MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Jorge Dinunzio appeals his sentence for two Level 4 child molesting convictions.
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The only issue he raises on appeal is whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. However, finding that Dinunzio waived his appeal, we dismiss.
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Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 15, 2021, the State charged Dinunzio with two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting
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and two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting. On July 21, 2023, Dinunzio and the State filed a plea agreement in which Dinunzio agreed to plead guilty to two counts of Level 4 felony child molesting and the State agreed to seek dismissal of the two counts of Level 1 felony child molesting. The Plea Agreement further provided for the “[t]otal sentence” for the two counts of Level 4 child molesting that “[a]ll terms are open to argument to the Court.” App. at 140. Section 4(r) of the Plea Agreement stated, in full:
Unless otherwise provided for in this plea agreement, [Defendant] hereby waives his right to appeal any discretionary portion of the sentence entered pursuant to and in accordance with this plea agreement and further acknowledges and affirms that this waiver is knowing and made voluntarily. Defendant understands that he otherwise would have a right to appeal his sentence if there were an open plea. The defendant hereby waives his right to appeal the sentence so long as the Court sentences him within the terms of the plea agreement. Defendant understands and waives his right to appeal the proportionality of the sentence under Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution; therefore, he knowingly and voluntarily agrees to waive his right to appeal his sentence on the basis that it is erroneous or for any other reason so long as the Court sentences him within the terms of this plea agreement.
Id. at 143. Dinunzio initialed Section 4(r) of the Plea Agreement, and signed the Plea Agreement.
[3] The trial court held a change of plea hearing on June 26, 2023, at which Dinunzio admitted to the factual basis supporting his crimes and acknowledged and confirmed his guilty plea. However, at one point, the trial court stated to Dinunzio: “You will still have the right to appeal the manner in which the Court {sic} imposes sentence and the amount of sentence that the Court does impose, just not the conviction. Do you understand that, sir?” Tr. at 88-89. Dinunzio responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” Id. at 89. The trial court accepted Dinunzios guilty plea, entered convictions on the two Level 4 felony child molestation charges, and dismissed the remaining charges.
[4] Following Dinunzios October 11, 2023, sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to nine years for each Level 4 felony offense, to be served consecutively for a total of eighteen years. The trial court then advised Dinunzio that he had the right to appeal “the sentence of this court in regards to the amount of sentence thats imposed” and appointed appellate counsel for him. Id. at 132. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] The State asserts that Dinunzio waived his right to appeal his sentence, and we agree. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to appeal their sentences, but they may waive that right so long as their waiver is knowing and voluntary. Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1232 (Ind. 2023) (citing Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 74 (Ind. 2008)). Dinunzio entered into a written plea agreement under which the State agreed to seek dismissal of the two higher felony charges and, in exchange, Dinunzio agreed to plead guilty to the two lesser felony charges. In addition, Dinunzio agreed that “[a]ll terms”—including the sentence—were “open to argument to the Court.” App. at 140. Furthermore, under the unambiguous terms of the written plea agreement, Dinunzio waived “his right to appeal his sentence on the basis that it is erroneous or for any other reason so long as the Court sentences him within the terms of the plea agreement.” Id. at 143. The trial court dismissed the two Level 1 felony charges of child molestation and entered convictions for the two Level 4 felony child molestation charges to which Dinunzio pled guilty; that is, the court “sentence[d] him within the terms of the plea agreement.” Id. Therefore, Dinunzio waived any appeal of his sentence, and this appeal must be dismissed.
[6] In his appeal brief,
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Dinunzio does not mention or otherwise acknowledge the existence of the provision of the plea agreement waiving his right to appeal his sentence and instead focuses solely on the trial courts subsequent statement at the plea hearing that he had a right to appeal his sentence. Nor does Dinunzio claim that his written waiver of the right to appeal his sentence was unknowing or involuntary or that the trial courts statement misled him into agreeing to it. Indeed, Dinunzio could not bring such a claim on direct appeal but could only do so by filing a post-conviction relief petition. See Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1234 (noting a defendant who has already been sentenced may not challenge the voluntariness of a guilty plea through direct appeal but must do so through post-conviction procedures).
[7] Moreover, even if Dinunzio had not waived his right to appeal his sentence, as he clearly has, he would have waived this appeal by failing to comply with our Appellate Rules. Specifically, Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that each contention on the issues presented in an appellants brief must be “supported by cogent reasoning.” When an appellant provides no cogent argument for a contention, that contention is waived. See, e.g., Burnell v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1167, 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting the presentation of the appellants contentions must contain a clear showing of how the issues and contentions relate to the particular facts of the case under review, and we will not review undeveloped arguments). Under our Appellate Rules, “[i]t is not sufficient for the argument section that an appellant simply recites facts and makes conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support.” Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); see also Lane Alan Schrader Trust v. Gilbert, 974 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (noting Rule 46(A)(8) “prevents the court from becoming an advocate when it is forced to search the entire record for evidence in support of [a partys] broad statements”).
[8] Here, the sole issue Dinunzio raises on appeal is, “Should Th[e Appeals] Court Revise Dinunzios Sentence under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)?” Appellants Br. at 4. Article 7, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution “authorize[ ] independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court.” Roush v. State, 875 N.E.2d 801, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (alteration in original). This appellate authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Id. Revision of a sentence under Rule 7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate that his sentence is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B); see also Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[9] Dinunzios brief begins and ends with the bald assertion that his sentence should be revised under Appellate Rule 7(B) because it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. However, the analysis portion of his brief only argues that his sentence was wrong because the trial court ignored the States and Probation Departments sentencing recommendations and failed to give adequate weight to mitigators. Those contentions do not tell us whether the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Dinunzio waived the asserted Rule 7(B) issue by failing to provide cogent reasoning in support of it.
Conclusion
[10] Dinunzios appeal must be dismissed because, in his written plea agreement, he clearly waived his right to appeal his sentence. Even had he not done so, his appeal would be dismissed for failure to comply with the requirements of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
[11] Dismissed.
FOOTNOTES
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. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a), (b).
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. We note that our motions panel denied the States previously filed motion to dismiss. However, as the writing panel, we may reconsider the denial of that motion, and we do so now. See, e.g., Pryor v. State, 189 N.E.3d 167, 169 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022).
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. I.C. § 35-42-4-3 (a)(1).
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. Dinunzio did not file a reply brief.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bailey
Chief Judge Altice and Judge Mathias concur.
Altice, C.J., and Mathias, J., concur.