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L.C. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner. (2024)

Court of Appeals of Indiana.2024-01-23No. Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-JT-1678

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] L.C. (“Mother”) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to her child S.H., born January 21, 2020 (the “Child”).

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Mother presents one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: Whether the trial courts decision to terminate Mothers parental rights was clearly erroneous.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In addition to the Child, Mother is the mother of J.C., D.C., and C.C. (the “Siblings”). The Child has a different father than the Siblings. Mothers parental rights as to the Siblings were terminated simultaneously with her parental rights to the Child. In a separate appeal, we affirmed the trial courts decision to terminate Mothers parental rights to the Siblings, and our Supreme Court denied transfer. In re L.C. (L.C. I), 213 N.E.3d 1079, No. 22A-JT-3061, slip op. (Ind. Ct. App. July 5, 2023), trans. denied sub nom. L.C. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 220 N.E.3d 55 (Ind. 2023). The trial court held all relevant proceedings in this case at the same time for both the Child and the Siblings, and the termination orders for the Child and the Siblings are nearly identical.

[4] We therefore set out the facts underlying the trial courts termination decision in this case as previously stated in Mothers first appeal:

The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) initially became involved with Mother in August 2018, and the [Siblings] were the subject of an out-of-home child in need of services (“CHINS”) case from August 2018 to December 2019 that had been initiated due to Mothers substance abuse. During this prior case, Mother relapsed after beginning a trial home visit and suffered from serious depression requiring inpatient mental health treatment. These circumstances extended the time during which [the Siblings] were involved with DCS. Mother was unsuccessfully discharged from inpatient treatment for substance abuse issues two times during the prior case. At the time of closure of the prior case, the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) still had active concerns about Mothers ability to maintain sobriety, the stability of her lifestyle and living environment, and her decision-making. After the prior CHINS cases closed, Mother began withdrawing from services and missed therapy sessions.

On March 17, 2020, DCS became involved with Mother in the current case. On that date, DCS investigated a report that Mother was using illegal substances and having suicidal ideations while residing at Hope Springs Domestic Violence Shelter. At that time, Mother, who had responsibility for the care of the [Siblings and Child], was observed sleeping constantly, and was difficult to wake. Mother had a long history of substance abuse, which added to DCSs concern for the [Siblings’ and Childs] wellbeing. On March 19, 2020, DCS filed its CHINS petition based on the allegations that Mother had been leaving the [Siblings and Child] unsupervised at night, using illegal substances, and having suicidal ideations. On the same day, the juvenile court held the detention and initial hearing and found that it was in the best interest of the [Siblings and Child] to be removed from Mothers care. Shortly after the hearing, Mother left the shelter where she had been residing for over a year. On May 18, 2020, Mother was arrested, charged with Level 4 felony burglary and Level 6 felony theft, and was incarcerated from May 18 to June 4, 2020.

On May 27, 2020, and on June 8, 2020, the CHINS factfinding hearing was held, and the following evidence was heard. Since the CHINS case was initiated, Mother had completed only one drug screen despite being ordered by the juvenile court to complete them as requested. Mother declined all services on multiple occasions, stating she did not need DCSs assistance. Although she had gone to a hospital on March 17 for suicidal ideations, Mother made no further efforts to obtain mental health services. At the time of the hearing, Mother had no stable home and was unable to provide for the [Siblings’ and Childs] needs. On July 14, 2020, the juvenile court issued its order adjudicating the [Siblings and Child] to be CHINS.

The dispositional hearing was held on August 11, 2020, and the juvenile court entered its dispositional order on August 23, 2020. In the dispositional order, Mother was ordered to participate in ․ reunification services[.]

At a review hearing on November 10, 2020, Mother was found to be noncompliant with the case plan. She had not completed random drug screens, signed a release for service providers, or called a doctor to gain clearance to participate in inpatient treatment as directed. Mother had not enhanced her ability to fulfill her parental obligations because she made no substantive progress in recovery from substance use, in gaining stability, or in maintaining her mental health. Further, Mother was uncooperative with DCS.

Mother went to a drug and alcohol treatment program called Club Soda from October 2020 through January 2021. She left the program and failed to notify the treatment team. Further, she relapsed twice in her substance abuse after she left. At a permanency hearing held in February 2021, the juvenile court found that Mother partially complied with the case plan and had engaged in services but was not consistent with attendance and that her housing was not stable. After her relapse, Mother went to a treatment program through the Volunteers of America from April 2021 through July 2021. At a permanency hearing in July 2021, the juvenile court found that Mother was complying with the case plan, was continuing to test negative for illegal substances, and had found employment. Between the months of July 2021 and the November 2, 2021 review hearing, Mother continued to comply with the case plan, participated in all court ordered services, and continued to have negative drug screens.

