MEMORANDUM DECISION
Mathias, Judge.
[1] A.B. (“Mother”) appeals the Floyd Circuit Courts termination of her parental rights over her minor children D.K., B.C., and S.C. (“the Children”). Mother presents the following restated issues for our review:
1. Whether the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) failed to accommodate her alleged disability and failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family.
2. Whether the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that the conditions that resulted in the removal of the Children from her care are not likely to be remedied.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] When D.K. was born April 12, 2016, Mother was only fifteen years old. In March 2018, DCS received a report that D.K. had somehow contracted gonorrhea. DCS removed D.K. from Mothers home and placed her in foster care. After Mother agreed to an informal adjustment, D.K. returned to live with Mother and her father, T.K. But DCS removed D.K. from the home again in July due to substance abuse issues, supervision issues, and Mothers lack of parenting skills.
[4] Thereafter, DCS filed a petition alleging that D.K. was a child in need of services. At the ensuing factfinding hearing, Mother admitted that D.K. was a CHINS. Accordingly, the trial court adjudicated D.K. to be a CHINS.
[5] At some point, D.K. was returned to Mothers care, but Mother was not fully compliant with services. On February 1, 2019, D.K. “was removed again from Mother and placed in Foster Care ․ due to Mothers failure to ensure Child had a sober caregiver, her failure to properly supervise Child, and her inconsistency in services.” Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 47. In August, Mother moved into Providence House, “a facility that offers private housing, reunification services, transportation, and allows children to live with their parents.” Id. at 48. D.K. moved in with Mother and her boyfriend, J.C., for awhile, but Mother and J.C. were “never consistently compliant” with the program at Providence House. Id.
[6] On October 13, 2019, Mother gave birth to twins B.C. and S.C., who were born severely premature. After a few months in the hospital, the twins returned home with Mother and J.C. Due to concerns about domestic violence and Mothers general noncompliance with services, however, their ability to continue living at Providence House was threatened. At the end of December, one of the twins was hospitalized with an infection. At the hospital, J.C. “was visibly intoxicated, and the hospital noted significant safety concerns, including unsafe sleep, leaving the bed rail down on the bed with the child in it, and parents leaving a blanket over the childs face.” Id. at 49. Accordingly, on December 30, DCS removed the twins from Mothers care. D.K. continued to live with Mother and J.C.
[7] Thereafter, DCS told Mother that J.C. would not be allowed to be around any of the Children. Mother was initially compliant, but in March 2020, J.C. was seen at Providence House. The Providence House Director, Liz England, “felt that Mother was not creating a safe environment for [D.K.] and was choosing not to participate in the program, so she recommended discharge.” Id. at 50. The DCS family case manager “begged” England to reconsider, and she allowed Mother and D.K. to stay pending a meeting and commitment to compliance from Mother. Id. Mother failed to attend that meeting, and Mother and the Children left Providence House.
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[8] Mother and the Children stayed with friends who had each had prior involvement with DCS. The DCS family case manager told Mother that that was not a safe environment for the Children, but Mother disregarded that advice. When the family case manager later checked on the Children, D.K. was not home, and the twins were exhibiting signs of a lower respiratory infection. Mother expressed no concern for the twins’ health. And it was later determined that D.K. had stayed overnight with Father, “who was not involved in the DCS case at all at the time.” Id.
[9] “Due to Mothers failure to ensure Child and her siblings were in a safe environment, the concerns for one of the childrens health, and her decision to leave Providence House, Child and her siblings were detained on March 27, 2020 and placed in foster care.” Id. After the Childrens removal, “Mother was referred for supervised visitation, domestic violence services, home based casework, and individual therapy. Mother was also given an application for section 8 to aid in finding independent housing.” Id. at 51.
[10] Mothers compliance with services was “sporadic,” but she did graduate from virtual visits with the Children to in-person, monitored visits. Id. at 52.
By August 2020, Mother was living in a nice hotel, had a voucher for section 8 housing, and was compliant in services and visitation. [J.C.] had been arrested and was incarcerated. There were still concerns with Mothers ability to adequately supervise [the Children], so a safety plan was enacted that indicated Mother was to be [the Childrens] only caregiver, and anyone who she wished to be around Child during a visit would first have to be approved by DCS.
[ ] In September 2020, DCS permitted [D.K.] to stay overnight with Mother at the hotel.
[ ] Mother secured a home through Section 8 in October 2020. She was consistently participating in therapy, home based case management, and visitation. Discussions were held with Mother that unsupervised overnights would continue and if she remained in compliance and there were no major issues with visitation, a Trial Home Visit would be scheduled.
[ ] At a visit to the home on October 13, 2020, [the family case manager, Chaley] Edwards reminded Mother of the previous safety plan regarding approved caregivers.
