MEMORANDUM DECISION
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Mother has two minor children, I.C. and C.W. (collectively, “the Children”), born in 2009 and 2019, respectively.
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The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned the juvenile court to find the Children to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) after Mother had been arrested for resisting law enforcement and discharging a firearm during an altercation with police. The juvenile court conducted a fact-finding hearing, at which Mother failed to appear. While Mother did not request permission to appear telephonically, DCS requested that Mother be allowed to do so. The juvenile court denied DCSs request and, after the conclusion of the fact-finding hearing, determined that the Children were CHINS. Mother contends that the juvenile court violated her procedural due-process rights to be present at the fact-finding hearing by refusing to allow her to participate telephonically. We disagree and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In May of 2023, Officer John Pogorov of the Whitestown Police Department received a call that Mother was wanted on an active warrant issued by another county. Officer Pogorov and his partner, Officer Reggie Thomas, located Mother, who denied that she had had an active warrant and then “pulled out a gun” in front of the Children. Tr. Vol. II p. 126. One of the Children stepped between Mother and Officer Pogorov, who requested backup, and Mother started “running away[.]”
[3] As Mother fled on foot, the Children attempted to follow her. Officer Pogorov attempted to follow Mother, lost sight of her, and “heard a shot fired in his direction[,]” which Officer Thomas saw Mother take. Appellants App. Vol. II p. 60. The Children attempted to follow Mother until a bystander intervened and escorted them to police. Police shortly thereafter apprehended Mother, who “made no inquiries about [the C]hildren[.]” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 60. At the police station, family case manager (“FCM”) Alyssa Downs spoke to the Children and observed that they were “distraught” and exhibited “signs of trauma and fear.” Appellants App. Vol. II p. 61.
[4] The State charged Mother with four Level 6 felonies: two counts of resisting law enforcement and two counts of neglect of a dependent in a situation that endangers a dependent. In June of 2023, DCS petitioned the juvenile court to find the Children to be CHINS. As the CHINS case proceeded and Mother was in the custody of the Boone County Jail, the juvenile court placed the Children with their Maternal Grandfather, with whom DCS requested they should remain (the Children were eventually placed with Maternal Grandmother). The juvenile court granted DCSs request and ordered supervised visits for Mother. Mother also moved to withdraw her counsels appearance so that she could represent herself, which motion the juvenile court granted.
[5] On July 27, 2023, DCS filed an emergency motion to compel, alleging that Mother had videorecorded DCS staff members at the local DCS office and uploaded the videos to social media and had also uploaded other inappropriate content, including portions of case documents, false accusations of an FCM having a criminal history, and false accusations of a DCS supervisor having committed perjury. A few days later, the juvenile court held a hearing on that motion. Mother appeared at the hearing; however, when Maternal Grandmother was asked to leave, Mother left with her and waived her right to contest the motion. At the hearing, FCM Downs testified regarding what Mother had posted on social media, text messages Mother had sent to her coworkers about her being a drug addict, and the effect of Mothers actions on her personal and professional life. On August 2, 2023, the juvenile court granted DCSs motion.
[6] On August 8, 2023, the juvenile court held a fact-finding hearing, at which Mother appeared with Kaysha Richardson, a purported “ADA advocate” and witness. Tr. Vol. II p. 89. The juvenile court asked Richardson to leave, at which point she called the police and made claims that she and Mother had been victims of trafficking. Earlier in the hearing, the juvenile court asked Richardson and Mother if they were recording the hearing, which they denied. However, as Richardson called the police, Mother asked if she was “recording this because [hers] had stopped[,]” and Richardson confirmed that she was. Tr. Vol. II p. 59. After some exchanges with the juvenile court, Mother left the hearing with Richardson and said, “You can proceed without me, thats fine.” Tr. Vol. II p. 64. At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court set another fact-finding hearing for August 25, 2023, and DCS sent a notice to Mother informing her of the time and date. Shortly thereafter, DCS also moved the juvenile court to prohibit Mother from recording any hearings, which motion the juvenile court granted.
