than the other, both had been wearing jeans and ski masks, and one had been wearing a “hoodie.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 42, 43.

[3] Video surveillance footage from the casino showed that two males matching the description given by Nguyen had watched and followed her through the casino. The men had arrived at and left the casino in a black Dodge Ram truck. The truck had briefly parked at a nearby gas station before following Nguyen as she left the casino.

[4] During his investigation into the robbery, South Bend Police Detective Bruno Martinsky spoke to Evans. Evans told Detective Martinsky that on the morning in question, he had driven his black Dodge Ram truck from the Hard Rock Casino in Gary to South Bend via the toll road. Evans claimed that he had come to South Bend to “get a dog from” Renard Corley. Tr. Vol. II p. 129.

[5] Toll-road records indicate that Nguyen had entered the toll road at the Portage exit and had exited at the Notre Dame exit in South Bend at 4:58 a.m.

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on September 7, 2021. Likewise, Evans had entered the toll road at the Portage exit and had exited at the Notre Dame exit in South Bend at 4:58 a.m. on September 7, 2021. At some point, Evans had re-entered the toll road at the Notre Dame exit, driving back toward the Portage exit, where he had exited at 5:57 a.m.

[6] On October 18, 2021, the State charged Evans with Level 3 felony armed robbery and Level 3 felony robbery resulting in bodily injury. The jury found Evans guilty as charged on December 4, 2023. The trial court entered a judgment of conviction on the armed-robbery charge and sentenced Evans to a twelve-year term, with two of those years suspended to probation.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[7] The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial courts decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. The trial courts decision will not be disturbed absent a requisite showing of abuse.

Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012) (citations omitted).

[8] Evans contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting three computer-generated maps of South Bend, i.e., Exhibits 23, 24, and 25, into evidence. Evans asserts that these exhibits were introduced “to show the location of [his] cell[ular tele]phone on the morning of the robbery.” Appellants Br. p. 10. Evans appears, however, to be challenging the wrong exhibits on appeal, as the record reveals that these exhibits were merely introduced to assist Detective Martinsky in showing the proximity of Nguyens and Corleys addresses to the toll road. The record further reveals that it was Exhibit 22 that was introduced for this purpose, not Exhibits 23, 24, and 25.

[9] Regardless, while Evans claims on appeal that the maps were admitted over his counsels objection, the following exchange indicates otherwise:

[The State]: Do all three of these maps appear to be a fair and accurate representation of kind of the north side of South Bend[,] including the Foster Street address and the toll road and then the entirety of South Bend and the south side of South Bend?

[Detective Martinsky]: Yes. Fair and accurate.

THE STATE: Your Honor, State moves to admit and publish States Exhibit 23, 24, and 25.

THE COURT: Any objection?

[Defense Counsel]: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So admitted.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 161–62 (emphasis added). Evanss failure to object to their admission at trial results in waiver of his appellate claim that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting the exhibits. Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 923 (Ind. 2003) (“Failure to object at trial to the admission of evidence results in waiver of that issue on appeal.”). Evans does not argue that the alleged error in admitting the challenged exhibits resulted in fundamental error and has therefore also waived any claim of fundamental error. See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (providing that failure to allege fundamental error in a “principal appellate brief” results in waiver). Evans has therefore waived appellate review of his challenge to the admission of Exhibits 23, 24, and 25.

[10] As noted above, the substance of Evanss argument instead appears to relate to Exhibit 22. Evans argues on appeal that the trial court “abused its discretion when it allowed, over objection, one of the States witnesses to testify about the results of a ‘CellHawk’ analysis, which alleged to pinpoint the location of [Evanss] cell[ular tele]phone during the morning of September 7, 2021.” Appellants Br. p. 11. Detective Martinsky testified that Exhibit 22 “is a screenshot from CellHawk,” which is a database that deciphers information uploaded from cellular records and “takes that information and puts it in an interface that cleans it up and makes it a little more presentable, gives it a map.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 144, 142. In this case, after Detective Martinsky uploaded the certified information provided by Evanss cellular provider and CellHawk generated Exhibit 22, which indicates that at approximately 5:48 a.m. on September 7, 2021, Evanss cellular telephone connected to a cellular tower just south of the toll road near South Bend. Evans objected to the admission of Exhibit 22, citing foundational issues. The trial court admitted Exhibit 22 over Evanss objection.