[ ] FCM Edwards made an unannounced visit to Mothers home on October 20, 2020, during an unsupervised visit. FCM Edwards observed multiple cars outside of the home and someone she didnt recognize looking through the window. Initially no one opened the door for [her], but after she was let in FCM Edwards discovered [D.K.] in the home but also three unidentified adults hiding in the laundry room who refused to identify themselves. Mother initially refused to identify them, but later informed FCM Edwards who they were. None of these individuals had been approved by DCS and it was discovered upon further investigation the individuals had criminal convictions and likely would not have been approved to be caregivers.
[ ] After the individuals left[,] FCM Edwards confronted Mother about the incident, and Mother did not indicate that she saw a problem with the situation.
[ ] As a result of Mother not following the safety plan and not showing that she can ensure [D.K.] is always surrounded by safe and secure people, Mothers visits reverted to fully supervised in an office setting.
[ ] After this incident, Mother became inconsistent in both services and visitation. Her longtime therapist, Charissa Brewer, moved to a different employer and could no longer work with Mother. While this was difficult for Mother, given her level of trust with Ms. Brewer, Mother did not make the efforts necessary to engage in therapy with subsequent providers.
Id. at 52-53.
[11] On January 29, 2021, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mothers parental rights over D.K., and on June 30, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mothers parental rights over the twins. Following a consolidated evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered thorough findings and conclusions and granted those petitions. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[12] Indiana appellate courts have long adhered to a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1230-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing the trial courts decision, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to the courts judgment. Id. In deference to the trial courts unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.
[13] To determine whether a termination decision is clearly erroneous, we apply a two-tiered standard of review to the trial courts findings of facts and conclusions of law. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings; second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. If the evidence and inferences support the courts termination decision, we must affirm. In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. We will accept unchallenged factual findings as true. See In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 614 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
[14] It is well-settled that the parent-child relationship is one of societys most cherished relationships. See, e.g., In re A.G., 45 N.E.3d 471, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Indiana law thus sets a high bar to sever that relationship by requiring DCS to prove four elements by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2023).
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We need only discuss one of those elements raised by Mother in this appeal: whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Childrens removal or the reasons for placement outside of Mothers home will not be remedied.
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I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i).
[15] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of a parent is wholly inadequate for a childs very survival. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148. It is instead sufficient to show that the childs emotional and physical development are put at risk by the parents custody. Id. If the court finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a).
Issue One: Reasonable Efforts
[16] Mother first contends that there is no evidence that DCS made reasonable efforts to accommodate her alleged disability under the ADA during the CHINS proceedings, and she argues that DCS generally failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family which violated her right to due process. Mother argues that, in light of her PTSD from a troubled childhood in the foster care system and her borderline intellectual functioning, DCS should have ensured that Mother “understood DCSs requirements and reasons for the Childrens detention.” Appellants Br. at 26. This, Mother maintains, DCS failed to do.
[17] However, as the State points out, Mother raises these issues for the first time on appeal, and they are waived. S.L. v. Indiana Dept of Child Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that a parent may waive a due-process claim in a termination proceeding by raising that claim for the first time on appeal). Mother acknowledges that she did not argue these issues to the trial court. But she asserts that, in essence, the issue of her disability was tried by implication. We do not agree.
[18] Waiver notwithstanding, it is well settled that,
although “[t]he DCS is generally required to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families during the CHINS proceedings,” that requirement under our CHINS statutes “is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute, and a failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.”
In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting A.Z. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs. (In re H.L.), 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 & n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added) (citing I.C. § 31-34-21-5.5)). Thus, Mothers argument on these issues is not well taken.
[19] In any event, Mother has not shown any violation of the ADA, nor has she shown that DCS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family in light of her PTSD and limited intellect. DCS spent almost four years working closely with Mother to try to provide her with the services she needed to learn how to parent the Children. The CASA, Rebecca Gardenour, testified that DCS had done “a very good job on offering services” to Mother, but Mother did not “follow through with the services.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 80. And DCS gave Mother second and third chances when she was noncompliant. In sum, Mother has not shown that DCS failed to provide appropriate reunification services during the CHINS proceedings.
Issue Two: Challenged Findings/Reasons for Childrens Removal
[20] Mother argues that several of the trial courts findings are unsupported by the evidence and that, in turn, those findings do not support the trial courts conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Childrens removal and continued placement outside of her home will not be remedied. We address each issue in turn.
A. Challenged Findings
[21] Mother challenges more than a dozen of the trial courts findings with respect to the termination of her parental rights over D.K., and seven of the courts findings with respect to the termination of her parental rights over the twins. As the State argues, every single one of Mothers challenges to the findings is either an impermissible request that we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do, or a request that we consider the findings out of context.
