MEMORANDUM DECISION
May, Judge.
[1] C.A. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his child, A.A. (“Child”). Father makes several arguments, which we revise and restate as:
1. Whether some of the trial courts findings were unsupported by the evidence, specifically,
1.1 Finding 14, concerning Fathers lack of participation in Fatherhood Engagement and visitation; and
1.2 Finding 17, concerning Fathers substance abuse and lack of stable housing; and
2. Whether the trial courts conclusions that the conditions under which Child was removed from Fathers care would not be remedied and that continuation of the Father-Child relationship posed a threat to Childs well-being were supported by the findings.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born September 15, 2020, to Father and B.E. (“Mother”).
1
Following birth, Child lived with Mother, who was also a minor, in Mothers foster care placement. On January 2, 2022, Child was “running through the home with a pill bottle in her hand and [Mother] discovered three (3) partially dissolved pills in her mouth.” (Ex. Vol. II at 11.) Mother contacted two other people and poison control before taking Child to the hospital.
[3] After examining Child in the emergency room, the hospital determined Child had “apparently consumed an unknown amount of an antipsychotic medicine[,]” which required hospital personnel to intubate Child. (Id. at 10.) The hospital called the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and alleged Child was a victim of abuse and/or neglect. Mother spoke with DCS and admitted Child had ingested the drugs as reported by the hospital. Based thereon, law enforcement executed a search of Mothers home and found “multiple illicit substances, paraphernalia, and empty pill bottles throughout the home.” (Id. at 11.) DCS could not locate Father.
[4] On January 4, 2022, DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) based on Mothers inability to properly supervise Child, as evidenced by the Childs medical emergency, and Mothers substance abuse issues. The petition also noted Mother was a minor who lived in foster care.
[5] That same day, the trial court held its initial hearing on the CHINS petition. Father appeared and waived both his right to counsel and his participation in the fact-finding hearing. On February 11, 2022, the trial court entered its order approving a “Facilitated Agreement of the Parties[,]” (id. at 16) (internal formatting omitted), in which Mother admitted Child was a CHINS. Because Father had waived his right to fact-finding in the matter, the trial court adjudicated Child as a CHINS based on Mothers admission.
[6] On April 20, 2022, the trial court held its dispositional hearing. On April 28, 2022, the trial court entered a dispositional order that required Father to, among other things: contact the DCS family case manager (“FCM”) every week; keep all appointments with any service provider, DCS, Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) and/or Guardian ad litem (“GAL”); obtain and maintain stable housing and income; refrain from consuming illegal substances; obey the law; complete a parenting assessment and a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations stemming therefrom; submit to random drug screens; attend the Fatherhood Engagement program; and participate in supervised visitation with Child. At the time, Child remained in Mothers care at Mothers foster care residence.
[7] On July 14, 2022, the trial court entered an order changing Childs placement to a foster care placement that was not Mothers foster care placement. Child resided in her foster care placement for seven months.
2
On January 11, 2023, the trial court held a hearing regarding Childs permanency plan. In its February 6, 2023, order on that hearing, the trial court noted Father had not complied with Childs case plan. Father had not participated in Fatherhood Engagement or supervised visitation with Child and had not completed a substance abuse assessment or drug screens. The trial court stated Father had “been referred for therapeutic visitation with [Child]” and DCS had made another referral for Father to complete a substance abuse assessment and drug screening. (Id. at 36.) The trial court changed Childs permanency plan to reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption. In June 2023, the trial court suspended Fathers visitation with Child due to positive drug screens.
[8] Based on Fathers noncompliance with services, DCS filed a petition to terminate Fathers parental rights to Child on August 30, 2023. On September 25, 2023, the trial court held an initial hearing on the termination petition. Father appeared at the hearing and requested counsel. The trial court appointed counsel for Father. At the end of the hearing, the trial court advised Father that the fact-finding hearing was scheduled for November 27, 2023, and that DCS could “proceed with evidence even in [his] absence” at that hearing. (Tr. Vol. II at 13.)
