MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] D.M. (Mother) and G.M. (Father) (collectively the Parents) appeal the trial courts orders involuntarily terminating their parental relationship with their minor children De.M., C.M., I.M., and L.M. (collectively the Children).
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Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to all four children. Mother separately appeals the termination of Mothers parental rights to C.M. and I.M.
2
Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Mother and Father are married and are the parents of De.M., born in June 2016; C.M., born in September 2017; I.M., born in June 2019; and L.M., born in December 2020. De.M., C.M., and I.M. have experienced significant medical issues. L.M. was born healthy. Mother suffers from autism and complex traumatic stress disorder. Father was physically, mentally, and sexually abused as a child.
[3] In November 2021, Mother, Father, and the Children lived in Hancock County with Mothers grandmother (Maternal Grandmother). On December 2, the Department of Child Services (DCS) opened an in-home child in need of services (CHINS) case for each of the Children, after substantiating reports of poor home conditions and the Children missing medical appointments. However, DCS did not remove the Children from the Parents’ care at that time. DCS provided the Parents with family preservation services that encompassed domestic violence, substance use, home-based casework, Fatherhood Engagement, and therapy. DCS also offered the Parents drug screens.
[4] In December 2021, Brianna Nance-Garner was assigned as the DCS family case manager (FCM). When she visited the familys home on February 2, 2022, Mother appeared to be “under the influence” and admitted to the FCM that he had used substances “within the last day or so[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 62. Both Mother and Father expressed suicidal ideations, and the home conditions were “deplorable.” Id. at 77. That day, DCS removed the Children from the Parents’ care and told the Parents to leave the home, based on their suspected drug use. The Children remained in the home under Maternal Grandmothers care. The Parents were admitted to a hospital for inpatient mental health treatment. Thereafter, the Parents were restricted to supervised visitation with the Children.
[5] Initially, the Parents were engaged in the family preservation services. However, their participation decreased after the Children were removed from their care, and the Parents were only minimally engaged in the services and did not complete them. The Parents submitted to some of the drug screens offered by the FCM but did not submit to any at the drug testing providers facility. Mother did not participate in any supervised visitation with the Children. In January 2022, Father had a mental breakdown over the death of his grandfather, and he left the state of Indiana and did not return until August 2022.
[6] On February 23, 2022, the trial court adjudicated the Children CHINS as to Mother, after he entered admissions to the allegations at the factfinding hearing held on February 17.
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Later that month, the Children were removed from Maternal Grandmothers home and placed in foster care. FCM Nance-Garner had visited the home and found Mother present, in violation of the trial courts order prohibiting Mother from having unsupervised contact with the Children. And the poor home conditions had not been rectified. De.M. and L.M. were placed with one foster family, and C.M. and I.M. were placed with a different foster family. On March 22, the trial court entered a dispositional order requiring Mother to, in relevant part, not use illegal substances or consume alcohol, complete a parenting assessment and all recommendations from the assessment, complete a substance abuse evaluation and treatment recommendations, submit to random drug screens, complete a domestic violence assessment and any recommendations from the assessment, and attend scheduled visits with the Children.
[7] The trial court adjudicated the Children CHINS as to Father on March 22, following a factfinding hearing held on March 10. On April 19, the trial court entered a dispositional order requiring Father to participate in services that included Fatherhood Engagement, substance abuse treatment, supervised visitation, and therapy services. The trial court ordered Father into reunification services that included home-based counseling, a parenting assessment and recommendations, a substance abuse assessment and recommendations, random drug screening, a domestic violence assessment and all recommendations, and supervised visitation.
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[8] DCS was granted wardship of the Children on March 22 for Mother and April 19 for Father. At that time, the permanency plan was for reunification. However, the Children never returned to the Parents’ care. FCM Nance-Garner stopped working with the Parents in March 2022 because her “rapport [with the family was] just broken[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 68. FCM Alexis Cooper was assigned to the family in June 2022.
[9] The trial court held review hearings on April 7, July 6, August 18, and October 6, 2022. On October 10, the trial court modified the Childrens permanency plan to include a concurrent plan of adoption. On December 2, DCS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of the Parents’ relationships with the Children. Factfinding hearings on the termination petitions were held on April 27, May 18, June 22, July 6, August 3, and August 24, 2023. Evidence included testimony by Mother, Father, the FCMs, service providers, the foster father for C.M. and I.M., and the court appointed special advocate (CASA).
