MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] This appeal involves the termination of R.W.’s (“Mother”) parental rights to her biological minor child, E.G-A., (“Child”).
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The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) became involved with Child after having received reports of abuse and neglect. After some time, the juvenile court adjudicated Child to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) based on the parents’ admissions and placed Child in relative care. Ultimately, after Mothers failure to satisfactorily adhere to the reunification plan, DCS petitioned to terminate Mothers parental rights, which the juvenile court granted. Mother challenges whether termination of her parental rights was in Childs best interest. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born to Mother in October of 2020. In May of 2022, DCS received a report of abuse or neglect of Child and became involved with Child. Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Field
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discovered the homes conditions to be below standard, drugs in the home, and that Child had been injured during a domestic-violence incident between Mother and Father. That same month, Mother agreed to complete the terms of an informal adjustment to address home conditions, drug abuse, and domestic violence.
[3] During the following months, Mother continued to test positive for drugs. In August of 2022, DCS received another report that Child had been suffering abuse or neglect. At that time, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine. DCS alleged Child to be a CHINS and placed her in relative care with her aunt and uncle, where she has remained since. In October of 2022, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS. In its corresponding dispositional order, the juvenile court ordered Mother, inter alia, to refrain from illicit drug use and alcohol consumption, obey the law, participate in random drug screens, engage in individual counseling, maintain suitable housing and employment, and maintain sobriety or participate in an inpatient substance-abuse treatment program.
[4] On February 2, 2023, the juvenile court conducted a review hearing at which it found that, since the previous October, Mother had left inpatient treatment after one week, had attended fewer than half of her scheduled home-based case-management sessions, had completed twenty of forty-eight scheduled drug screens (three of which were positive for methamphetamine), and had not attended individual counseling.
[5] In April of 2023, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing at which it found that Mother had missed all of her substance-abuse treatment sessions in January and February but had attended three of four sessions in March and one in April; missed all of her case-management sessions in January but attended three of four in February, all four in March, and one in April; completed seventeen of twenty-five drugs screens and tested positive for methamphetamine twice in February; and attended two individual therapy sessions in February, two of three in March, and one in April. The juvenile court changed Childs permanency plan to adoption.
[6] In October of 2023, the juvenile court held another permanency hearing, at which it found that Mother had attended three of four treatment sessions in April, three of four in May, one of four in June, and none in July. The juvenile court also found that Mothers services at the Bowen Center had been suspended in July because she had failed to attend an assessment that was supposed to have been completed in May. Once Mother completed the assessment and services resumed, she made “minimal” progress in treatment. Ex. Vol. I p. 46. The juvenile court noted that Mother had attempted residential treatment at a facility in Fort Wayne but Mother “left the same day because she felt uncomfortable and had problems with the fellow residents.” Ex. Vol. I p. 47. Additionally, the juvenile court found that, since the last hearing, Mother had completed only thirty-two of fifty-one scheduled drug screens and tested positive for drugs twelve times between May and September. Consequently, DCS petitioned to terminate Mothers parental rights.
[7] The next month, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on DCSs termination petition. In granting DCSs petition, the juvenile court found that Mother had “failed to complete approximately half of her scheduled drug screens” and “tested positive for illegal substances at least once in 10 of the last 12 months[,]” the latest positive test occurring less than one month before the termination hearing. Appellants App. Vol. II p. 61. Moreover, Mother had failed to complete an inpatient substance-abuse program, secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income, obey the law, and maintain suitable and safe housing.
[8] The juvenile court noted that Mother had pled guilty to public intoxication in 2021 and leaving the scene of an accident in 2023. Additionally, Mother had been arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated and public intoxication and disorderly conduct in 2023, which charges were still pending at the time of the termination hearing. Due to her criminal activity, “Mother no longer has a valid drivers license and relies on friends and family to provide transportation.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 62. Further, Mother had been evicted from her home in October of 2023, and had spent the prior year living with “various relatives and friends [․] and also spent some time incarcerated.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 62. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was unemployed and, over the past year, had only briefly held various jobs.