[7] On August 25, just a few hours before the hearing, DCS moved to allow Mother to participate telephonically. The juvenile court denied that motion and conducted the hearing, which Mother failed to attend. DCS informed the juvenile court that Mother was likely residing in Texas and had an outstanding no-bond warrant for her arrest due to alleged violations of conditions of her pre-trial release in the pending criminal case.
[8] At the start of the hearing, the juvenile court addressed DCSs motion and noted that it had previously ordered that Mother could not attend hearings with telephones or other electronic-recording devices to ensure that she would not record the proceedings. Court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) Kate Engel objected to Mothers participation by telephone. Ultimately, the juvenile court denied DCSs motion to have Mother participate telephonically because Mother knew about the hearing but had “voluntarily left the State” and the concern that she might record the hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 92.
[9] The juvenile court proceeded with the fact-finding and heard testimony from witnesses, including Officers Pogorov and Thomas, FCMs Downs and Noah Rinehart, and Ireland Home Based Services worker Katie Sherar. FCM Downs testified that the Children were CHINS because Mother had “put them in direct danger” and “abandoned” them. Tr. Vol. II p. 118. FCM Downs further testified that court intervention was necessary because the Children would not receive services without the courts involvement. FCM Rinehart indicated that he had referred services for Mother, including visitation, a parenting assessment, and home-based case work, but Mother had turned down the assessment and the case work and refused to participate in child-family team meetings. Sherar testified that she had observed Mothers visits with the Children and, at their last visit in August of 2023, Mother had attempted to bring someone with her. When Sherar had tried to determine whether she had to end the visit, Mother called the police, causing I.C. to become upset. Sherar had had to comfort I.C. because Mother had not “do[ne] anything to calm her[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 159.
[10] In September of 2023, the juvenile court entered its order finding the Children to be CHINS. Two months later, it issued a dispositional order in which it ordered Mother to participate in reunification services.
Discussion and Decision
[11] Mother does not challenge the juvenile courts CHINS order as an abuse of discretion. Instead, Mother claims that the juvenile court committed fundamental error by refusing to let her participate telephonically in the August 25, 2023 hearing. See Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 678 (Ind. 2013) (“Failure to object at trial waives the issue for review unless fundamental error occurred.”).
[12] Fundamental error is “an extremely narrow exception to the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendants rights as to make a fair trial impossible.” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014). To demonstrate fundamental error, a “defendant must show that, under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in not sua sponte raising the issue because alleged errors (a) constitute clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process and (b) present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Id. We evaluate “the alleged misconduct in the context of all that happened in the proceeding and all the relevant information presented to the [juvenile] court.” Matter of Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1214–15 (Ind. 2019). “[A] finding of fundamental error essentially means that the trial judge erred by not acting when he or she should have” and “is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred[.]” Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668.
[13] In making her fundamental-error argument, Mother emphasizes that the juvenile courts refusal to allow her to appear telephonically at the fact-finding hearing violated her procedural due-process rights. Procedural due process is “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). The State argues that the juvenile court did not commit fundamental error, and we agree.
[14] Presumably, Mother knew about the fact-finding hearing because DCS had sent her a notice identifying the date and time of the hearing. In the related context of the termination of a parents parental rights, we have previously concluded that “a parent does not have a constitutional right to be physically present at a final termination hearing.” Thompson v. Clark Cnty. Div. of Fam. and Child., 791 N.E.2d 792, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. Whats more, a “juvenile court may presume a parent knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her right to be present during a termination hearing upon a showing that the parent was properly notified of the scheduled trial date but failed to appear.” In re A.B., 922 N.E.2d 740, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); see also In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that the juvenile court had not violated parents procedural due-process rights when it had failed to secure his presence during a CHINS proceeding where the record indicated that he had never moved for transport to the proceedings).