[9] On November 27, 2024, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing and Father did not appear. During the hearing, DCS presented evidence that, while Father completed some ordered services such as a “parenting education program” and supervised visitation with Child, (id. at 28), Father did not complete Fatherhood Engagement as ordered and did not have stable housing or income. In addition, Father missed forty-eight out of fifty random drug screens. In the drug screens he did complete, Father tested positive for THC, though Father told the FCM that he tested positive for THC because he was buying “a legal form of THC ․ that he bought from a gas station or smoke shop.” (Id. at 26.) The FCM, Childs CASA, and Childs foster mother testified that termination of Fathers parental rights was in Childs best interests.
[10] On December 20, 2023, the trial court entered an order terminating Fathers parental rights to Child that contained the following unchallenged findings:
9. Although [DCS] made referrals for services to enhance Fathers skills, his effort in those services offered without cost to himself was inadequate to result in significant improvement of Fathers parenting skills.
10. Father failed to maintain weekly contact with the FCM, and also failed to keep appointments with service providers and DCS.
11. Father does not currently have a legal and stable source of income with which to support himself and [Child].
12. Father has failed to engage in a number of random drug screens offered to support his sobriety (missing 48 screens).
13. Analyses [sic] reports from Cordant [a company conducting drug screens] reflect that Father continues to test positive for THC. From June of 2023 until the evidentiary hearing date, Father tested positive for controlled substances on six occasions and negative for the same on one occasion.
* * * * *
15. DCS has received no records indicating that [Father] has, through private services, enhanced his ability to parent [Child].
16. Fathers visits have been suspended by the CHINS court pending [Fathers] submission of a screen that is negative for any illegal substances, and he failed to attend his home-based case work session on November 14, 2023.
17. In short, there is not evidence that [Father] ․ has stable employment or other lawful means to provide for himself and [Child] ․ or has taken full advantage of the services offered to him so that he could overcome these parenting challenges.
18. The Court finds most telling that [Father] failed to even appear for [a] hearing on the important question of whether his parental rights to [Child] would be terminated, notwithstanding actual knowledge of the date, time and location of the hearing.
(App. Vol. II at 5-6.)
Discussion and Decision
[11] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. The termination of parental rights is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities[.]” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)).
[12] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and prove:
(A) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
(ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6 that reasonable efforts for family preservation or reunification are not required, including a description of the courts finding, the date of the finding, and the manner in which the finding was made.
(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a county office of family and children or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child;
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations at the termination hearing. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” Id. at 1261. Because parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children, the State “must strictly comply” with the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights. In re Q.M., 974 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cnty. Dept of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). As our Indiana Supreme Court explained in In re V.A.:
In reviewing whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate “we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility.” We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give “due regard” to the trial courts unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. “We will set aside the trial courts judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.”
51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016) (internal citations omitted).
[13] When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 125 (Ind. 2016). When reviewing the trial courts findings and conclusions we “shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial judge to judge the credibility of witnesses.” Ind. T.R. 52(A). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
1. Challenged Findings
1.1 Finding 14
[14] Father challenges the portion of Finding 14 that states, “DCS offered these services[ ] ․ Fatherhood Engagement with Supervised Parenting Time, which he did not complete[.]” (App. Vol. II at 5.) Father contends he completed a parenting assessment and a parenting education program as referred by DCS and thus the trial courts finding that he did not complete Fatherhood Engagement was not supported by the evidence. Further, Father asserts that “[h]e did not voluntarily stop visiting [Child]” because “[h]is visitation was suspended by the CHINS court.” (Fathers Br. at 8.)
[15] At the fact-finding hearing, FCM Kenneth Delph testified the Fatherhood Engagement program “entails homebased case work, parenting education, and visitation[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 22.) DCS referred Father to Fatherhood Engagement twice: once in March 2022 and a second time in February 2023. DCS was unable to find a provider that could work with Father because Childs placement was a considerable distance away from Fathers residence and a portion of those services required Childs presence. In an effort to provide Father the services included in Fatherhood Engagement, DCS worked with separate service providers. In September 2023, DCS referred Father for a parenting assessment and subsequent parenting education, both of which he completed on November 14, 2023 - three days before the fact-finding hearing.
