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STATE OF IOWA v. BRYAN MICHAEL HALFHILL (2024)

Court of Appeals of Iowa.2024-03-06No. No. 23-0998

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Opinion

Bryan Halfhill appeals his convictions of second-degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child. He challenges the district courts denial of his motion for new trial, claiming the verdicts are contrary to the weight of the evidence. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Halfhill and G.U. were in a romantic relationship for several years, and in 2018, they lived together with their young child and G.U.’s older son, D.U. G.U.’s sexual relationship with Halfhill started out “normal,” but then it became “a chore” to satisfy him. Halfhill began asking G.U. “to find a girlfriend, somebody for a threesome.” G.U. “tried,” but she “didnt find anybody.” Around November 2017, D.U. told her Halfhill was “taking pictures of him, his privates.” G.U. was initially “mad” when she learned Halfhill was abusing D.U., but she “ended up doing what [Halfhill] wanted” because “he had [her] brainwashed.” G.U. observed Halfhill “having [D.U.] touch his penis, stroking it, giving him a hand job.” G.U. also participated in sexual acts with D.U., stating she did so because Halfhill “kind of forced [her] to.” The abuse continued while they lived together.

On November 16, 2018, G.U.’s niece, E.G., spent the night at the familys home. G.U. asked E.G. to spend the night because Halfhill “had been wanting a young girl for awhile,” and he “kept bugging [G.U.] to have [E.G.] over.” That night, G.U. took “pictures, videos” of herself participating in sexual acts with E.G. The next morning, the family went to an arcade. Halfhill tried to bribe E.G. to perform oral sex on him outside in the van, and he promised he would give her a toy if she did so. When E.G. refused, Halfhill angrily gave the toy to another child.

The next day, E.G. reported to her mother (G.U.’s sister) “what had happened.” E.G.’s mother immediately confronted G.U. about E.G.’s allegations, and G.U. admitted they were true. G.U. then reported to Halfhill that E.G. “had told” her mother. G.U. did not go into “detail” about what E.G. said, but Halfhill told G.U. to “blame it all on [him].” He instructed G.U. to “[c]lear [w]hole phone,”

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which G.U. refused to do because she didnt want to lose sentimental photographs of their childs birth stored on the phone. Halfhill then instructed G.U. to “[g]et rid of” the phone, which G.U. refused to do because it was on her parents’ plan. Halfhill said he would buy her a new phone. A few hours later, Halfhill sent a picture of sleeping pills and stated he was going to kill himself. G.U. begged Halfhill not to commit suicide. Halfhill was later found unconscious at his grandparents’ house after he had fallen and hit his head.

Police investigated E.G.’s allegations, which led to the seizure of G.U.’s phone. G.U. stated Halfhill had “downloaded” two apps on her phone “to hide pictures [so] that theyre not in your regular photo album.” Although G.U. attempted to “delete[ ]” texts and photographs containing evidence of sexual abuse, police discovered some images of child pornography involving E.G. and D.U. None of the texts or photographs discovered linked Halfhill to specific instances of sexual abuse; “[t]hey were all deleted.” Police also seized three phones from Halfhill. No incriminating evidence was found on the “newest” phone, and the software investigators used to access mobile device data were unable to get through Halfhills passcodes on the other phones.

Police interviewed D.U. in December 2018, who stated, “Bryan let me touch his pee-pee and my moms butt.” D.U. explained the abuse in more detail in a subsequent deposition. E.G. did not provide any statements regarding abuse by G.U. or Halfhill. Halfhill denied all allegations regarding sexual abuse or lascivious acts. When interviewed, Halfhill said he was unable to “remember things” because he “took 250 extra-strength sleeping pills.” He explained he told G.U. to clear her phone because she threatened him “to make it go away or else ․ she was going to put it all on [him].” He explained he tried to commit suicide because he “would rather be dead than have that label.”

The State charged Halfhill with second-degree sexual abuse, lascivious acts with a child, and lascivious acts with a child by way of soliciting a person to commit a sex act with a child. Following trial, the jury found Halfhill guilty as charged. On appeal, this court reversed Halfhills convictions upon finding “backdoor hearsay was improperly admitted and it was prejudicial to Halfhill.” See State v. Halfhill, No. 19-2093, 2021 WL 1400761, at *1, *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2021). The court remanded the case for a new trial.

Following a second trial, the jury found Halfhill guilty of second-degree sexual abuse and lascivious acts with a child, and not guilty of lascivious acts with a child by way of soliciting a person to commit a sex act with a child.

