MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pyle, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] A.S. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with her son, Z.S. (“Z.S.”). Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination. Concluding that there is sufficient evidence to support the termination, we affirm the trial courts judgment.
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[2] We affirm.
Issue
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the termination of the parent-child relationship.
Facts
[3] The evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment reveal that when twenty-nine-year-old Mother was seven years old, she was removed from her mother. Following her removal, Mother spent the ensuing eleven years in psychiatric hospitals, state hospitals, group homes, and foster care. During that time, doctors diagnosed her with bi-polar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, borderline personality disorder, and antisocial personality disorder. Also, during that time, Mother attempted suicide on more than one occasion.
[4] In September 2021, while seven months pregnant with Z.S. and while living at Faith Mission in Elkhart County, Mother was involved in an incident with another resident. Concerned that Elkhart County DCS would remove her child from her following his birth, Mother went to St. Joseph County and made up a story that she was the victim of domestic violence to obtain housing at the YWCA. In November 2021, the State charged Mother with two counts of Class A misdemeanor battery for the incident that occurred in Elkhart County (“the Elkhart County case”).
[5] Mothers son, Z.S., was born in November 2021. Hospital staff immediately noticed that an easily frustrated Mother was unable to care for Z.S.’s basic needs, including feeding him, changing his diaper, bathing him, and calming him. Mother also told hospital staff that she had had mental health issues throughout her life, and hospital staff learned that Mother had not been taking her antipsychotic medication. Concerned that Mother would not be able to independently care for Z.S. after being discharged from the hospital, hospital staff contacted a DCS case worker, who removed Z.S. from Mother when he was three days old. DCS placed Z.S. in foster care.
[6] Two days later, DCS filed a petition alleging that Z.S. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The petition specifically alleged that hospital staff had noticed that Mother “would pull [Z.S.] away when he was latched and feeding, causing worry that Mother would not feed [Z.S.] enough.” (Ex. Vol. at 122). The petition further alleged that Mother told hospital staff “that she did not think she could ‘do this,’ meaning care for [Z.S.] on her own.” (Ex. Vol. at 122).
[7] In December 2021, the trial court adjudicated Z.S. to be a CHINS. Also, in December 2021, Mother pleaded guilty in the Elkhart County case to one count of Class A misdemeanor battery, and the State dismissed the second count. The trial court sentenced Mother to one year of probation, which included anger management classes.
[8] Further, in December 2021, Mother began attending parenting education and individual counseling with therapist Janet Stone (“Therapist Stone”) at the Center for Positive Change (“the Center”). Mother also began supervised visits with Z.S.
[9] In February 2022, the trial court issued a CHINS dispositional order that required Mother to: (1) maintain suitable housing; (2) obey the law; (3) attend individual counseling; (4) complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; (5) complete a psychological evaluation and successfully complete all recommendations; and (6) attend supervised visits with Z.S.
[10] In April 2022, Therapist Stone discharged Mother from counseling because Mother had twice violated the Centers no-show/no-call attendance policy. Therapist Stone was concerned about Mothers ability to parent Z.S. because “the stability would not be there for [Z.S.].” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 95).
[11] After Therapist Stone had discharged Mother from counseling, Mother began attending counseling sessions with therapist Cinda Elrod (“Therapist Elrod”) at Meridian Health Services in April 2022. In May and June 2022, Mother participated in a psychological assessment with forensic psychologist Jeff Burnett (“Dr. Burnett”). Dr. Burnett diagnosed Mother with post-traumatic stress disorder and borderline personality disorder. He also provisionally diagnosed Mother with bi-polar disorder. Dr. Burnett, who had “significant concerns regarding [Mothers] ability to safely and appropriately parent” Z.S., recommended that Mother participate in a psychiatric evaluation, individual counseling, parenting classes, and case management services. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 84). Dr. Burnett also recommended that Mother participate in a medication management program and drug screens to determine whether she was taking her previously prescribed antipsychotic medication. In November 2022, Therapist Elrod unsuccessfully discharged Mother from counseling for “․ non-attendance. And then not answering phone calls.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 113).
[12] In December 2022, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mothers parental relationship with Z.S. Three months later, in March 2023, Mother attended an intake assessment at Oaklawn Psychiatric Center. The assessor recommended that Mother attend group therapy in a specialized trauma group. Mother attended only one session and did not return to the group.
[13] Also, in March 2023, Mother began case management services with Faith Feitz (“Feitz”), a family consultant at Lifeline Youth and Family Services. When Feitz first began working with Mother, Mother was employed at Wendys and lived with a co-worker (“the co-worker”). However, shortly thereafter, Mother had a conflict with the co-worker, quit her job, and became homeless. Feitz attempted to help Mother find another job and stable housing. However, Mother stopped attending meetings with Feitz at the end of May 2023, and Feitz closed Mothers case.
[14] DCS family case manager Stephani Miller (“FCM Miller”), who was assigned to Mothers case in July 2023, met with Mother just three days before the termination hearing. At that time, Mother was homeless, and she was not taking her antipsychotic medication because she preferred to use meditation and her learned coping skills. FCM Miller asked Mother if she was participating in services, and Mother responded that she was going to begin therapy with a therapist named Melinda at Imani and Unidad, a counseling center in South Bend.
