MEMORANDUM DECISION
Riley, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Jarrod W. Brattain (Brattain), appeals his conviction for domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Brattain presents this court with one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain his conviction for domestic battery.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] By 2023, Brattain and T.K. had been in a relationship for the past five years and were living together in Brattains residence in Shelbyville, Indiana. Their relationship was characterized by many arguments and fights. On March 10, 2023, T.K. woke up to Brattain yelling at her for cheating on him. Brattain was angry and threw T.K.’s cellphone on the floor. While still on the bed, Brattain climbed on top of T.K. and held her down by her neck. T.K. attempted to escape but Brattain grabbed her face, smacked it, and squeezed it, leaving a mark and bruising above her left eye, marks on her neck, and a cut on her lip. Brattain was holding T.K. on the bed “in a rude[,] insolent[,] or angry manner.” (Transcript p. 40). T.K. managed to leave the residence and drive to a Walmart parking lot where she sat for a minute and then drove to a nearby police station where she reported the incident to Officer Josh Kieffer of the Shelbyville Police Department (Officer Kieffer). T.K. recounted the incident to Officer Kieffer and informed him that her pain was a four on a one to ten scale. Officer Kieffer noticed that T.K. had been “crying for quite a while and her face was red.” (Tr. p. 48). He observed a “cut on her lip and could also see some bruising to her eye.” (Tr. p. 49). T.K. stated that Brattain had hit her in the face, “but she couldnt remember if it was with [a] close fist or an open hand.” (Tr. p. 49). Although T.K. informed Officer Kieffer that some bruising on her eye was in fact make-up, Officer Kieffer, based on his “training and experience as [a] law enforcement officer,” concluded that the bruising on T.K.’s left eye appeared to be an injury. (Tr. p. 49).
[5] On March 13, 2023, the State filed an Information, charging Brattain with strangulation, a Level 6 felony, and domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. On July 23, 2023, the trial court granted the States motion to dismiss the strangulation charge. On January 2, 2024, the trial court conducted a bench trial. Following the close of the evidence, the trial court concluded T.K. “to be a credible witness” and to be “thoroughly convinced that [Brattain] battered her that day.” (Tr. p. 68). Although Brattain testified in his own defense, the trial court noted that his “story doesnt make sense to me.” (Tr. p. 68). The trial court found Brattain guilty as charged and sentenced him to 365 days, all suspended to probation, except for eight days.
[6] Brattain now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[7] Brattain contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to establish that he committed domestic battery. Our standard of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction is well-established: we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we affirm if there is “substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Lehman v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1097, 1104 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.
[8] To establish domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, beyond a reasonable doubt, the State was required to prove that Brattain “knowingly or intentionally ․ touch[ed] a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner.” See I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1). Not contesting the other statutory elements, Brattain solely challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the ‘rude, insolent, or angry manner’ prong of the charge. Although “rude,” “insolent,” or “angry” are not separately defined in Indianas domestic battery statute, “these disjunctive terms of art have plain and ordinary meanings readily susceptible of application by a factfinder.” In re Hill, 144 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2020) (providing dictionary definitions for each term).
[9] T.K. testified that, while he angrily yelled at her, Brattain touched her by grabbing her face, smacking it, and squeezing it, leaving a mark and bruising above her left eye, marks on her neck, and a cut on her lip. After she managed to leave the residence, T.K. recounted the incident to Officer Kieffer and reported that her pain was a four on a one to ten scale. Officer Kieffer observed a “cut on her lip and could also see some bruising to her eye.” (Tr. p. 49). Although T.K. informed Officer Kieffer that some bruising on her eye was make-up, Officer Kieffer, based on his “training and experience as [a] law enforcement officer,” concluded that the bruising on T.K.’s left eye appeared to be an injury. (Tr. p. 49).
[10] Brattains argument conjures a number of hypothetical situations, such as that he was merely touching T.K.’s face to move it so she would look at him, that T.K.’s lip was injured during a hug or affectionate encounter, or that T.K.’s bruised eye was merely cosmetic residue. However, like the trial court noted that Brattains “story doesnt make sense,” we are equally unpersuaded by his arguments on appeal. (Tr. p. 68). Accordingly, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Brattains conviction.
CONCLUSION
[11] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Brattains conviction for domestic battery, as a Class A misdemeanor.
[12] Affirmed.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Riley
Judges Kenworthy and Felix concur.
[13] Kenworthy, J. and Felix, J. concur