At a review hearing on December 14, 2021, the juvenile court found that Mother had partially complied with the case plan by participating in all court-ordered services and maintaining negative drug screens. The juvenile court remained concerned about Mothers choices and priorities due to an incident that occurred during one of her visitations with the [Siblings and Child]. At that point, Mother was permitted to have unsupervised visits but was not permitted to have anyone else attend these visits. On her first unsupervised visitation, Mother allowed a family member (her sisters son) to be with the [Siblings and Child] unsupervised. This family member was reported to have sexually abused the [Siblings]when he inappropriately touched them prior to the visit and had solicited sexual acts from D.C. previously. Despite this history, Mother did not believe he was a threat to the [Siblings and Child]. D.C. became mute after this visit, which the juvenile court determined indicated that he was traumatized by the contact with the family member.

On February 18, 2022, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mothers parental rights to the [Siblings and Child]. At a February 22, 2022, review hearing, Mother had partially complied with the case plan and had participated in random drug screens. Mother informed the treatment team that she was pregnant, but she had previously withheld this information and openly denied it before eventually disclosing. This lack of candor created obstacles for the treatment team, including efforts to coordinate appropriate parenting time. Additionally, she had not fully engaged in therapy and missed appointments. If she missed any more appointments, it was determined that she would be unsuccessfully discharged from the service. Little progress has been made on altering her decision-making to ensure the safety and wellbeing of the [Siblings and Child] was prioritized. Mother admitted that she made poor choices about who she surrounds herself with and not focusing on the needs of the [Siblings and Child].

The termination hearing was held on August 22, 2022. At the hearing, testimony was given that Mother had a chronic lack of housing and employment. To address this, she was required to complete home-based casework. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was employed at McDonalds and had housing provided to her through her church at a discounted rent. She routinely refused, however, to provide budgets or allow the treatment team to view her financial situation. Financial stability was imperative to ensure Mother could maintain utilities and provide food for her family. Mother admitted she would not be able to afford her home and support the [Siblings and Child] without the rental assistance from her church and additional assistance.

Mother had a twenty-year history with substance abuse. She had numerous criminal convictions related to illegal substances and surrounded herself with individuals who used methamphetamine. Mother left Club Soda unsuccessfully without informing the treatment staff and then relapsed. She turned in several positive drug screens in the early stages of the underlying CHINS case. Throughout her substance abuse history, Mother failed to remove individuals who used illegal substances from her life. Mother admitted to the FCM that being around people who are users was triggering for her. During the pendency of the case, Mother was romantically involved with two men who both abused illegal substances, including methamphetamine. Further, Mothers sponsor recommended she participate in a twelve-step program and the juvenile court ordered her to do so. Despite having more than twelve months to work on her steps and progress, Mother was only on the second step at the time of the termination hearing.

Mother was referred to individual therapy to address past trauma and help her progress toward reunification. However, Mother had not progressed meaningfully in individual therapy, and instead, in her sessions, she blamed DCS, CASA, and the juvenile court for the [Siblings’ and Childs] removal, rather than demonstrating accountability for her actions. Additionally, Mother missed enough sessions to be terminated from the therapy, but DCS requested that the provider keep the referral open and continue to serve her, policy notwithstanding. Mother had also asked to stop individual therapy because she no longer wanted to participate. Mother was unwilling to address long-term trauma or work on her harmful thought processes.

The [Siblings’ and Childs] FCM and CASA recommended termination of Mothers parental rights. The [Siblings’ and Childs] FCM reasoned that [Siblings and Child] were thriving in their current homes and Mother failed to prioritize the [Siblings and Child] or change her mentality to ensure their safety over her own wants. The [Siblings’ and Childs] CASA recommended termination of Mothers parental rights because it was in their best interest to be adopted. DCSs plan for the [Siblings and Child] was adoption.

On December 4, 2022, the juvenile court issued its order, terminating Mothers parental rights to the [Siblings and Child]. The juvenile court based its decision on, among other things, Mothers failures to engage in services, including the twelve-step program, to address her drug use; to progress in her individual therapy; to remove the influence of individuals who use illegal substances from her life; and to exercise good judgment when participating in visitation.

L.C. I, No. 22A-JT-3061, slip op. at ¶¶ 3–15.

[5] Mother now appeals the trial courts termination of her parental rights to the Child.

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Discussion and Decision

[6] “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute. When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45–46 (Ind. 2019) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013)), cert. denied.

