MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case Summary
[1] C.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial courts order that her consent was not required for R.L. and B.M.Ls (“Adoptive Parents”) adoption of C.W.’s children, A.W.W. and A.E.W. (“Children”), and the subsequent decree of adoption. She raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as the following issue: whether the trial court clearly erred when it determined that Mothers consent was not required for the adoption of Children.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] A.W.W. was born to Mother on January 14, 2018, and R.H.’s paternity of A.W.W. was established in July 2018. R.H.’s parental rights were terminated in January 2022. A.E.W. was born to Mother on January 7, 2020, but no paternity was established and no putative father was registered.
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[4] A.W.W. was adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) on May 31, 2019, based on Mothers admissions that she was involved in a “hit and run” accident while A.W.W. was in the car, she was not permitted to drive because she was under the influence of alcohol, and she had consumed cocaine. In addition, an older sibling of A.W.W. had previously been adjudicated to be a CHINS while in Mothers care. Mother also had a criminal history of domestic violence from 2017. A.W.W. was placed with Adoptive Parents in their capacity as licensed foster parents.
[5] A.E.W. was adjudicated to be a CHINS on September 16, 2020, based on Mothers admissions that, when A.E.W. was five months old, the police intervened in an incident during which she had been intoxicated and, while carrying A.E.W. in her arms, had attempted to force entry into a neighbors home. Mother had also tested positive for cocaine. A.E.W.’s head was injured during the incident, and he suffered from a “brain bleed” which led to subsequent seizures and behavioral issues that he still experienced by the time of the adoption hearing. Tr. at 20. A.E.W. was initially placed with relatives, but on or before December 8, 2020, he was placed with his brother in the care of Adoptive Parents.
[6] A.W.W. has been in Adoptive Parents’ care since he was a little over one year old, and A.E.W. has been in Adoptive Parents’ care since he was a little less than one year old. Neither child was ever returned to Mothers care after removal. Both Childrens permanency plans in their CHINS cases provide for their adoption by Adoptive Parents.
[7] Based on the incident in which Mother injured A.E.W., on November 5, 2021, she was convicted of neglect of a dependent, as a Level 3 felony; criminal confinement, as a Level 5 felony; and residential entry, as a Level 6 felony. Mother was sentenced to fourteen years, with nine years executed, in the Department of Correction (“DOC”), and a no contact order was issued as to A.E.W. Mothers earliest confirmed release date from imprisonment is in May 2028.
[8] During the pendency of the CHINS cases and before her confinement in the DOC, Mother had various types of employment and was able to support herself. However, Mother was not ordered by the CHINS court to pay child support, and she did not voluntarily do so. During that time, Mother periodically gave gifts to Children. Mother had limited supervised visitation with A.W.W.; however, she had no visitation with A.E.W. due to the no contact order. A.E.W. does not know Mother and neither child asks about Mother.
[9] On July 20, 2020, Adoptive Parents filed their petition to adopt A.W.W., and on October 21, 2021, they filed their petition to adopt A.E.W. On May 3, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on whether Mothers consent to the adoptions was required. Mother testified that, while in prison, she has been attending classes to address recidivism, emotional well-being, effective parenting, and the development of a reunification plan. She has also completed a domestic violence class. Mother also testified that, through completion of various programs, she could be released from prison as early as December 2027. Mother further testified that she is a “good mother.” Appealed Order at 3.
[10] A.E.W. suffers from seizures, for which he takes medication, and exhibits outbursts and behavioral issues as side effects of his condition. A.E.W. completed speech therapy while in Adoptive Parents’ care but will continue to need occupational and fine motor skills therapies. Adoptive Parents have the means and ability to provide and care for Children, including A.E.W.’s special needs. Adoptive Parents and Children are bonded and have the support of extended family. Children refer to Adoptive Parents as “mom and dad.” Appealed Order at 4.
[11] Prior to Mothers incarceration, she was not able to sustain sobriety. The assistant director of the program for the Childrens Court Appointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) in their CHINS cases testified at the May 3, 2023, hearing on consent that Mother does well with maintaining sobriety when she is in structured settings but otherwise reverts to her addictions. The CASA assistant director opined that, without supervision and structure for Mother, Children would be at risk in her care. The CASA assistant director further opined that adoption by Adopted Parents is in Childrens best interests.
[12] On July 13, 2023, the trial court issued its order that Mothers consent to adoption was not required. In doing so, the trial court made the following findings, among others:
the CHINS case records reflect a child endangering pattern of conduct that existed prior to and continuing after the mothers infliction of injuries on [A.E.W.]. She was intoxicated and engaged in behaviors that threatened [A.W.W.]’s well-being in 2019. Despite the provision of services, she used cocaine and alcohol; behavior that resulted in harm to [A.E.W.]. By her own admission, her sobriety did not begin until after her incarceration. This pattern brings validity to the CASA assistant directors conclusion that the mother is not able to self-govern her behaviors in an unstructured environment.
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Given [Mothers] historic pattern of behaviors, this court concludes that her ability to meet [A.E.W.]’s special needs is in doubt.
The Court finds and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence supports a finding that [Mother] is an unfit parent.
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․ mother is incarcerated until 2028. Absent this adoption the childrens permanency will be forestalled for significant period of time. Most of their young lives have been in the context of the uncertainty associated with foster care placement. As the CASA assistant testified, forcing them to wait for permanency is cruel.
