MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Kurt Bredemeier was the passenger in a vehicle that Indiana State Police had stopped for speeding and failing to signal a turn. A K-9 officer conducted an open-air dog sniff of the vehicle, which resulted in a positive alert at the front passenger seat. As a result, troopers searched the car and discovered methamphetamine under the passenger seat and Bredemeiers cellular telephone, for which they obtained a search warrant. After recovering evidence indicating that Bredemeier had been dealing methamphetamine, the State charged Bredemeier with Level 2 felony possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver and Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. Prior to trial, Bredemeier moved to suppress evidence discovered on his telephone, which motion the trial court denied. A jury found Bredemeier guilty on both counts and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate twenty-six-year sentence with one year suspended. Bredemeier claims that: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that he had possessed the drugs found under his seat; (2) the trial court improperly admitted evidence from his telephone; and (3) his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In January of 2022, Indiana State Police Trooper Tyler Widner observed a car traveling fifty-six miles per hour in a forty-five-mile-per-hour zone that also failed to signal a turn properly. Trooper Widner initiated a traffic stop and, as he was walking up to the vehicle, observed the passenger “reaching” and “moving around” before the vehicle stopped. States Ex. 1 at 1:01; 3B at 14:30–35, 15:04–10. Trooper Widner identified Jeanie Anderson as the driver and Bredemeier as the passenger.
[3] Within seven minutes of the stop, Trooper Tyler Fox arrived with his dog and conducted an open-air sniff of the vehicle, which resulted in a positive alert at the front-passenger side. The troopers searched the vehicle and discovered a bag containing 13.43 grams of methamphetamine under the passenger seat and Bredemeiers telephone on the seat. After being read his rights, Bredemeier admitted that the substance “was meth, and then he said it was his.” Tr. Vol. II p. 97.
[4] Detective Paul Stolz obtained a search warrant for Bredemeiers telephone. The warrant authorized law enforcement to search for evidence related to Bredemeiers possession of and intent to distribute methamphetamine in
[a]ny and all stored communication files, including digital images, voice mail, text messages [․] email, contact lists, address books, buddy lists, opened and un-opened picture and video files, chat logs, electronic messages, call logs, and any other files associated with said cellular phone, including associated email accounts, instant messaging or text messaging accounts, voice-over-IP (VoIP) network information, voice logs and voice data, wireless link points, IP addresses, MAC addresses, or any other digital communication accounts, but not limited to the model number, serial number, IMEI number, MEID/ESN number, and/or ICCID/SIM card number of said phone.
Ex. Vol. IV p. 161. The search of the telephone revealed several text threads in which Bredemeier was arranging drug deals using terminology consistent with narcotics dealing. Moreover, after Bredemeier had been arrested, he made multiple telephone calls from jail to Anderson, in which he encouraged her to “take this” charge for him by claiming that the methamphetamine had been hers. States Ex. 12 at 1:26. Bredemeier also instructed Anderson to find and “wipe” his telephone. States Ex. 13 at 0:39.
[5] On January 31, 2022, the State charged Bredemeier with Level 2 felony possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver and Level 4 felony possession of methamphetamine. On October 29, 2022, the day before his jury trial was set to begin, Bredemeier moved to suppress the evidence discovered on his telephone, arguing that the warrant had failed to describe with sufficient particularity the evidence to be seized. At the start of trial, the trial court denied Bredemeiers motion, finding the warrant sufficiently particular. A jury found Bredemeier guilty as charged. The trial court imposed a twenty-six-year sentence with one year suspended on the dealing conviction and a concurrent sentence of ten years with one year suspended on the possession conviction.
Discussion and Decision
I. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence to Prove that Bredemeier had Possessed the Drugs
[6] “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict.” Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will neither assess witness credibility nor “weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.” Id. When presented with conflicting evidence, we “must consider it most favorably to the trial courts ruling.” Id. We will affirm the conviction “unless no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. “The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.” Id.
[7] Possession of contraband may be actual or constructive. Holmes v. State, 785 N.E.2d 658, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Constructive possession is established by “showing that the defendant has the intent and capability to maintain dominion and control over the contraband.” Id. When possession of the premises on which the contraband is discovered is not exclusive, constructive possession may still be established by showing circumstances that indicate “knowledge of the presence of the contraband and the ability to control it.” Id. at 661. Those circumstances include incriminating statements by the defendant, attempted flight or furtive gestures, a drug manufacturing setting, proximity of the defendant to the contraband, contraband in plain view, and the proximity of the contraband to items owned by the defendant. Id.
[8] Here, Bredemeier asserts that the State did not meet its burden to show that he had possessed the methamphetamine that had been found in Andersons vehicle. In making that argument, Bredemeier analogizes his case to Houston v. State, 997 N.E.2d 407, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), in which we reversed the defendants conviction based on insufficient evidence establishing possession. In that case, police had discovered contraband between the passenger seat and the center console, the defendant had not been the sole occupant of the vehicle, there had been no evidence that any of the occupants had been aware of the contrabands presence, there had been no evidence that the defendant had attempted to flee or had made furtive gestures, the contraband had not been not in plain view, and it had not been commingled with any of the defendants belongings. Id. at 410–11. Bredemeiers reliance on Houston is misplaced.
