MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[1] Dannheiser pleaded guilty to a Level 5 felony domestic battery
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in exchange for a fixed sentence consisting of time as a direct placement to community corrections and time suspended to probation. The State petitioned to revoke the direct placement, and Dannheiser admitted to the violation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked not only Dannheisers remaining time as a direct placement, but also part of his time suspended to probation. Dannheiser now appeals, challenging the revocation of the suspended time. On appeal, the State argues we should not reach the merits because Dannheiser waived his appellate rights.
[2] We conclude that Dannheiser did not waive his right to appeal the sanction imposed. Further, because we identify prima facie error in the revocation of the suspended time, we reverse the revocation of the suspended sentence, otherwise affirm the trial courts revocation order, and remand for the court to issue an amended order.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In October 2020, the State charged Dannheiser with Level 5 felony domestic battery. Dannheiser and the State reached a plea agreement under which Dannheiser would plead guilty in exchange for the following agreed sentence:
A sentence of 1826 days to the Indiana Department of Correction [“the DOC”], 1095 days of said sentence to be suspended with credit for [time served and]. ․ to be served on supervised probation pursuant to the terms as set forth herein.
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The executed portion of said sentence shall be served on electronically monitored home detention as a direct placement to the [DOC] and shall be supervised by the Scott County Community Corrections Department.
Appellants App. Vol. 2 p. 77. As for “[t]he probationary term of [the] sentence[ ],” the plea agreement specified that Dannheiser would be “subject to” not only “the Standard Terms and Conditions of Probation, as set forth in a separate document signed by [Dannheiser],” but also “any ․ additional terms that may be included in said document.” Id. at 78. Dannheiser separately executed a document titled “Terms and Conditions of Probation,” therein acknowledging that he “shall obey all laws of the United States of America, both state and federal, including the laws of the State of Indiana and its municipalities.” Id. at 80. The document also set forth specific “terms and conditions of probation[.]” Id. One condition was that Dannheiser “shall not commit another criminal offense.” Id. Another condition was that he “shall not use or possess alcohol or drugs or controlled substances unless prescribed by a physician.” Id. at 81.
[4] On March 9, 2023, the trial court accepted Dannheisers guilty plea, entered its judgment of conviction, and sentenced Dannheiser “according to the terms and conditions” of both “the ‘Memorandum of Plea Agreement’ and [the] ‘Terms and Conditions of Probation[.]’ ” Id. at 84. The trial court expressly noted that those documents were “incorporated into the Sentencing Order.” Id.
[5] On March 23, 2023, the State filed a document titled “Petition to Revoke Direct Placement and Request for Hearing.” Id. at 126. Therein, the State asserted that Dannheiser “violated his [d]irect [p]lacement ․ and should be ordered to execute the remaining time of his [d]irect [p]lacement in the [DOC].” Id. As for the violation, the State alleged that Dannheiser “committed a new criminal offense, to-wit: Possession of Methamphetamine and/or Possession of Paraphernalia,” and “possessed, used, and/or consumed illegal drugs and/or controlled substances.” Id. The State requested “a hearing ․ to determine whether [Dannheisers] [d]irect [p]lacement will be revoked[.]” Id. at 127.
[6] Dannheiser and the State reached an agreement under which Dannheiser would “enter[ ] an open or blind admission to the Petition to Revoke Direct Placement, in which [Dannheisers] sentence w[ould] be determined by the [trial] [c]ourt upon the completion of a sentencing hearing.” Id. at 141. The agreement specified that, in exchange for the admission, the pending criminal case would be dismissed. The agreement also contained the following clauses:
[Dannheiser] hereby waives any right he may have to appeal the sentence imposed by the [trial] [c]ourt, including the right to seek appellate review of the sentence pursuant to Ind. App. Rule 7. [Dannheiser] further waives any right he may have to appeal the finding and/or balancing of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances by the [t]rial [c]ourt. [Dannheiser] waives his right to challenge the sentence on the basis that it is erroneous and/or inappropriate.
Id. Dannheiser filed a motion requesting an admission hearing, which the trial court held on August 10, 2023. The hearing included the following exchange:
The Court: You have agreed to admit that you violated the terms and conditions of your direct placement[,] [p]ursuant to a petition that was filed with the court on March 23, 2023․ If a violation of your direct placement ․ is found, any or all of the balance of the unserved time could be revoked and you would have to serve that time incarcerated at the [DOC]. That would be the total sentence [of] 1826 days.
[The State]: Its 731.
The Court: 1095 were suspended, so itd be 731 days. And you would get credit for the 128 days you were given at the time of sentencing plus any credit for time already served on direct placement. Do you understand the nature of the alleged violation and the possible penalty?
