MEMORANDUM DECISION
Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] In 2024, Antonia Hoeping was convicted of invasion of privacy for violating a protective order her former neighbor obtained against her. Hoeping now appeals and raises one issue for our review: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to establish Hoeping committed invasion of privacy.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Hoeping met A.G. in 2015 when they lived next door to each other. In November 2022, A.G. obtained a protective order (the “P.O.”) against Hoeping. The P.O. court found that A.G. had shown that Hoeping had engaged in “repeated acts of harassment.” Tr. Vol. III at 4. Consequently, the P.O. court enjoined Hoeping from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with [A.G.]” and “threatening to commit or committing acts of stalking or harassment against [A.G.].” Id. The P.O. court also required Hoeping to stay away from A.G.’s residence and place of employment. The P.O. was set to expire on May 15, 2023.
[4] On March 10, 2023, A.G. was employed as an in-home care giver for a client in Greenfield, Indiana. At approximately 5:00 p.m. that day, while A.G. and her client were in a car pulling out of the clients driveway, a white Cadillac SUV pulled up to the driveway. From the record, it is impossible to determine if the Cadillac blocked the driveway, and for purposes of this appeal, we assume it did not. A.G. did not recognize the vehicle, so she got out of the car and approached the Cadillac to see if the driver needed help; as she did so, the driver rolled down the window. A.G. then recognized the driver as Hoeping. According to A.G., the following exchange occurred:
I asked, “Can I help you?” She said, “You know who I am?” I stated, “Yes, I do.” And I said, “Can I help you,” again. She asked if I was sleeping with her husband, and I stated, “No,” and that she needed to leave.
Tr. Vol. II at 42 (cleaned up). A.G. called law enforcement, and an officer arrived on scene approximately five minutes after Hoeping left.
[5] The State charged Hoeping with invasion of privacy as a Class A misdemeanor
1
. At her bench trial, Hoeping testified that she was aware of the P.O. and that she was driving a white Cadillac SUV in March 2023. Hoeping denied encountering or otherwise having contact with A.G. on March 10, 2023, or any time after A.G. obtained the P.O. While A.G. said the encounter occurred around 5:00 p.m., Hoeping denied leaving the house except one time that day when she left her house to get food for her son around “mid-afternoon, like two (2:00) threeish (3:00) – maybe a little earlier. Im not positive.” Tr. Vol. II at 50 (cleaned up).
[6] The trial court found Hoeping guilty as charged and sentenced her to 365 days at the Hancock County Jail, with 2 of those days executed and the other 363 days suspended to probation. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Hoeping argues that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial to support her conviction for invasion of privacy as a Class A misdemeanor. “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments trigger a deferential standard of appellate review, in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the [factfinder].’ ” Owen v. State, 210 N.E.3d 256, 264 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018)), rehg denied (Aug. 17, 2023). In our review, “we consider only ‘the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.’ ” Id. (quoting Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 1992)). We will reverse a guilty verdict only when no reasonable trier of fact “could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lock v. State, 971 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
[8] In order to convict Hoeping of invasion of privacy as a Class A misdemeanor under Indiana Code section 35-46-1-15.1(a)(2), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hoeping knowingly or intentionally violated an ex parte order issued under Indiana Code chapter 34-26-5. Hoeping argues only that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that she knowingly or intentionally violated the P.O. “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Id. § 35-41-2-2(a).
“[K]nowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence.” Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. So given this real-world constraint, a defendants mens rea may be proven by “circumstantial evidence,”—that is, it may be reasonably “inferred from a defendants conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Id.
A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064–65 (Ind. 2024) (alteration omitted).
[9] The probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict here reveal that Hoeping was aware of the protective order and drove the same vehicle A.G. encountered on March 10, 2023. The trial court clearly credited A.G.’s testimony over Hoepings, and A.G. testified that Hoeping drove up to her place of employment and accused her of sleeping with Hoepings husband. The trial court could have reasonably inferred from these facts that Hoeping knowingly or intentionally violated the P.O. on March 10, 2023. Nevertheless, Hoeping argues that she could not have “ ‘knowingly or intentionally’ made contact with [A.G.]” because the State failed to offer evidence about whether Hoeping knew where A.G. worked, and if so, how she knew. Appellants Br. at 10–11. Hoepings arguments are an attempt to have us reweigh the evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we cannot do, Owen, 210 N.E.3d at 264 (quoting Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 570). The State is not required to prove how Hoeping knew where A.G. worked. See I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(2); A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1064–65. Even if it was required to do so, the fact that Hoeping showed up at A.G.’s place of employment and accused her of having sex with her husband is sufficient to prove such knowledge. See A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1064–65. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Hoepings conviction for invasion of privacy as a Class A misdemeanor, and we affirm that conviction.
[10] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(2).
Memorandum Decision by Judge Felix
Judges Riley and Kenworthy concur.