[10] During the factfinding hearings, the trial court learned that the Parents struggled with substance abuse since DCS first became involved with the family. The Parents disclosed their ongoing substance use and relapses to DCS and throughout the proceedings continued to test positive for illegal substances. In January 2023, the Parents made a detailed plan to address their substance abuse but failed to follow the plan and were unsuccessful in achieving sobriety.
[11] Mother struggled with alcohol, methamphetamine, opiates, heroin, fentanyl, and carfentanil. He was “[v]ery open” with FCM Cooper about his substance use and his relapses. Tr. Vol. 2 at 101. In 2022 and 2023, Mother repeatedly sought substance abuse treatment at facilities that Mother found, rather than using providers that had been referred by DCS, but Mother was not able to achieve long-term sobriety.
[12] In March 2022, Mother had an intentional overdose. He sought inpatient treatment at Sycamore Springs because he had “picked up a meth[amphetamine] problem[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 117. In April, he returned to Sycamore Springs for alcohol detoxication and then went to the Anabranch Recovery Center for inpatient treatment. Mother relapsed on heroin in June and July. In August, Mother returned to Sycamore Springs for additional inpatient treatment. That same month, he went to Landmark treatment facility for what was supposed to be a twenty-day program. However, he stayed for three days and relapsed three days after he left. In April 2023, Mother entered Brentwood Springs and completed the weeklong inpatient drug treatment program. However, one week later, Mother relapsed on fentanyl and methamphetamine. In July, Mother again returned to Sycamore Springs for inpatient treatment. At that time, Mother reported using methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl daily along with carfentanil when it was available.
[13] Father participated in some inpatient substance use treatment, including a monthlong stay at one facility in September 2022. He did not engage in the after-care program and relapsed within three days. Father entered substance use treatment again in January 2023. In April, Father “was on drugs” and “got hit by a car[,]” which resulted in a six-week hospital stay. Id. at 223. Upon his release, he went to the Anabranch Recovery Center for two and one-half weeks for substance use treatment.
[14] As for drug screens, DCS had to complete six referrals for drug screening for Mother due to Mothers failure to engage and five referrals for Father. Mother completed three screens with DCS, in February and May 2022 and in January 2023, and tested positive on each screen for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and/or fentanyl. Father completed four drug screens with FCM Cooper, three of which were positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl, and one of which was unreadable.
[15] FCM Cooper made three referrals each for the Parents for mental health needs. And Father admitted during the termination factfinding hearings that he had not addressed his mental health challenges. Mother also had numerous inpatient stays for mental health treatment, most recently in August 2023, when Mother reported suicidal ideations.
[16] During the proceedings, Mother and Father each had multiple criminal drug charges filed against them. Mother had three criminal cases pending when the termination factfinding hearings were held. All the charges in the cases were filed after DCS became involved with the family. In one case, Mother was charged with possession of a syringe, possession of methamphetamine, possession of a narcotic drug, and possession of a controlled substance. In a separate case, Mother was charged with possession of a syringe, possession of a narcotic drug, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of paraphernalia. When the May 18, 2023 factfinding hearing took place, Mother was incarcerated on a charge of unlawful possession of a syringe that had been filed in a separate case.
[17] Meanwhile, in September 2022, Father was charged with possession of paraphernalia, operating without a license, and driving left of center. He was also charged in a separate case with possession of paraphernalia. In March 2023, he was charged with possession of a syringe, possession of methamphetamine, possession of a narcotic, and possession of a controlled substance. Father did not appear at the August 3, 2023 factfinding hearing because he had been incarcerated since July 7.
[18] The trial court learned that DCS had made numerous referrals for the Parents for supervised visitation with the Children. However, the visitation was inconsistent because of the Parents’ frequent participation in inpatient treatment programs. Mother began visiting with the Children in May 2022, but he “lost [his] transportation” and did not see the Children “at all for a couple of months[.]” Id. at 138. In October 2022, Mother consistently visited with the Children “four days a week.” Id. at 139. In 2023, Mother visited with the Children “[f]requently” but “sporadically.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 138. However, in March 2023, the visitation supervisor ended services when the Parents behaved in a manner that was “inappropriate” and “very disrespectful” after a visit was canceled. Tr. Vol. 3 at 82. Another visitation service provider closed the service referral after Mother failed to visit the Children for several weeks in a row. Id.