[Dannheiser]: Yes, [y]our Honor.
Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 5–6. Shortly thereafter, the trial court asked the State to establish a factual basis. Dannheiser then admitted to the allegations in the petition, and the trial court accepted Dannheisers admission. See Appellants App. Vol. 2 p. 16. The trial court proceeded to hear evidence regarding a sanction.
[7] Regarding the sanction, the State argued that the trial court should “revoke the remainder of th[e] home detention sentence.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 25. As for the portion of the sentence involving time suspended to probation, the State said:
And then additionally, just to note, there was no petition to revoke probation filed in this matter, and theres no disposition as it relates to that. I dont think theres anything that would necessarily change at this juncture with the probation sentence. I think that three years suspended would remain as is. But like I said, we believe that the home detention should be revoked.
Id. Dannheiser asked that the court to maintain his placement and that he “go directly to [a] treatment facility” while “hav[ing] the responsibility of being on the bracelet and paying for the bracelet[.]” Id. at 26. Dannheiser asked that, after treatment, he be ordered to “continue to work with [a treatment provider] and[/]or community corrections with aftercare treatment that would give him the tools that he needs to be out and sober.” Id. at 26. The trial court took the matter under advisement and scheduled a hearing to announce the sanction.
[8] At the hearing on August 15, 2023, the court imposed the following sanction:
The Court: ․ Im going to revoke the balance of your home detention[.] ․ And then what Im going to do is Im going to convert 730 days of your probation[ary] period to a direct placement. And Im going to order that you follow all of the terms and conditions of the direct placement that have already been issued. And Im going to add the condition that you reside at either Hickory Creek or an equivalent treatment facility as approved by the Community Corrections Department. And then that will leave 365 days suspended. If youre successful on the home detention part, direct placement part, then [that will] be followed by 365 days of probation.
Id. at 31. After setting forth the sanction, the trial court asked Dannheiser and the State whether they had “anything further,” and the parties declined to address additional topics. Id. A few hours later, the trial court arranged for Dannheiser to appear remotely, noting that it had “neglected to give [him] one advisement” related to the “right to appeal the sentence [it] pronounced [that] morning.” Id. at 32. The court then said: “[Y]ou do have the right to appeal your sentence that I imposed this morning.” Id. Dannheiser now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[9] Dannheiser challenges the trial courts decision to impose a sanction involving the revocation of time suspended to probation, rather than only the time associated with his direct placement. Before reaching the merits, we address the States contention that Dannheiser waived his right to appeal this issue.
I. Waiver of Appeal
[10] A defendant may waive the right to an appeal. See, e.g., Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 74–77 (Ind. 2008). To do so, the waiver must be knowing and voluntary. Id. If the defendant signed a contract containing an unambiguous waiver provision, we generally enforce the provision, regarding the waiver as knowing and voluntary. See id. Of course, “contract law principles generally apply” in these scenarios. Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1232 (Ind. 2023). Thus, in enforcing a written waiver provision, we apply the plain meaning of the provision. Cf. Griffin v. State, 756 N.E.2d 572, 574 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. If we conclude that the defendant effectively waived his appellate rights, we will dismiss the appeal. See, e.g., Starcher v. State, 66 N.E.3d 621, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (applying the terms of a plea agreement and dismissing).
[11] Here, the State focuses on the contract Dannheiser signed after the State petitioned to revoke his direct placement. The agreement specified that Dannheiser would “enter[ ] an open or blind admission to the Petition to Revoke Direct Placement, in which [Dannheisers] sentence w[ould] be determined by the [trial] [c]ourt upon the completion of a sentencing hearing.” Id. at 141 (emphases added). Regarding waiver, the agreement stated:
[Dannheiser] hereby waives any right he may have to appeal the sentence imposed by the [trial] [c]ourt, including the right to seek appellate review of the sentence pursuant to Ind. App. Rule 7. [Dannheiser] further waives any right he may have to appeal the finding and/or balancing of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances by the [t]rial [c]ourt. [Dannheiser] waives his right to challenge the sentence on the basis that it is erroneous and/or inappropriate.
Id. Focusing on the foregoing waiver provision, the State asks us to dismiss the appeal. The State asserts that, despite the trial courts subsequent advisement that Dannheiser retained the right to appeal from the courts order, “the plea agreement, in its written form, is clear” and determinative. Appellees Br. p. 10. All in all, the State claims that Dannheiser “waived his right to appeal the sentence imposed by the trial court for his violation of home detention.” Id.