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By the clear and convincing evidence this court finds and concludes that the best interests of the children are served by dispensing with the Respondent mothers consent to the adoption.
From the totality of the circumstances of this case, this court concludes that the mothers consent to the adoption is not required and that her motions to contest the adoptions should be denied.
Appealed Order at 5-6.
[13] Following a hearing, on November 16, 2023, the trial court granted the adoption petitions and entered decrees of adoption. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[14] Mother contends that the trial court erred when it concluded that her consent was not required for the adoption of Children. Our standard of review in adoption cases is well-settled:
In family law matters, we generally give considerable deference to the trial courts decision because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, “get a feel for the family dynamics,” and “get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005).
Accordingly, when reviewing an adoption case, we presume that the trial courts decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption. In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972–73 (Ind. 2014).
The trial courts findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. In re Paternity of K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” Id. We will not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 973. Rather, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial courts decision. Id.
E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018).
[15] As this Court has noted, “the most protected status in any adoption proceeding is that of the natural parent. Recognizing the fundamental importance of the parent-child relationship, our courts have strictly construed the adoption statute to preserve that relationship.” In re Adoption of D.H., 135 N.E.3d 914, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In re Adoption of N.W., 933 N.E.2d 909, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), adopted by 941 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 2011)). However, the best interest of the child is paramount, and “our main concern should lie with the effect of the adoption on the reality of the minor childs life.” Id. (quoting In re Adoption of K.F., 935 N.E.2d 282, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied).
[16] This case is governed by Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-8(a)(11)
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which states, in relevant part:
Consent to adoption ․ is not required from any of the following:
(11) A parent if:
(A) a petitioner for adoption proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to be a parent; and
(B) the best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be served if the court dispensed with the parents consent.
[17] Termination of parental rights cases provide useful guidance to the courts as to what makes a parent “unfit” for purposes of adoption cases. In re Adoption of M.L., 973 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Termination cases have considered factors such as a parents substance abuse, mental health, willingness to follow recommended treatment, lack of insight, instability in housing and employment, and ability to care for a childs special needs. Also, this Court has consistently held in the termination context that it need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development are permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. It is well-settled that individuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their children. A parents criminal history is relevant to whether the parent is unfit under Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(11).
K.H. v. M.M., 151 N.E.3d 1259, 1267-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citations omitted), trans. denied.
[18] Here, the Adoptive Parents provided clear and convincing evidence that Mother is unfit to parent Children. Mother has pursued criminal activity, which has led to her current incarceration that is likely to last until 2028 and which has prevented her from developing positive and meaningful relationships with Children. Mother is unable to maintain sobriety except when she is in a structured, supervised setting, as shown by her pattern of substance abuse. Moreover, Mothers substance abuse has caused harm to Children, particularly A.E.W. who still suffers from injuries sustained while he was in Mothers care while she was abusing substances. Despite the fact that Mother is currently incarcerated for the harm she inflicted on A.E.W., she maintained at the hearing that she is a good mother, thus showing a lack of insight. Mothers patterns of criminal activity and substance abuse also negatively affect her ability to provide for A.E.W.’s special needs.
[19] In addition, the evidence supports the trial courts ultimate finding that adoption of Children without Mothers consent is in Childrens best interests.
The primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interests of the child. The State has a strong interest in providing stable homes for children. To this end, early, permanent placement of children with adoptive families furthers the interests of both the child and the State. An adoption enables a child to be raised in a stable, supportive, and nurturing environment and precludes the possibility of state wardship.
M.L., 973 N.E.2d at 1224 (citations omitted). Here, the evidence established that Adoptive Parents have provided Children with a stable, nurturing environment. While Children have little-to-no bond with Mother, they have bonded with Adoptive Parents to whom they refer as “mom and dad.” Appealed Order at 4. Adoptive Parents are able to provide, and have been providing, for all Childrens needs, including A.E.W.’s special needs, while Mother has shown little-to-no ability to do so. Furthermore, Adoptive Parents and Children have the support of Adoptive Parents’ extended family. And Mother is currently incarcerated until 2028; therefore, “[a]bsent this adoption [C]hildrens permanency will be forestalled for a significant period of time,” which is not in their best interests. Id. at 6. This evidence supports the trial courts conclusion that adoption without Mothers consent is in Childrens best interests.
Conclusion
[20] Adoptive Parents proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother is unfit. The evidence also supported the trial courts conclusion that adoption without Mothers consent is in Childrens best interests. The trial court did not clearly err when it granted the adoption petitions and entered decrees of adoption without Mothers consent.
[21] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. G.S. was named as the father of A.E.W. in this action and was provided with notice. Although G.S. filed a motion to contest the adoption, he did not file to establish paternity of A.E.W. and he did not appear for the hearing to contest adoption. Therefore, the trial court found that G.S.’s consent to the adoption was irrevocably implied pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-12. Neither G.S. nor A.W.W.’s Father, R.H., participate in this appeal.
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. As the trial court correctly noted, Children could not be adopted without Mothers consent based on Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-10(1)(H) because Mother was not convicted of and incarcerated for neglect of a dependent –i.e., A.W.E.—as a Level 3 felony at the time the adoption petitions were filed; her conviction and incarceration came later.
Bailey, Judge.
Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.