[22] For example, Mother argues that findings No. 34, 39, and 40 are unsupported by the evidence. Each of those findings relates to Mothers noncompliance with various aspects of her stay at Providence House. Mother argues that, while the trial court found that she was “never consistently compliant” with services at Providence House, the evidence shows that her compliance was “consistent enough to maintain participation.” Appellants Br. at 32. And Mother argues that the trial court “overlooks Mothers compliances” from time to time. Id. But Mother mischaracterizes the word “consistent,” which is defined as “marked by harmony, regularity, or steady continuity: free from variation or contradiction.” Consistent, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/consistent (last visited June 12, 2024). The trial court cited evidence showing that, while Mother sometimes complied with services, she had periods of noncompliance. The CASA testified that Mothers participation in services “hasnt been consistent at all.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 80. Mothers challenge to these findings is without merit.
[23] Mother also argues that finding No. 58 is unsupported by the evidence. In that finding, the trial court found that, “[a]s a result of Mother not following the safety plan and not showing that she can ensure Child is always surrounded by safe and secure people, Mothers visits reverted to fully supervised in an office setting.” Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 53. Mother cites testimony showing that she kept D.K. safe, but she ignores her own testimony that, in October 2020, DCS visited her home and found people there who were “not approved by DCS” while D.K. was sleeping. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 127. And Mother testified that that was the “last time [she] got unsupervised visits.” Id. at 128.
[24] In Finding No. 75, the trial court found that “Mother has not consistently participated in services. Throughout the entirety of the case, she has not successfully completed any program or services. She was discharged from multiple different providers, making it difficult to find providers who were willing to work with her.” Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 56. Mother asserts that that finding is erroneous because she did complete “a budgeting curriculum.” Appellants Br. at 35. And she states that she made significant progress in several other areas. The evidence shows that Mother “completed an entire chapter” on budgeting that was part of a life skills book. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 247. But that was only one part of the life skills curriculum that Mother was working on with the family case manager. Completing that chapter did not mean that Mother completed the life skills program she was engaged in. Mother has not shown that Finding No. 75 is unsupported by the evidence.
[25] We need not address the rest of Mothers challenges to the findings because they are blatant requests that we reweigh the evidence. We hold that Mother has not shown that any of the trial courts findings are clearly erroneous.
B. Reasons for Removal and Continued Placement Outside the Home
[26] Mother contends that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Childrens removal and continued placement outside of her home will not be remedied. Consideration of this argument involves a two-step analysis: first, identifying the conditions that led to removal, and, second, determining whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will be remedied. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014). In the second step, the trial court determines a parents fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions; in other words, the court must balance a parents recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. In conducting its analysis, the trial court may also consider the reasons for the childs continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
[27] Here, D.K. was initially removed from Mothers care because D.K. had gonorrhea, and she was subsequently removed from Mothers care due to safety concerns. The twins were removed from Mothers care because of unsafe sleeping conditions, lack of supervision, and failure to complete ordered services. The reason the Children were not returned to Mothers home was because of persistent safety concerns. At the final hearing, the CASA testified that she had “a lot of concerns” for the Childrens safety if they were to be returned to Mothers care. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 79. And the CASA testified further that Mother had not shown enough progress after four years to prove that she could provide a safe environment for the Children. See id. at 81.
[28] As Mother points out, she did make progress for some periods of time in some areas. But, as the CASA testified, Mothers progress in services was followed by lapses. Specifically, Gardenour testified:
[Mother] hasnt followed through with the services. Every once in a while, there–therell be a little uptick, but it ․ falls behind again. We ․ dont go forward, we go backwards. And so I dont know why she doesnt follow through or follow through with the visits, but ․ it hasnt been consistent at all. And it hasnt been an upward, you know, things are getting better, because its not ․ its falling backwards.
Id. at 80.
[29] Once again, Mothers arguments on appeal simply seek to have this Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. The trial courts conclusion that the conditions that resulted in the Childrens removal and continued placement outside her home will not be remedied are supported by the findings, and the findings are supported by the evidence. We therefore affirm the trial courts judgment on this issue.
[30] For all these reasons, we affirm the trial courts termination of Mothers parental rights over the Children.
[31] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. It is unclear when the twins were returned to Mothers care.
2
. The fathers of D.K. and the twins do not participate in this appeal.
3
. The legislature has amended this statute effective March 11, 2024. Rather than subsection (b), the relevant provisions are now found in subsection (d).
4
. Mother purports to argue that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial courts determination that termination of her parental rights is in the Childrens best interests, but the argument section of her brief omits any cogent argument on that issue, and we do not address it.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Mathias
Chief Judge Altice and Judge Bailey concur.
Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.