[9] At the termination hearing, court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Mark Spencer testified that termination of Mothers parental rights was in Childs best interests. CASA Spencer explained that Child was “flourishing” with her placement family, with whom she has been for over a third of her life, and taking her out of that situation would not be positive “for her at all.” Tr. Vol. II p. 93. Moreover, FCM Bradley Samuel testified that Mother has made “[m]inimal” progress towards reunification. Tr. Vol. II p. 81. FCM Samuel pointed out Mothers consistently testing positive for methamphetamine, housing instability, unresolved concerns regarding domestic violence, unemployment, and criminal activity. FCM Samuel also noted that Child is “thriving at her placement” and has “a real strong attachment to everybody in that household.” Tr. Vol. II p. 83. In December of 2023, the juvenile court entered its order terminating Mothers parental rights to Child.
Discussion and Decision
[10] The federal Constitution protects parents’ right to raise their children; however, that right “may be terminated when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1169 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). In other words, parental rights, when necessary, must be subordinate to the childs best interests. In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 164 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The termination of parental rights is appropriate “where the [child]’s emotional and physical development is threatened.” In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. However, juvenile courts “need not wait until the [child is] irreversibly harmed [․] before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Id.
[11] When reviewing the termination of a parental relationship,
[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.
In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d at 1170. Given the juvenile courts proximity to the evidence and witnesses, we will reverse its decision to terminate a parent-child relationship only if the decision is clearly erroneous. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). “A finding is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support it. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the findings of fact do not support the [juvenile] courts conclusions thereon, or the conclusions thereon do not support the judgment.” In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d at 164 (internal citations omitted).
[12] Here, Mother argues only that the undisputed evidence does not support the juvenile courts conclusion that termination was in Childs best interests, which DCS, among other things, was required to establish. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(C). In determining whether termination serves a childs best interests, we “must look at the totality of the evidence.” Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019). The totality of the evidence before the juvenile court demonstrates that termination is in Childs best interests.
[13] We have held that a “parents historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the childs best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Here, we have little hesitation in concluding that the record supports a finding that Mother is unable to provide adequate care for Child. For instance, Mother “failed to complete approximately half of her scheduled drug screens” and “tested positive for illegal substances at least once in 10 of the last 12 months[,]” with the latest positive test occurring just three weeks before the termination hearing. Appellants App. Vol. II p. 61. Moreover, Mothers criminal activity during the pendency of the CHINS case has resulted in her losing her drivers license, rendering her reliant on friends and family for transportation. Notably, Mother has also “failed to maintain suitable and safe housing[,]” having lived with various friends and relatives in Plymouth, Rochester, and Kokomo, including her boyfriend at the time “who has been violent with her and her relatives[.]” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 62. All of this, along with Mother’ s unemployment at the time of the termination hearing, rendered Mother unable to support Child.
[14] Further, Indiana courts have long relied on the recommendations of the FCM, CASA, GAL and other service providers when considering whether “a reasonable finder of fact could conclude based on clear and convincing evidence” that “the termination is in the best interests of” a child. In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d at 1173. Here, CASA Spencer and FCM Samuel each testified that termination of Mothers parental rights would serve Childs best interests because Mother had made “[m]inimal” progress in her reunification plan and Child had been “flourishing” in her relative placement. Tr. Vol. II pp. 81, 93.
[15] We will not make a child “wait indefinitely for [his or her] parents to work toward preservation or reunification[,]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648, or “wait until [the child is] irreversibly harmed [․] before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773. Because a “[child has] an interest in terminating parental rights that prevent adoption and inhibit establishing secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships[,]” we conclude that the juvenile courts decision is not clearly erroneous. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230.
[16] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. Father has voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and does not participate in this appeal.
2
. The record does not appear to contain FCM Fields first name.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford
Judges Crone and Tavitas concur.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.