[19] Tameka Moore, who served as Fathers Fatherhood Engagement manager and visitation supervisor from October 2022 through February 2023, observed that the Parents interacted appropriately with the Children and that there was an evident bond between them. However, Moore never recommended that the Parents progress to a less restrictive level of visitation due to their inability to maintain sobriety. And Moore was concerned about Fathers mental health and stability.
[20] At the factfinding hearings, FCM Cooper testified that termination of the Parents’ parental rights to the Children was in the Childrens best interest, citing that the Children were “doing very well” in their foster care placements, and the inconsistent visits with the Parents had led to “disruptive behaviors” on the Childrens part. Tr. Vol. 2 at 124. She further testified that she believed the conditions that resulted in the Childrens removal and placement outside the Parents’ home would not be remedied. The CASA testified that the Parents were no closer to reunification with the Children than they were on the day the Children were removed from their care. The CASA was concerned that neither parent had “followed through” with adequately addressing their substance use and mental health challenges. Tr. Vol. 3 at 54.
[21] On October 5, 2023, the trial court issued substantially similar orders terminating the parent-child relationship between Father and the Children and between Mother and C.M. and I.M. The trial court found that the Children had been removed from the Parents for at least six months under a dispositional decree, there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in their removal or the reasons for placement outside the Parents’ home will not be remedied, continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Childrens well-being, termination of parental rights is in the Childrens best interests, and there is a satisfactory plan for the Childrens care and treatment, which is adoption. Both Mother and Father now appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[22] We recognize that “a parents interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[A]lthough parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Involuntary termination of parental rights is the most extreme sanction a court can impose, and therefore “termination is intended as a last resort, available only when all other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id.
[23] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving the termination of parental rights.” In re C.A., 15 N.E.3d 85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
In considering whether the termination of parental rights is appropriate, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment, and give due regard to the trial courts opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the trial courts findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. [Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)]. In evaluating whether the trial courts decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review the trial courts judgment to determine whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment.
In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229-30 (Ind. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In addition, we note that unchallenged findings of fact are accepted as true by this Court. In re S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 608 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). As such, if the unchallenged findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, we will affirm. Kitchell v. Franklin, 26 N.E.3d 1050, 1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied; T.B. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[24] A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship must allege, among other things:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the childs removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.
(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).
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DCS must prove each element by “clear and convincing evidence.” R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 629; Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. If the trial court finds that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).
[25] On appeal, the Parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence DCS presented to satisfy Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(B)(i) and (ii), -(C), and -(D). The Parents also raise an evidentiary claim. We first address the evidentiary claim and then turn to the Parents’ sufficiency challenges.
Section 1 – The Parents have failed to establish any reversible error on grounds that the trial court admitted hearsay evidence from the Childrens CHINS cases and then included the evidence in its findings supporting its termination determinations.
[26] The Parents claim that the trial court erred when it admitted hearsay statements into evidence over their objection and then included the evidence in its findings to support the termination of their parental rights to the Children. The admission of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the trial court. D.B.M. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 20 N.E.3d 174, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2015). Evidentiary rulings of a trial court are afforded great deference on appeal and are overturned only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We will reverse the trial courts decision regarding the admission of evidence only when the decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. In re L.T., 145 N.E.3d 864, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). It is well established that errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party. Des.B., 2 N.E.3d at 834.
[27] Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In re K.R., 154 N.E.3d 818, 820 (Ind. 2020) (citing Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c)). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible unless it falls under a recognized exception. Ind. Evidence Rule 802. These exceptions are enumerated in Indiana Rule of Evidence 803. Statements not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted do not run afoul of the hearsay rule—they are not hearsay. Ind. Evidence Rule 802.