[9] Unlike the evidence in Houston, the evidence establishing that Bredemeier had possessed the contraband discovered during the search is overwhelming. First, Bredemeier admitted that it was his methamphetamine. Second, Trooper Widner observed Bredemeier “reaching” and “moving around” before the vehicle stopped, and Bredemeier admitted that he had placed the methamphetamine under the seat when Trooper Widner had seen him moving around. States Ex. 3B at 14:30–35, 15:04–10; 16:22–28. Third, and troopers discovered the methamphetamine under the seat in which Bredemeier had been sitting near his telephone. These circumstances are more than sufficient to establish constructive possession of the methamphetamine.
[10] Moreover, during his jail calls to Anderson, Bredemeier encouraged her to tell law enforcement that the methamphetamine had belonged to her and instructed her to “wipe” his telephone, on which the incriminating text-message chains had been found. States Ex. 13 at 0:39. Attempts to induce false testimony and conceal evidence may be considered as consciousness of guilt. See Bennett v. State, 787 N.E.2d 938, 946 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied; see also McKinstry v. State, 660 N.E.2d 1052, 1053 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). As a result, we conclude that the evidence introduced by the State sufficiently established that Bredemeier had possessed the methamphetamine discovered during the search of Andersons vehicle.
II. The Text-Message Evidence was Obtained Pursuant to a Valid Warrant
[11] Bredemeier argues that the trial court improperly admitted evidence obtained from his telephone after he had been arrested. More particularly, Bredemeier argues that the warrant was not sufficiently particular under Indiana Constitution Article 1, section 11. We, however, disagree.
[12] The admission of evidence is entrusted to the trial courts discretion and is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Mack v. State, 23 N.E.3d 742, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. “When, however, the admissibility turns on questions of constitutionality relating to the search and seizure of that evidence, our review is de novo.” Jacobs v. State, 76 N.E.3d 846, 849 (Ind. 2017). A warrant must describe the place to be searched and the items to be searched for with sufficient particularity; however, “there is no requirement that there be an exact description.” Overstreet v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1140, 1158 (Ind. 2003). Notably, a “search warrant is presumed valid[.]” Smith v. State, 981 N.E.2d 1262, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.
[13] We conclude that the warrant in this case was sufficiently particular in what was to be searched and what was to be searched for. The search warrant specified that police would search Bredemeiers telephone for evidence of methamphetamine possession and intent to distribute in “[a]ny and all stored communication files” and provided an enumerated list of specific items that constituted stored communication files, including text messages. Ex. Vol. IV p. 161. We have previously held that similarly broad descriptions regarding cellular telephones are sufficient. In Carter v. State, 105 N.E.3d 1121, 1130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied, we upheld a warrant that described the place that police could search as the defendants cellular telephone and described what to be searched for as “any information relating to calls, messages, including Facebook messages and accounts” and “all information including but not limited to photographs, images, emails, letters, applications, and folders [․] that would indicate the identity of the phones owner/user[.]” Id. at 1129. Contrary to Bredemeiers argument, the warrant to search for “[a]ny and all stored communication files” related to his drug dealing and possession is not impermissibly broad. Ex. Vol. IV p. 161; see Carter, 105 N.E.3d at 1131 (a warrant is not impermissibly general when it authorizes law enforcement to search specifically for the challenged evidence, including text messages on a cellular telephone).
III. Bredemeiers Sentence is Appropriate
[14] Bredemeier argues that his sentence is inappropriate. We “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial courts decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). “Although appellate review of sentences must give due consideration to the trial courts sentence because of the special expertise of the trial bench in making sentencing decisions, Appellate Rule 7(B) is an authorization to revise sentences when certain broad conditions are satisfied.” Shouse v. State, 849 N.E.2d 650, 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. However, our review of sentencing decisions is “very deferential[.]” Golden v. State, 862 N.E.2d 1212, 1218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. As a result, we will only reverse a trial courts sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1215. The sentencing ranges for Level 2 and 4 felonies are ten to thirty years and two to twelve years, respectively. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. For his two convictions, Bredemeier received an aggregate sentence of twenty-six years, less than the maximum.
[15] When it comes to the nature of his offenses, Bredemeier argues only that the sentence imposed on his conviction for possession with the intent to deliver is inappropriate based on the nature of the crime. Specifically, he argues only that he was convicted for having approximately thirteen grams of meth, which suggests that it was for personal use. We, however, disagree. Evidence in the record establishes that Bredemeier was regularly dealing methamphetamine.
[16] Bredemeiers character also does nothing to warrant a reduced sentence. Bredemeier argues that, based on a balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors, an appropriate sentence would be the advisory of seventeen and one-half years. Again, we disagree. We consider several circumstances when evaluating whether a defendants character warrants a sentence reduction, including whether the defendant has expressed remorse for his crimes, Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 216 (Ind. 2016); whether he has obtained treatment or rehabilitation for past illegal behaviors, id.; whether he is likely to be deterred from committing new crimes, Cotto v. State, 829 N.E.2d 520, 526 (Ind. 2005); whether he was on probation, parole, or pretrial release in another case at the time he committed the underlying offense, Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind. 2006); and whether he has a criminal history. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on rehg, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007).
[17] In considering those circumstances, we note that “[e]ven a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendants character.” Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Here, however, Bredemeiers criminal history is significant. Over the course of four decades, he has been convicted of crimes in four states, including several felony offenses. Moreover, at the time of his sentencing in this case, he had two pending charges for Level 2 felony dealing methamphetamine in two separate cause numbers. Based on the nature of Bredemeiers crime coupled with his extensive criminal history, we cannot say that his twenty-six-year sentence is inappropriate.
[18] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford
Judges Crone and Tavitas concur.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.