Granted. Although we find no evidence of actual bias, we conclude that defendants counsels role as campaign chairperson for two of the judges on the appellate panel provides a substantial and objective basis that would reasonably be expected to prevent the judges from conducting any aspect of the cause in a fair and impartial manner. La. Code Civ. P. art. 151(B).
Accordingly, the judgment of the ad hoc judge is reversed, and the motions to recuse Judge Nakisha Ervin-Knott and Judge Rachael Johnson are granted. The case is remanded to the court of appeal to randomly allot two of its judges to sit in place of the recused judges pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 158(B) and to consider the merits of the pending writ application.
The reality of electing judges is that attorneys often chair those campaigns. Attorneys have a direct interest in the quality of judge candidates, are often respected civic leaders, and can bring credence to nascent campaigns. While the personal relationship between a judge and their campaign chairperson can require recusal, the position alone should not.
Outside of an opposed election, the campaign chairperson has only a ministerial duty to certify the accuracy of required annual reports, which are usually prepared by others then certified by the judges campaign treasurer. Because a judge is prohibited from directly fundraising for their own campaign, campaign committees are necessary. The campaign committee is required to designate a chairperson. La. R.S. 18:1491.1. These requirements are designed to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary by insulating elected judges from the solicitation and receipt of campaign contributions. The chairpersons certification of the required annual reports in this context does not provide a substantial and objective basis to doubt the judges’ impartiality. It is merely a byproduct of electing judges. This context weighs against recusal.
The temporal relation between a judge and their election campaign, thus their campaign chairperson, is also critical in the subject recusal evaluation. Here, neither judge had an opposed election in many years. They both ran unopposed in 2022. Judge Ervin-Knott last had an opposed election ten years ago (2014), and Judge Johnson last ran opposed seven years ago (2017). The temporal relation here weighs against recusal.
Also, here the attorney is appearing in a representative capacity before the judge, not in a personal capacity on a matter of personal interest. The attorney is appearing as an advocate. This fact weighs against recusal.
The facts presented are simply too tenuous to conclude that these judges cannot, in accordance with due process, conduct a fair and impartial trial for these parties with this attorney serving as an advocate. I dissent and would deny the motions to recuse.
I agree with the decision of the majority that under these facts and specific circumstances, recusal is warranted.
As stated in the Per Curiam, there is no evidence of actual bias in this case. However, the close relationship of Mr. Litchfield as current Chairperson of the campaign finance committee of two of the three judges assigned to the panel who will determine the outcome of the writ in question presents a troubling situation and warrants a close review. This case is a close call; however, the ad hoc judges review confirms that recusal is appropriate. La. Code Civ. P. art. 151(B). Though Mr. Litchfields position may be primarily ministerial, this ongoing relationship as the Chairperson and not merely a contributor or supporter of their campaign creates a substantial and objective basis that recusal should be granted. Further, other judges of the Fourth Circuit are available to consider this matter, so as not require the service of the judges in question.
Additionally, I agree with the majority that Judge Pitchers decision not to hold a hearing is not problematic as the facts regarding the basis for the request for recusal are undisputed and the issue is merely one of application of the statute to those facts.
PER CURIAM
Crichton, J., concurs in the result for reasons assigned by Justice Griffin.
Genovese, J., dissents.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Griffin, J., concurs in the result and assigns reasons.