[15] Further, Mother failed to secure her attendance at the fact-finding hearing through alternative means. For instance, prior to the August 8, 2023 fact-finding hearing, Mother had filed “several emergency motions” with the juvenile court; however, she made no effort to request permission to participate remotely. Tr. Vol. II p. 48. Mothers lack of effort in this regard, coupled with her decisions to leave the August 8, 2023 fact-finding hearing early, tell the juvenile court to “proceed without” her, and leave the state despite knowing of the upcoming hearing, demonstrates that the juvenile court did not violate her procedural due-process rights or commit fundamental error. Tr. Vol. II p. 64.
[16] Mothers arguments that the juvenile court committed fundamental error are unavailing. In making her argument, Mother relies on Partee v. State, 184 N.E.3d 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. In that case, Partee (representing himself) “began a tirade of semi-coherent claims[,]” spoke over the trial court, and would not answer the trial courts questions. Id. at 1228. The trial court ordered Partee to be removed momentarily from the courtroom and, on Partees return, he “immediately began to rant about the trial courts alleged lack of authority over him” and “refused to be quiet.” Id. The trial court ultimately removed Partee from the courtroom during his jury trial. Id. at 1228–31. We concluded that the trial court had not committed fundamental error by failing to advise Partee that he could remain in the courtroom if he had promised to behave. Id. at 1235–36.
[17] Mother also relies on Wilson v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1264, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied, in which Wilson, during his trial, had physically struggled with bailiffs and shouted profanity, causing the trial court to order him to be removed from the courtroom. When Wilson continued his outbursts after his return, the trial court expelled him for the remainder of his trial. Id. at 1270. We upheld Wilsons removal, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion when it had ejected him without first warning him that he could be removed for the remainder of trial. Id. at 1270–71. In relying on these cases, Mother argues that although the cases differ in material ways from hers, they demonstrate that the juvenile courts concern that Mother would continue to record the proceedings if permitted to attend telephonically was only speculative and that her right to be present at trial should not be hindered based on mere speculation. In other words, the trial court should have employed “ ‘less stringent remedies’ before excluding a party from trial.” Appellants Br. p. 13 (quoting Wells v. State 176 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)).
[18] Partee and Wilson, however, are easily distinguished. In Partee and Wilson, the trial court ordered the defendants to be removed after their inappropriate conduct. Here, however, the juvenile court did not remove Mother from the courtroom or prevent her from appearing; instead, Mother decided herself to leave the courtroom and not appear for the final fact-finding hearing. As mentioned, Mother had left the August 8, 2023 hearing voluntarily and had told the juvenile court to “proceed without me[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 64. Further, Mother had known of the August 25 fact-finding hearing and had exchanged numerous text messages with DCS about it in the days leading up to it. Mother had simply chosen not to attend, and the juvenile court had noted that she had “voluntarily left the State of Indiana [․] and has [ ]resided in Texas[,]” actions she had taken “by her own free will[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 92, 93. Whats more, Mother had neglected to make any arrangements herself to procure her attendance by alternative means, relying instead on DCSs own motion.
[19] Additionally, Mother argues that, if good cause existed for Father to appear telephonically, then so too did it exist for her, and the juvenile courts denial of DCSs motion amounted to fundamental error. We disagree. Father resides in Colorado and had lived there throughout the CHINS proceedings, his counsel had requested permission to allow him to participate telephonically, and he had not posted recordings of the confidential proceedings on social media as Mother did and was not the subject of an order barring his ability to use electronic and recording devices, including cellular telephones at the CHINS proceedings. Mother, on the other hand, had resided in Indiana but had left for Texas knowing of the impending fact-finding hearing, possibly to avoid her outstanding warrant for allegedly having violated the conditions of her pre-trial release in the pending criminal case. Given the narrowness of the fundamental-error exception, we cannot say that the juvenile court committed fundamental error when it denied DCSs petition to allow Mother to participate telephonically in the August 25, 2023 hearing. See Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668.
[20] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. Father does not participate in this appeal.
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford
Judge Crone and Judge Tavitas concur.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.