[11] We need not determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Exhibit 22, however, because admission of evidence demonstrating that Evanss cellular phone (and by extension, Evans) was in South Bend on the morning in question was, at most, harmless.

An error in admitting evidence does not require reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of a party. The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction. The erroneous admission of evidence may also be harmless if that evidence is cumulative of other evidence admitted.

Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (cleaned up), trans. denied.

[12] Prior to trial, Evans admitted to Detective Martinsky that on the morning in question he had driven his black Dodge Ram truck from the Hard Rock Casino in Gary to South Bend via the toll road. Records from the toll road also indicate that the black Dodge Ram truck that was registered to Evans traveled from Portage to South Bend and back along the toll road during the hours in question on September 7, 2021. Exhibit 22 merely indicated that Evanss cellular telephone had been in South Bend on the morning in question, which he himself essentially admitted. As such, even if the trial court could be said to have abused its discretion by admitting Exhibit 22, the admission was harmless, as it was cumulative of other admitted evidence. See id.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finders role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial courts ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-

finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (cleaned up). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[14] Evans also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, arguing that “[t]here is nothing in the evidence to link [him] and his black truck with either the truck on the video in the casino parking lot and the truck which passed through the Notre Dame toll gate on September 7, 2021[,]” or that he had participated in the robbery. Appellants Br. p. 18. We disagree.

[15] Following the robbery, Nguyen informed police that she had been robbed at gunpoint by two masked men. Nguyen informed police that both of her attackers had been “black,” one had been taller than the other, both had been wearing jeans and ski masks, and one had been wearing a “hoodie.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 42, 43. Video surveillance footage from the casino showed that two black males matching the description given by Nguyen had watched Nguyen and had followed her through the casino. The men had arrived at and left the casino in a black Dodge Ram truck. The truck had briefly parked at a nearby gas station before following Nguyen as she left the casino.

[16] Detective Martinsky spoke to Evans after the Indiana Gaming Commission provided the Illinois state license plate for the black Dodge Ram truck that had visited the casino on the night in question. Evans told Detective Martinsky that he had been at the Hard Rock Casino in Gary during the late-evening/early-morning hours of September 6–7, 2021. Evans further admitted that he had been driving his black Dodge Ram truck and, upon leaving the casino, took the toll road from Gary to South Bend.

[17] Toll-road records indicate that Nguyen had entered the toll road at the Portage exit and had exited the toll road at the Notre Dame exit in South Bend at 4:58 a.m. on September 7, 2021. Likewise, Evans had entered the toll road at the Portage exit and had exited the toll road at the Notre Dame exit in South Bend at 4:58 a.m. on September 7, 2021. At some point, Evans had re-entered the toll road at the Notre Dame exit, driving back toward the Portage exit, at which he had exited at 5:57 a.m. The State argued at trial that while Nguyen lived close enough to the toll road to allow for Evans to have completed the robbery and to have returned to the Portage exit by 5:57 a.m., Corely lived further from the toll road and the distance of Corelys home from the toll road would have made it improbable that he could have visited Corelys home and returned to the Portage exit by 5:57 a.m.

[18] Further, Evans claimed to have been in South Bend to “get a dog from” Corley. Tr. Vol. II p. 129. Corley testified, however, that he had previously communicated to Evans that he worked weekdays from 4:00 a.m. until 1:30 p.m. and would not be available to take Evans to see the dog during those hours. In addition, while Evanss telephone records indicated that there had been a number of calls between Evans and Corley on September 16, 2021, there were no calls between Evans and Corely on September 6 or 7, 2021, or any other date prior to September 15, 2021.

[19] The evidence is sufficient to support a reasonable inference from the jury that Evans had followed Nguyen home from the casino and participated in the robbery. Evanss claim to the contrary effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 958.

[20] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

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.   The record reveals that all times noted in the toll-road records reflect “central time.” Tr. Vol. II p. 73.

Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford

Judges Crone and Tavitas concur.

Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.