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D.R. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner (2024)

Court of Appeals of Indiana.2024-07-05No. Court of Appeals Case No. 24A-JT-181

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Weissmann, Judge.

[1] D.R. (Father) appeals the termination of his parental rights over T.R. (Child). Because Father abandoned Child shortly after her birth, spent most of these proceedings incarcerated for a litany of crimes, and continues to have a substance abuse problem, we affirm.

Facts

[2] One month after Childs birth in the fall of 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report about intoxicated parents staying at a hotel with a newborn. DCS went to the hotel and found Father and Childs Mother arguing in the parking lot. The two agreed to leave separately.

[3] Mother and Child went to stay at the home of Childs Maternal Grandfather, where Father was not welcome. Within a week, Mother went to the store and did not return. Unable to take care of a newborn, Maternal Grandfather called Childs Aunt, who took Child. Aunt saw that Child had many medical problems, including a diaper rash, a yeast infection, and a clogged tear duct.

[4] Aunt took Child to the hospital for treatment but ran into trouble when the hospital asked for parental consent or DCSs permission. Aunt contacted DCS, which in turn tried to contact Father and Mother. Both refused to go to the hospital or consent to any treatment. DCS then authorized Childs treatment and placed Child in Aunts care on an emergency basis.

[5] DCS filed a petition claiming Child was a child in need of services (CHINS). The petition alleged that Father and Mother were homeless, had a history of substance abuse, and were not taking responsibility for Childs well-being. After a fact-finding hearing, the trial court found Child to be a CHINS and ordered Mother and Father to complete reunification services. Father needed to keep in touch with DCS, obtain and maintain safe housing and a legal source of income, complete a substance abuse assessment and follow through with any recommendations, submit to random drug screens, complete a domestic violence assessment, and visit Child regularly and consistently.

[6] Although DCS offered services to Father, he did not participate. Father was also involved in several criminal cases, including charges of public intoxication, criminal trespass, disorderly conduct, possession of methamphetamine, and false informing. As a result of these charges, Father was incarcerated during most of the CHINS case.

[7] After not hearing from Mother and Father since the CHINS hearing nearly six months earlier, DCS changed Childs permanency plan from reunification to adoption and petitioned to terminate their parental rights. At a termination hearing, Childs family case manager (FCM) and the court appointed special advocate (CASA) both testified that termination was in Childs best interests and that DCS’ plan for Childs care and treatment was adoption. Father was incarcerated at the time of the termination hearing and did not appear, despite having the opportunity to do so. Mother also failed to appear.

[8] The trial court entered an order terminating Mothers and Fathers parental rights. The court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Childs removal and retention in foster care would not be remedied, that the continuation of the parent-child relationship would pose a threat to Childs wellbeing, that termination was in Childs best interests, and that there was a satisfactory plan for Childs care and treatment. Father alone appeals the termination order.

Discussion and Decision

[9] The State bears a high burden to terminate parental rights. The State must prove that a childs parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[10] A petition to terminate parental rights must allege, in relevant part:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023). If the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that these allegations are true, it must terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code §§ 31-35-2-8, -37-14-2. In reviewing a termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). The judgment will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.

[11] Father argues only that DCS failed to adequately prove with a reasonable probability that (1) the conditions leading to termination will not be remedied and that (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship threatens Childs well-being. As these are disjunctive requirements, either being true will satisfy the requirements of subsection (B), and thus support the trial courts judgment terminating Fathers parental rights. In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We find the remedying conditions issue dispositive.

There Is a Reasonable Probability that the Conditions Leading to Childs Removal Will Not Be Remedied

[12] The analysis here requires two steps. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). First, the relevant conditions for the childs removal must be identified. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Second, we “determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” E,M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)). Given its firsthand view as the factfinder, the trial court is entrusted with determining the “delicate balance” of a parents fitness at the time of the termination hearing. Id.

[13] The reason for removal in this case was simple: Father effectively abandoned Child only one week after her birth. And Fathers abandonment came at a particularly critical time when Child needed medical care. Even so, Father contends that Childs condition was not strictly his fault, as he was prevented from visiting Mother and Child while they stayed with Maternal Grandfather. But Father refused, or at least ignored, DCSs entreaty for his consent to Childs medical treatment during this time.

[14] The trial court did not clearly err in finding that Fathers abandonment and neglect of Child were unlikely to improve. Father was arrested several times after Childs removal and was incarcerated during most of the CHINS proceeding, including during the termination hearing. See In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (“the trial court must judge a parents fitness to care for her children at the time of the termination hearing”). Further, Fathers efforts toward reunification were dismal, with nearly no reported success at completing his required reunification services despite opportunities for services during his frequent periods of incarceration.

[15] Against this evidence, Father points to his own testimony that he intends to take parenting and basic education classes. Setting aside that this is no more than an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence, the evidence that Fathers behavior remains unchanged is overwhelming. See Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372-73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that a fathers “inaction” and “lack of commitment to preserve his relationship with his children” showed that the conditions leading to the childrens removal were unlikely to be remedied).

[16] Finding no clear error in the termination of Fathers parental rights, we affirm.

Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

Memorandum Decision by Judge Weissmann

Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.