[7] To terminate Mothers parental rights, DCS had to prove by clear and convincing evidence, that, among other things,

(B) one of the following is true:

(i)  there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Childs removal or the reasons for placement outside Mothers home will not be remedied,

(ii)  there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of Mothers relationship with the Child poses a threat to the well-being of the Child, or

(iii) the Child has, on two separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) termination is in the best interests of the Child; and

(D) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child.

See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2); id. § 31-37-14-2.

[8] We will affirm a trial courts termination of parental rights unless that decision is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45 (citing In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014)). A trial courts termination decision is clearly erroneous if the courts findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions or if the legal conclusions do not support its ultimate decision. Id. (citing E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642). We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the courts decision. Id. (citing In re K.E., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015)). Furthermore, we accept as true any findings which Mother does not challenge on appeal. See R.M. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992)), trans. not sought.

[9] Here, Mother challenges only five findings

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and one conclusion; we accept as true all other findings and conclusions. The relevant uncontested findings and conclusions include the following:

1. The Child “has spent nearly her entire life in foster placement” and “identifie[s] her placement as ‘Mom,’ ” Appellants App. Vol. II at 43; see also id. at 44, 46;

2. Mothers “judgment was severely lacking” when she allowed her nephew to be alone with the Siblings and Child, and “[t]his incident is emblematic of the danger facing the children if left in [Mother]’s care without supervision,” id. at 43;

3. In engaging in a relationship with a person who had a methamphetamine-related conviction, Mother “prioritized her own wants and desires over the needs of her children, as she has done throughout their lives,” and Mother “does not appear to recognize how serious this incident is and how imperative it is to remove herself from situations where she would be triggered or tempted to use illegal substances,” id. at 43–44;

4. Mother “has not made the life changes necessary to sustain sobriety,” id. at 44;

5. Mother “has been unwilling to address long term trauma or work on her harmful thought processes,” id.;

6. Mothers “conduct has been harmful to the Child and her half-siblings,” id.;

7. “Continued contact with drug users and a sexual abuser is a direct threat to the childrens wellbeing,” id. at 44–45;

8. “The Child has no more time to wait for [Mother] to decide she needs to come first,” id. at 45;

[10] The trial court was required to find only that one prong of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence. K.E. v. Ind. Dept of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 464 n.4 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Here, the trial court concluded that two of the three prongs of Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had been established by clear and convincing evidence: (1) “the conditions that resulted in the [C]hilds removal or the continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by Mother and Father”; and (2) “continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Childs wellbeing.” Appellants App. Vol. II at 49.

[11] Mother argues only that the trial courts findings and conclusions regarding whether she had remedied the conditions necessitating the Childs removal from her care were clearly erroneous. Assuming for the sake of argument that Mother is correct on this issue, the trial courts ultimate decision to terminate Mothers parental rights as to the Child remains supported by its uncontested findings and conclusions regarding the continuation of the parent-child relationship posing a threat to the Childs wellbeing. See Appellants App. Vol. II at 48–49; Appellants Br. at 16–22. Moreover, Mother also does not challenge the trial courts findings and conclusions regarding (1) termination of Mothers parental rights being in the Childs best interests and (2) there is a satisfactory plan in place for the care and treatment of the Child, namely, adoption. See Appellants App. Vol. II at 49; Appellants Br. at 16–22. Accordingly, the undisputed findings and conclusions sufficiently support the trial courts ultimate decision to terminate Mothers parental rights to the Child. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2); K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 464 n.4 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 373); R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564 (citing Madlem, 592 N.E.2d at 687). We therefore hold that the trial court did not err when it terminated Mothers parental rights.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

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.   D.H., the Childs father, also had his parental rights to the Child involuntarily terminated, but he does not join in this appeal.

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.   We observe that Mother includes more than 40 statements of fact—including quoted material—in the Statement of Facts section of her brief that she does not support with citations to the record. Appellants Br. at 5–14. This is a violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(6)(a). Mother repeats many of the same facts in her Argument and again fails to support these statements with citations to the record. Appellants Br. at 17–22. This is a violation of Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Nonetheless, because Mothers noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46(A) does not substantially impede our review of her claim, we choose to address the merits thereof. See Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015).

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.   Mother challenged four of these five findings in L.C. I, No. 22A-JT-3061, slip op. at ¶¶ 19–22. The fifth finding that Mother challenges is that the Child “does not appear particularly bonded to [Mother].” Appellants Br. at 19 (quoting Appellants App. Vol. II at 43).

Felix, Judge.

Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.