[28] At the factfinding hearings, DCS offered into evidence Exhibit 2, which contained the chronological case summary (CCS), the pleadings, and the trial courts orders from the Childrens CHINS cases but did not include any DCS reports. Mother objected, and Father joined in the objection, on grounds that the pleadings contained hearsay and the pleadings could not be admitted through judicial notice.
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DCS countered that the pleadings were not being submitted for the truth of the matter asserted. The trial court took the matter under advisement. At a later factfinding hearing, DCS again offered Exhibit 2 into evidence, and the Parents renewed their hearsay objection. DCS clarified that it was not asking the trial court to take judicial notice of the records, but instead sought admission of the records “simply to show why [DCS] opened a CHINS [case] in the first place.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 175.
[29] At the August 3, 2023 factfinding hearing, the trial court admitted the exhibit over objection but noted that it was doing so “for the purpose of verifying the record of the CHINS cases and not for the ․ the truth of the matter asserted [in] the contents of the hearings that are contained in those documents. So it will be a narrow admission ․ but it will not be for the truth of the matter asserted in those hearings.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 182. In its final orders terminating the Parents’ parental rights to the Children, the trial court incorporated excerpts from the CHINS pleadings into its findings.
[30] On appeal, the Parents argue that the trial court abused its discretion not only by admitting Exhibit 2 into evidence but also by including the “hearsay-based” evidence in its findings to support its termination determinations. Fathers Br. at 19. Specifically, the Parents challenge findings 9 through 13, which included the reasons for the Childrens removal from the Parents’ care, the procedural history of the CHINS cases from the date of the Childrens removal through the dispositional hearings, and the case plans outlined in the Parents’ respective dispositional orders. The Parents also challenge findings 16 through 19, which read as follows:
16. On April 7, 2022, the court held a review hearing, at which neither parent appeared. The court found that Mother was partially complying with the case plan but had not remedied the reasons for [the Childrens] removal. Specifically, the court found Mother was engaged in a week long detox program and wanted in-patient treatment for his substance abuse, but had not yet completed the substance abuse assessment. Mother had also not completed the domestic violence assessment, engaged in homebased casework, or been compliant with drug screening. Mother had completed the intake for therapy but not started sessions. Finally, Mother had attended two February visits with the children. Father ․ had not started any services. He had also completed the intake for homebased therapy and visited with the children twice.
17. On July 6, 2022, the court held another review hearing. Only Mother appeared for this hearing. The Court found that neither parent was complying with the [Childrens] case plan[s]. Mother had not completed the domestic violence assessment, engaged in homebased casework, or participated in homebased therapy. Moreover, Mother was still refusing to screen for the Department when asked. The only screen the Department had from Mother was from May 17, 2022, which was positive for Methamphetamine and Amphetamine. Mother had also not been visiting the children regularly. Mother did testify that he was engaged in a group program in northern Indiana, where he moved, but the Department had no documented evidence of this program. Father had still not engaged in any services – domestic violence assessment, substance use assessment, or therapy. He had engaged in three out of six visits in June, but no others since February 2022.
18. On August 10, 2022, the Department filed a Verified Rule to Show Cause for both Mother and Father, outlining all the services parents were not utilizing and how they were in violation of the Dispositional Order. A hearing was held on August 18, 2022. Counsels for Mother and Father argued that incarceration was not the appropriate sanction, and that termination of parental rights is the remedy available to the Department for parents who refuse to comply with the Dispositional Order. The Court, having heard all arguments, denied the Departments request for sanctions and recommended termination of parental rights. The Order was issued August 23, 2022.
19. On October 6, 2022, the Court held a virtual permanency hearing and testimony was provided as to [the P]arents’ compliance with the dispositional order. Both parents appeared. The Court found [the P]arents had not complied with the [Childrens] case plan[s]. Mother had not completed or engaged in any of the following: a substance use assessment, any treatment sought on his own, home-based casework, home-based therapy, a parenting assessment and recommended services, domestic violence services, or all scheduled visitations. While Father had recently completed substance use treatment, the FCM had been unable to confirm attendance in any after-care since his discharge. Moreover, he had not completed or engaged in any of the following: home-based therapy, a parenting assessment and recommended services, domestic violence services, Fatherhood Engagement or any scheduled visitation since June. After hearing all testimony, the Court granted the Departments request for a concurrent plan of adoption. The Order was issued October 10, 2022.
