Writ granted in part; otherwise denied. We find that the court of appeal correctly determined that the district court erred in imposing procedural bars to dismiss applicants post-conviction claims involving violations of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Ezidore v. Hooper, 23-363 (La. App. 5 Cir. 8/30/23) (unpubd). However, we also find that the court of appeal erred in determining from the information available that post-conviction applicant Keith Ezidore failed to show that any material suppression had occurred. Accordingly, we grant the application in part to reverse that portion of the court of appeals ruling, and we remand to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing at which applicant will have the opportunity to carry his burden post-conviction, La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.2, of showing the State suppressed material evidence that was reasonably likely to have affected the judgment of the jury. See generally Wearry v. Cain, 577 U.S. 385, 136 S.Ct. 1002, 194 L.Ed.2d 78 (2016); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972) (clarifying that the rule stated in Brady applies to evidence undermining witness credibility).
As for applicants recantation-based claim of factual innocence, we find that applicant has failed to present evidence that is both new and sufficiently corroborated in accordance with La.C.Cr.P. art. 926.2(B)(2), (B)(1)(a). Therefore, applicants claim of factual innocence can properly be dismissed, see La.C.Cr.P. arts. 929, 930, and the application here with regard to the claim of factual innocence is denied.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED
PER CURIAM:
Crichton, J., dissents and would deny.
Crain, J., dissents and would deny.
McCallum, J., dissents and would deny.