[12] As an initial matter, we note that the appellate record contains references to a “sentence” imposed for Dannheisers violation of a condition of his placement. These references are inartful because “[a] trial courts action in a post-sentence ․ violation proceeding is not a criminal sentence[.]” Jones v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Ind. 2008). Rather, these “post-sentence ․ proceeding[s]” instead involve the trial courts authority to impose “sanctions” upon the violation of a condition of the alternative placement. Id.; cf., e.g., Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999) (explaining that an alternative placement is a conditional liberty, not a right). The distinction is material in this case because the State relies on a waiver provision involving “any right [Dannheiser] may have to appeal the sentence imposed by the [trial] [c]ourt, including the right to seek appellate review of the sentence pursuant to Ind. App. Rule 7.” Appellants App. Vol. 2 p. 141. But Dannheiser is not appealing his sentence. Rather, Dannheiser is appealing a decision involving a sanction for violating the condition of his alternative placement. Cf., e.g., Jones, 885 N.E.2d at 1290 (noting that the sanction imposed for a placement violation “is not a criminal sentence as contemplated by the rule,” so the sentence “review and revise remedy” of Appellate Rule 7(B) “is not available” in these types of appeals).
[13] We conclude that the instant waiver provision—which repeatedly refers to sentencing matters—does not unambiguously apply to a placement-related sanction. We therefore decline the States request to dismiss the appeal.
II. Revocation of Suspended Sentence
[14] Turning to the merits, Dannheiser points out that, although the State filed a petition to revoke his direct placement, the State did not file a petition to revoke the suspended portion of his sentence. Dannheiser argues that revoking part of his suspended sentence violated his “due process rights to notice and an opportunity” to be heard. Appellants Br. p. 8. Specifically, he argues that the State “expressly stipulated that [his] probation was not subject to revocation as there had been no [p]etition or [d]isposition to revoke probation.” Id. A stipulation is a “voluntary agreement between opposing parties concerning some relevant point[.]” Stipulation, Blacks Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). A “stipulation relating to a pending judicial proceeding, made by a party to the proceeding or the partys attorney, is binding without consideration.” Id.
[15] The State does not address Dannheisers argument that its oral assertion amounted to a stipulation. Rather, the State more generally argues that Dannheiser was not deprived of due process. The State also discusses whether the sanction imposed was inappropriate. As to the sanction, the State asserts: “The only discernible difference in the manner [Dannheiser] is serving his sentence now, as opposed to before he committed a new felony and failed three drug tests, is that he is subject to electronic monitoring.” Appellees Br. p. 12.
[16] Because the State declined to address Dannheisers contention that there was a binding stipulation as to potential sanctions, we are not obligated to develop an argument on the States behalf. Rather, the “failure to respond to an issue raised by an appellant is akin to failure to file a brief.” Newman, 719 N.E.2d at 838. “Under such circumstances, we may reverse upon a showing of prima facie error on the issue which was not addressed.” Natl Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Gingrich, 716 N.E.2d 491, 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “Prima facie means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Newman, 719 N.E.2d at 838.
[17] In this case, Dannheiser established that when the trial court attempted to advise him of potential sanctions, the State interjected and informed the trial court that only 731 days were subject to revocation—i.e., only the portion of Dannheisers sentence that was associated with the direct placement. The record reflects that, immediately after the States assertion, the trial court gave an advisement consistent with the assertion, informing Dannheiser the potential sanction was “731 days” before “credit ․ given at the time of sentencing plus any credit for time already served on direct placement.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 6. Dannheiser then indicated that he understood the “possible penalty[.]” Id. The trial courts advisement limiting Dannheisers potential sanction to the 731 days on direct placement is consistent with the States verbal framing of the issue at the hearing and the language in its Petition to Revoke Direct Placement.
[18] Under the circumstances, we conclude that Dannheiser demonstrated prima facie error in the revocation of part of his suspended sentence. Thus, although we affirm the revocation of time on direct placement, we reverse that portion of the order revoking the suspended time. We remand with instructions to enter an amended order that reflects only the revocation of time on direct placement.
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Conclusion
[19] We decline to dismiss because the contract provision regarding appellate waiver did not unambiguously apply to a post-sentencing sanction. Further, because Dannheiser demonstrated prima facie error in the revocation of the suspended portion of his sentence, which was contrary to the States “stipulation,” we reverse that part of the order revoking the time on probation. Otherwise affirming, we remand for entry of an amended revocation order consistent with this opinion.
[20] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
FOOTNOTES
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. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (c)(4).
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. Nothing about our opinion should be read to constrain the trial courts authority to modify the conditions of probation in a manner consistent with Indiana Code section 35-38-2-1.8.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Foley
Judges Riley and Brown concur.
Riley, J., Brown, J., concur.