[16] As to home-based case work, FCM Delph testified Father engaged in some home-based case work by accepting assistance in finding stable housing. However, FCM Delph also testified Father had missed the home-based casework appointment scheduled immediately prior to the fact-finding hearing and he had not progressed in home-based services.
[17] Regarding visitation, at the beginning of the CHINS case in January 2022, DCS referred Father for supervised visits with Child and Father attended some visits with Child. That referral was closed out sometime thereafter because Father missed three visits. Father did not visit with Child from May 2022 until December 2022. Starting in late December 2022 or early January 2023, Father began participating in supervised visitation. However, in June 2023, the trial court suspended Fathers visitation with Child because his drug screens were positive for THC. Visits were never resumed because Father tested positive for THC in all subsequent drug screens except one.
[18] Thus, while Father did complete one part of the Fatherhood Engagement program – that is, parenting education – he did not complete the other two components - home-based casework and visitation with Child. While Father attempts to place the blame on DCS for his inability to participate in visitation, it was his positive drug screens that resulted in the suspension of visitation. Therefore, the evidence supported the trial courts findings, and Fathers arguments are an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
1.2 Finding 17
[19] Father also challenges two portions of Finding 17. In the first, the trial court stated, “there is no evidence to indicate that [Father] has overcome his active substance abuse disorder[.]” (App. Vol. II at 5.) Father argues the record was “devoid of evidence” that he had a “substance abuse disorder[.]” (Fathers Br. at 9.) To support his contention, Father states, “J.E. Schmidt, M.D., Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine, (Matthew Bender) defines ‘substance abuse disorder’ as ‘A mental disorder resulting from (or associated with) the continued use of substances (usually drugs or medicines) which affect the nervous system.’ ” (Id.)
3
Father is correct that the record contains no evidence that Father was diagnosed by a mental health professional with substance abuse disorder.
[20] However, this erroneous use of the term “disorder” is of no consequence because there are additional findings to support the fact that Father has a substance abuse problem. Regarding Fathers substance abuse, the trial court found:
12. Father has failed to engage in a number of random drug screens offered to support his sobriety (missing 48 screens).
13. Anylyses [sic] reports from Cordant [the service that conducted drug testing] reflect that Father continues to test positive for THC. From June of 2023 until the evidentiary hearing date, Father tested positive for controlled substances on six occasions and negative for the same on one occasion.
* * * * *
16. Fathers visits have been suspended by the CHINS court pending [Fathers] submission of a screen that is negative for any illegal substances. ․
Father does not challenge Finding 12, 13, or 16, and thus they stand proven. See Henderson, 139 N.E.3d at 232 (“We accept unchallenged findings as true.”). Any error in the trial courts characterization of Fathers substance abuse problem is superfluous because there were other findings to support the fact that Father has an issue with illegal substances. See, e.g., Matter of D.P., 213 N.E.3d 552, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (superfluous findings, even if erroneous, are not a basis for reversal provided the trial court made other unchallenged findings), trans. denied.
[21] Father also challenges another portion of Finding 17, which states, “there is no evidence to indicate [Father] ․ has stable and secure housing for himself and [Child].” (App. Vol. II at 5.) During the fact-finding hearing, FCM Delph testified:
[DCS]: Has he maintained a home that would be suitable[,] safe[,] and stable in which he could parent [Child]?
[FCM Delph]: Yes, his home is stable.
[DCS]: Uh tell us about that home.
[FCM Delph]: Um from my understanding it is a three-to-four bedroom home where he resides with [h]is mother and um current fiancé. From my understanding there are no other individuals in the home. Um and from my understanding as well as case history that his mom did come back as eligible to be safe with [Child].
[DCS]: Okay, does [Father] have [a] legal um opportunity to remain in the home?
[FCM Delph]: Yes, from my understanding.
[DCS]: Okay is his name on the deed or the lease?
[FCM Delph]: No, he resides there knowing that its his mothers home.