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Halfhill filed a motion for new trial, which the district court denied. Halfhill appealed the courts ruling, and this court determined the district court applied the wrong standard in ruling on the motion. See State v. Halfhill, No. 22-0395, 2023 WL 2395869, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2023). The court therefore “reverse[d] the district courts ruling on the motion for new trial and remand[ed] to the district court for a ruling on this motion, applying the weight-of-the-evidence standard.” See id. at *1, *3.

On remand, the district court issued another ruling denying Halfhills motion for new trial. Halfhill appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district courts denial of a motion for a new trial on weight-of-the-evidence grounds for an abuse of discretion—the most deferential standard of review. See State v. Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d 231, 246 (Iowa 2022); see also State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127, 137 (Iowa 2017). When a claim is made that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, “the verdict may be set aside and a new trial granted” if “the court reaches the conclusion that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and that a miscarriage of justice may have resulted.” State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 472 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 658–59 (Iowa 1998)). “A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence where ‘a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other.’ ” State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 658).

III. Analysis

Halfhill claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. He argues the court unreasonably interpreted the witnesses’ testimony, claiming “[b]oth of the States primary witnesses[, G.U. and D.U.,] had severe credibility problems,”

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whereas “Halfhill gave credible testimony denying the allegations against him.”

Unlike the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, the weight-of-the-evidence standard permits the district court to consider the credibility of witnesses. State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). This makes sense because deciding a motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence requires consideration of “whether more ‘credible evidence’ supports the verdict rendered than supports the alternative verdict.” Id. (citation omitted). “It is up to the district court, who sat through trial, to determine the credibility of the various witnesses.” State v. McPeek, No. 22-1961, 2023 WL 8449569, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023). Here, the district courts written ruling noted:

The undersigned was present for the entirety of the trial and saw every witness testify, watched the depositions that were played in lieu of live testimony, and examined every exhibit. Following remand, the undersigned also reviewed the trial transcript. Applying the weight-of-evidence standard, the Court is firmly convinced that the weight of the evidence supports the jurys verdicts.

The States case rested heavily on the testimony of [G.U.], who is the mother of the victim involved in the sexual abuse charge and the aunt of the victim involved in the lascivious act charge.[4] The undersigned found [G.U.] to be a credible witness who provided truthful testimony. Defendant, on the other hand, was not a credible witness. The greater weight of the credible evidence, consisting of [G.U.]’s testimony and the other evidence offered by the State, was consistent with and not contrary to the jurys verdicts in the case. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion for new trial based on the weight-of-the-evidence standard.

In our view, this is not one of those “exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.” Ellis, 578 N.W.2d at 659 (citation omitted). As the court noted, it presided over Halfhills three-day trial, observed each witness testify, watched the depositions, and examined each exhibit. The court also reviewed the trial transcript. Based on its review, the court found “[t]he greater weight of the credible evidence ․ was consistent with and not contrary to the jurys verdicts in the case.” We find no abuse of discretion in the courts ruling. See Stendrup, 983 N.W.2d at 246 (“Our review is not to determine whether the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence but only to determine whether the district court abused its considerable discretion in denying the motion.”); State v. Agan, No. 21-1703, 2023 WL 3092504, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2023) (“Although the evidence supporting the other statements could have been interpreted in a manner weighing less heavily in favor of conviction, they were drawn directly from the evidence presented, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in its reasoning or credibility determinations.”). We affirm.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

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.   G.U. explained Halfhill meant for her “[t]o wipe my phone, to factory reset it” so “nothing was on it.”

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.   G.U. was charged and convicted for her participation in the abuse in a separate federal case.

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.   Halfhill also points to the “benefit” G.U. received “in her federal case” in exchange for her testimony, which he claims “further marred” her credibility. At trial, G.U. acknowledged “[t]hey did give me a sentence reduction, but they put my stuff as concurrent, thats my reduction.” She testified even with the reduction she would not be released from prison until 2045. G.U. stated her “motivation” for testifying in Halfhills trial was “to protect [her] kids” from “further abuse.”

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.   Halfhill also challenges the courts characterization of E.G. as a “victim,” noting “[s]he was not a victim of Halfhills actions, only [G.U.]’s.” Halfhills explanation of his contention belies any challenge to it. Evidence of abuse to E.G. was introduced at trial, and the district courts generalized reference to E.G. as a victim (in lieu of using her name) to describe G.U.’s relationship to her was not an abuse of discretion.

BOWER, Chief Judge.