Fathers Appendix Vol. 2 at 6-7.
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[31] “In bench trials, it is generally presumed that the trial judge disregards inadmissible evidence and renders its decision solely on the basis of [relevant] and probative evidence.” In re A.J., 877 N.E.2d 805, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (2008). Moreover, evidence of a parents prior involvement with DCS, including the filing of previous CHINS petitions and previous termination proceedings, is admissible as proper character evidence and helpful in demonstrating negative habitual patterns of conduct to determine parental fitness and the best interests of the children. A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied; see also Carter v. Knox Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 761 N.E.2d 431, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that DCS is “entitled to offer into evidence the CHINS petition, the predispositional report, the parental participation order, the modification report or any other document or order containing written findings, which was required to be created during the proceedings”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[32] Here, the trial court admitted Exhibit 2 on the narrow basis of verifying the CHINS proceedings and not for the truth of the matters contained in the CHINS pleadings. Statements not admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not hearsay. Ind. Evidence Rule 802. Regarding the trial court including excerpts from the CHINS proceedings in its findings, we note that other evidence supported the challenged findings. For example, Mother admitted that the Children were CHINS. And during the factfinding hearings, the FCMs and the DCS service providers testified to the reasons the Children were adjudicated CHINS, the services offered to the Parents, the Parents’ level of engagement in the services, and the Parents’ substance use and frequent participation in treatment programs. Also, the challenged findings are supported by the remaining unchallenged findings that were included in the trial courts termination orders. See Fathers Appendix Vol. 2 at 8-10, findings 21-31; see also J.M. v. N.M., 844 N.E.2d 590, 599 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“To the extent that the judgment is based on erroneous findings, those findings are superfluous and are not fatal to the judgment if the remaining valid findings and conclusions support the judgment.”), trans. denied. For the foregoing reasons, the Parents have not established any reversible error concerning the admission of Exhibit 2 into evidence and the trial courts subsequent inclusion of that evidence in its findings supporting its termination determinations.
Section 2 – The trial courts conclusion that there is a reasonable probability of unchanged conditions is not clearly erroneous.
[33] The Parents contend that DCS failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Childrens removal and continued placement outside of their Parents home will not be remedied. In determining whether such a probability is reasonable, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231. First, “we must ascertain what conditions led to [the Childrens] placement and retention in foster care.” Id. Second, “we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134 (Ind. 2010)). In the second step, the trial court must judge a parents fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, and balancing a parents recent improvements against “habitual pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id.
[34] “Where there are only temporary improvements and the pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find that under the circumstances, the problematic situation will not improve.” In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In addition, a trial court may consider services offered by DCS and the parents response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need only establish ‘that there is a reasonable probability that the parents behavior will not change.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Kay L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).
[35] Here, the trial court found that the conditions that led to the Childrens removal from the Parents’ care were “admissions of substance use” and “expression[s] of suicidal ideation[s].” Fathers Appendix Vol. 2 at 31. The trial court further found that the Parents “never substantially complied with court-ordered services and were never successfully discharged from them”; “never took the steps to achieve long-term sobriety”; “failed to follow [their detailed] plan[s]” to address their substance use; “rarely” submitted to drug screens, and, when they did, “the screens were positive”; were “arrested and charged with possession of illegal substances during the case[;] ․ [and] were inconsistent with visitation for most of the case, which was usually interrupted by detox programs or incarceration.” Id. at 34-35. The trial court also found that Mother “waited until the termination of parental rights case was already started to start therapy and only attended a few sessions over the next seven months.” Id. at 34. The Parents do not challenge these findings.
[36] While the Parents are to be commended for their participation in treatment programs—albeit, independent of DCSs referrals—and for their efforts toward sobriety and stability, the unchallenged findings amply support the trial courts conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the Parents’ use of illegal substances and their mental health issues are unlikely to be remedied. Thus, the trial courts conclusion is not clearly erroneous.
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Section 3 – The trial courts conclusion that termination is in the Childrens best interests is not clearly erroneous.