[DCS]: So it would at his [m]others acquiescence that he be able to stay there?
[FCM Delph]: Correct.
[DCS]: So he doesnt actually have a suitable home for himself. He has one that he thinks his mother would let him continue to stay in, right?
[FCM Delph]: Correct, he does not have his own housing under his own name.
(Tr. Vol. II at 23-4.) FCM Delph testified that Father lived at his mothers house because his mother, at the time, permitted him to do so. The trial court was free to decide that his housing was unstable because his mother could ask him to discontinue his residency at her house at any time. Therefore, the evidence supported the trial courts findings, and Fathers arguments are an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143 (appellate court cannot reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses).
2. Challenged Conclusions
[22] Father argues the trial courts findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed from his care would not be remedied because Child was not technically removed from his care and therefore the reasons for removal could not be attributed to him. In support of his argument, Father cites In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1133-4 (Ind. 2010), in which our Indiana Supreme Court held the fathers parental rights to the child could not be terminated because, in part, the trial courts findings did not support its conclusion that the conditions under which the child was removed could not be remedied because the father was not responsible for those conditions. Id. at 1134.
[23] In that case, the trial court did not issue a dispositional order regarding the father, even though he was named as a party in the CHINS matter and Child was adjudicated a CHINS as to both mother and father. Id. at 1130. Instead, over a year after the child was declared a CHINS, DCS allowed visitation between the father and his child for approximately three months before the visits were discontinued because father had not established paternity. Id. The father established paternity about a year thereafter and visited with child consistently during the six months before the termination fact-finding hearing. Id.
[24] In the I.A. courts order terminating mothers and fathers parental rights to child, the trial court made several findings regarding mothers failure to participate in services. Regarding father, the trial court made two findings - that father had “not bonded with the child after six (6) months of Parent Aid[e] services” and that father “needs lots of direction regarding simple tasks relating to the care of the child.” Id. at 1131. Our Indiana Supreme Court held those two findings did not support the trial courts conclusion that the conditions under which child was removed would not be remedied as to the father because there was no evidence regarding why the child was not placed with the father either at the time of removal from mothers care or at some point while the child was in foster care. Id. at 1134
[25] Here, like in I.A., Father was not responsible for the conditions under which Child was removed from Mothers care. However, unlike in I.A., the trial court delineated reasons why Child was not placed with Father at the beginning of the CHINS proceeding – specifically, his lack of housing and his drug use – in its dispositional order when it required Father to complete services to address, among other things, his housing and substance abuse issues. Father did not complete those services, and the trial court made several findings about his inability to parent Child and provide her with a stable environment. Based thereon, we hold the trial courts findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed would not be remedied.
4
See, e.g., Matter of C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (fathers noncompliance with the requirements of the trial courts dispositional order supported the trial courts conclusion that the conditions under which child was removed from his care would not be remedied), trans. denied.
Conclusion
[26] The evidence before the trial court supports its findings that Father did not complete the Fatherhood Engagement program and did not have stable housing. While there was no evidence that Father had been diagnosed with a substance abuse disorder, the error in that finding was superfluous because there were several other findings indicating that Father habitually used THC and his drug use interfered with his ability to parent Child. Finally, the trial courts findings supported its conclusion that the conditions under which Child was removed would not be remedied. Based thereon, we affirm the involuntary termination of Fathers parental rights.
[27] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Mother voluntarily terminated her parental rights to Child by signing a consent of adoption. She does not participate in this appeal.
2
. The record does not indicate why this change in placement occurred or where Child was placed during those months.
3
. Fathers citation does not provide a page number or publication year, and thus we cannot confirm his quote. We remind counsel to include full citations to sources.
4
. Father also argues the trial courts findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the Father-Child relationship poses a threat to Childs well-being. As the relevant statute is written in the disjunctive, DCS is required to prove only one of the three parts of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B). See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A) is written in the disjunctive and, thus, DCS need prove only one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied. Accordingly, we need not address this argument to affirm the trial courts judgment.
Memorandum Decision by Judge May
Judges Brown and Pyle concur.
Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.