[15] The trial court held a termination hearing in July 2023 and heard the facts as set forth above. In addition, DCS permanency supervisor Heidi Trenerry (“Supervisor Trenerry”) testified that multiple therapists had discharged Mother from individual counseling because of her inconsistent attendance. Supervisor Trenerry also testified that DCS did not know whether Mother had been taking her antipsychotic medication because she had not consistently participated in drug screens. Supervisor Trenerry further opined that Mother had not remedied DCS’ reasons for involvement in the case because she was “just not taking care of ․ her severe mental health needs[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 19).
[16] In addition, Sarah Price, visitation supervisor at Families First Center (“Supervisor Price”), testified as follows regarding Mothers visits with Z.S. during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings:
So attendance has always been a ․ concern. [Mother] has been discharged twice from Families First Center for attendance. Whether it be day of cancellations or no call, no shows. Most recently, from March 1st to May 22nd [2023], there were nine cancellations and no call, no shows. So its always been kind of a pattern of not so good attendance.
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 129). Supervisor Price further testified that Mothers last visit with Z.S. had been on May 22, 2023, two months before the termination hearing.
[17] Further, at the hearing, CASA Kyleigh Lindzy (“CASA Lindzy”) testified that Z.S. suffered from developmental delays and attended weekly physical and occupational therapies. In addition, CASA Lindzy testified that Z.S. had recently had an MRI to rule out neurological issues and would be attending an appointment with a pediatric neurologist at Riley Childrens Hospital. CASA Lindzy also testified that she recommended the termination of Mothers parental relationship with Z.S. According to CASA Lindzy, her biggest concern was Mothers mental health issues.
[18] Mother also testified at the hearing. She acknowledged her long history of mental health issues and agreed that she had not consistently remained engaged in therapy throughout the pendency of the CHINS proceedings. Mother also agreed that she had not consistently attended visits with Z.S. Mother further agreed that Z.S. should not have to wait for her to become a better parent.
[19] Following the hearing, in November 2023, the trial court issued a detailed twenty-one-page order terminating Mothers parental rights. The trial courts order provides, in relevant part, as follows:
p. Mothers failure to substantially complete her services, failure to address her significant mental health needs, failure to obtain and maintain suitable housing, and failure to consistently visit with [Z.S.] demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the removal and continued placement of [Z.S.] outside of Mothers home will not be remedied.
(App. Vol. 2 at 140).
[20] Mother now appeals.
Decision
[21] Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). However, the law provides for termination of that right when parents are unwilling or unable to meet their parental responsibilities. Bester v. Lake County Office of Family and Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents but to protect their children. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
[22] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229. Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment. Id.
[23] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
[24] Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
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DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.
[25] Where, as here, the trial courts order contains specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we engage in a two-tiered review. In re A.G., 6 N.E.3d 952, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom that support them. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial courts conclusions or the conclusions do not support the resulting judgment. Id.
[26] In addition, as a general rule, appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This deference recognizes a trial courts unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court[ ] only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.
[27] As a preliminary matter, we note that Mother does not challenge the trial courts factual findings. As a result, she has waived any argument relating to whether these unchallenged factual findings are clearly erroneous. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (explaining that unchallenged trial court findings are accepted as true), trans. denied. We now turn to the substantive issue in this case.
[28] Mothers sole argument is that the evidence is insufficient to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Z.S.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mothers home will not be remedied. However, we note that the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence also established that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Z.S.’s well-being. Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. The trial court, therefore, needs only to find one of the requirements of this subsection by clear and convincing evidence. See L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 209. “Standing alone, the finding that the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the child[ ] satisfies the requirement listed in subsection (B).” Id. In other words, we need not reach Mothers argument related to Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).
[29] Nevertheless, in light of Mothers constitutional right to raise her child, we choose to address her argument that the evidence is insufficient to show that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Z.S.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mothers home will not be remedied. In determining whether the conditions that resulted in a childs removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parents fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual conduct may include parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parents response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id.
[30] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Z.S. was removed from Mother because of Mothers mental health issues. During the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother did not consistently attend individual therapy to address these mental health issues. Specifically, multiple providers discharged Mother from individual therapy because of her inconsistent attendance. In addition, Mother failed to consistently participate in drug screens, and DCS was, therefore, unable to determine whether she was taking her antipsychotic medication. Further, just a few days before the termination hearing, Mother told FCM Miller that she was not taking this medication because she preferred to rely on meditation and learned coping skills. In addition, Mother failed to successfully complete case management services and was homeless at the time of the termination hearing. We further note that Mother did not consistently visit Z.S. during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings. This evidence supports the trial courts conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Z.S.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mothers home will not be remedied. Accordingly, there is sufficient evidence to support the termination of Mothers parental relationship with Z.S.
[31] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Z.S.’s father is not participating in this appeal.
2
. The Indiana General Assembly significantly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 while Mothers appeal was pending. See Ind. Public Law 70-2024, SEC. 4 (eff. Mar. 11, 2024). The amendment alters the allegations that DCS must include in a petition to terminate a parents parental rights. Here, because the amendment took effect after DCS filed the petition to terminate Mothers parental rights, the amendment does not apply to this case.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Pyle
Judges May and Brown concur.
May, J., and Brown, J., concur.