[37] The Parents also challenge the trial courts conclusion that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Childrens best interests. Mother specifically asserts that he had “maintained a bond and positive relationship” with C.M. and I.M., and that while Mother “may not have been ready to care for [C.M. and I.M.] at the date of the final fact-finding hearing, ․ he had [made] enough progress [to] be given a chance to become fully ready.” Mothers Br. at 24, 25. Father takes issue with the trial courts conclusion because, according to Father, he “remained a viable plan for the [C]hilrens permanency.” Fathers Br. at 15.
[38] To determine whether termination is in a childs best interests, the trial court must look to the totality of the evidence. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. “[C]hildren cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification—and courts ‘need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the childs physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 648 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235). Also, “[p]ermanency is a central consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). “[W]e have previously held that the recommendation by both the case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the childs best interests.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.
[39] Here, FCM Cooper testified that termination of the Parents’ parental rights was in the Childrens best interests, citing that the inconsistent visits with the Parents had led to “disruptive behaviors” on the Childrens part. Tr. Vol. 2 at 124. The CASA testified that termination of the Parents’ parental rights was in the Childrens best interests because the Parents had not remedied the conditions that led to the Childrens removal from their home. The trial court found that the “CASA, FCM Cooper, and [a therapist] all testified and opined that [the P]arents have been unwilling to take the necessary steps to show they are capable of parenting” the Children and “based on the totality of the evidence, ․ termination is in the [Childrens] best interest[s].” Fathers Appendix Vol. 2 at 49.
[40] The FCMs and CASAs testimony in support of termination, combined with the clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Childrens removal from or reasons for placement outside the Parents’ home will not be remedied, is sufficient to support the trial courts conclusion that termination is in the Childrens best interests. See A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that termination of the Parents’ parental rights is in the Childrens best interests.
Section 4 – The trial courts conclusion that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the Childrens care and treatment is not clearly erroneous.
[41] Finally, Father challenges the trial courts conclusion that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the Childrens care and treatment. FCM Cooper testified that the permanency plan for the Children was adoption. Father bases his challenge to the permanency plan on the following: the Children were placed in “separate non-familial [foster care] placements and C.M. and I.M.’s placements had not effectuated any ․ visits” with the other siblings; “[m]ultiple providers indicated that the [C]hildren appeared bonded with Father”; “DCS prematurely petition[ed] to terminate Fathers parental rights”; and “Father remained a viable permanency plan for the [C]hildren.” Fathers Br. at 14.
[42] On this issue, DCS is only required to establish that “there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child” in termination proceedings. In re B.M., 913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted). And this Court has held that adoption is a “satisfactory plan” for the care and treatment of a child under the termination of parental rights statute. Id.
[43] Here, FCM Cooper testified that she had discussed the permanency plan of adoption with all the foster parents and that she had no concerns regarding their willingness to adopt the Children. The foster father for C.M. and I.M. testified that he was willing to adopt them. Accordingly, Father has not established any clear error in the trial courts conclusion that DCS had a satisfactory plan of care for the Children. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial courts termination orders.
[44] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Mother is the biological mother of the Children. Mother is a transgender man, preferring the pronouns he/him. He legally changed his name to D.M. on October 12, 2021. Mother has two older children (the Older Children), born prior to his relationship with Father. The Older Children are not involved in this appeal.
2
. Following a trial court-ordered mediation, Mother signed consents to the adoption of De.M. and L.M. Mother also signed separate post-adoptive agreements for the Older Children.
3
. Father did not appear at this factfinding hearing.
4
. Father did not appear at either his CHINS factfinding hearing or his dispositional hearing.
5
. Our legislature made significant changes to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4 in 2024. DCS filed its petitions in 2022, under the prior version of the statute.
6
. The Parents stipulated that the CCS for each of the Childrens CHINS cases was admissible.
7
. We cite to the trial courts order terminating Fathers parental rights to L.M. but note that all the trial courts termination orders read substantially the same.
8
. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive. Where, as here, DCS has met its burden as to remediation of conditions, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i), “we need not address whether the State has proven its allegations under Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(ii).” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234 (citing In re W.B., 772 N.E.2d 522, 531 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). Accordingly, we do not address the Parents’ contentions that they do not pose a threat to the well-being of the Children.
Crone, Judge.
Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.