The defendant, Robert R. Allen, was charged by bill of information with one count of possession of heroin, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance, less than two grams, in violation of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:966(C)(4)(a), and initially pled not guilty. The defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. The defendant then withdrew his not guilty plea and pled guilty as charged pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La. 1976). The trial court sentenced the defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for two years, suspended the sentence, and placed the defendant on supervised probation for two years. The defendant now appeals, challenging the trial courts denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm the conviction and sentence.
FACTS
On February 14, 2022, Detective Tyler Lindsey (“Detective Lindsey”) and Lieutenant Nicholas Glenn of the Bogalusa Police Department were patrolling the Pleasant Hill area of Bogalusa—an area considered by law enforcement to be high in crime, particularly for narcotics use and distribution, home burglaries, and theft. At around 1:30 p.m., Detective Lindsey observed the defendant, an individual with whom he was familiar, “cutting through a yard.” Detective Lindsey knew this residence did not belong to the defendant and further testified that the defendant, upon noticing the patrol unit, “turned his face where we couldnt see who he was or trying to shade himself. When we turned around, he moved further into the yard and ended up walking under a carport.”
The two officers then initiated an investigatory stop and ordered the defendant to come out from under the carport. According to Detective Lindsey, the defendant “was extremely nervous. He couldnt tell us - other than that he was there to see someone, he couldnt tell us who lived at the house, [or] who he was there to see.” While in the process of conducting a safety frisk for weapons, the officers inquired of the defendant whether he had “anything on him.” Initially, the defendant “hesitantly” responded he did not, but then admitted to having “something on him[,]” located in his pocket.
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Detective Lindsey then removed two bags from the defendants pocket, which he suspected, and the defendant confirmed to be, heroin. After securing the evidence, the defendant was released until an arrest warrant could be obtained at a later date, as the two officers believed the defendant was leaving from a nearby narcotics trafficking house and were conducting a further investigation.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole assignment of error, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police officers did not have sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop or search him. The defendant further argues that, “[c]utting across a yard comer at midday does not create the requisite reasonable suspicion to believe that [he] had committed or was about to commit a crime. Nor did [Detective] Lindsey articulate any facts to justify a belief that [he] was armed so as to present a danger to him and justify the frisk. The small amount of heroin seized and [his subsequent] admission [․] should have been suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ ”
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless search is unreasonable unless the search can be justified by one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Cox, 2018-0769 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/22/19), 272 So.3d 597, 602. writ denied, 2019-00604 (La. 9/17/19), 278 So.3d 973, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 1279, 206 L.Ed.2d 262 (2020). Once a defendant makes an initial showing that a warrantless search or seizure occurred, the burden shifts to the State to prove the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant or any evidence seized without a warrant. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703(D).
The right of law enforcement officers to stop and interrogate one reasonably suspected of criminal conduct is, however, recognized by both federal and state jurisprudence. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Bell, 2014-1046 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1/15/15), 169 So.3d 417, 421. A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him his name, address, and an explanation of his actions. La. Code Crim. P. art. 215.1(A); see State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984). Reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop is something less than probable cause
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and must be determined under the specific facts of each case by whether the officer had sufficient knowledge of particular facts and circumstances to justify the infringement on the individuals right to be free from governmental interference. State v. Thompson, 2002-0333 (La. 4/9/03), 842 So.2d 330, 335. Evidence derived from an unreasonable stop, i.e., seizure, will be excluded from trial. State v. Lowery, 2004-0802 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/17/04), 890 So.2d 711, 718, writ denied, 2005-0447 (La. 5/13/05), 902 So.2d 1018.
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists to temporarily detain a person, the totality of the circumstances, “the whole picture,” must be considered. Belton, 441 So.2d at 1198 (citing, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 441, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). The detaining officer must have knowledge of specific, articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the stop. State v. Matthews, 2015-1281 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/26/16), 191 So.3d 1080, 1083-84; State v. Hieks, 2022-0085 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/16/22), 2022 WL 4286557, *3 (unpublished). Nevertheless, public safety requires some flexibility for police officers to investigate and prevent crime. In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the officers past experience, training, and common sense may be considered in determining if his inferences from the facts at hand were reasonable. Deference should be given to the experience of the officers who were present at the time of the incident. State v. Cyprian, 2021-0287 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/22/21), 340 So.3d 271, 282. Although flight, nervousness, or a startled look at the sight of a police officer is, by itself, insufficient to justify an investigatory stop, this type of conduct may be highly suspicious and, therefore, may be one of the factors leading to a finding of reasonable suspicion. State v. Scott, 561 So.2d 170, 173-74 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 556 So.2d 394 (La. 1990). Moreover, the reputation of an area is another articulable fact upon which a police officer may rely and is relevant in the determination of whether or not there was reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Areas known to be high crime areas are places where the character of the area gives color to conduct that might not otherwise arouse the suspicions of an officer. State v. Starks, 615 So.2d 943, 947 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) (citing, Scott, 561 So.2d at 173).
A trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress the evidence is entitled to great weight because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v. Jarrell, 2007-1720 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/12/08), 994 So.2d 620,625. When a trial court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the trial courts discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81. However, a trial courts legal findings are subject to a de novo standard of review. See State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751. In determining whether the ruling on a motion to suppress was correct, this court is not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion. State v. Jefferson, 2018-0083 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/24/18), 261 So.3d 793, 799, writ denied, 2018-1671 (La. 2/25/19), 266 So.3d 294.
Based on a thorough review of the record, we find Detective Lindsey possessed articulable, reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the defendant. Detective Lindsey, an officer with five years’ experience in the Bogalusa Police Department Violent Crimes Task Force, was patrolling a high crime area and believed the defendant, someone familiar to him, was walking away from a nearby house known for narcotics distribution. Additionally, when the defendant noticed Detective Lindsey, he attempted to evade the officers by walking into the carport of a residence that was not the residence where Detective Lindsey knew him to reside. As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, “[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be [the] most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
Moreover, as the area where Detective Lindsey was patrolling was a known high crime area, particularly for narcotics distribution, and where the defendant exhibited nervous and evasive behavior upon contact with the officers, the subsequent safety frisk of the defendant was also justified.
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Courts must give deference to the training and experience of police officers in determining which suspects might prove to be a danger to themselves or others. State v. Sims, 2002-2208 (La. 6/27/03), 851 So.2d 1039, 1045. The officer need not establish that it was more probable than not that the detained individual was armed and dangerous. Rather, it is sufficient that the officer establishes a “substantial probability” of danger. Further, drugs and gun violence frequently go hand-in-hand. See State v. Kimble, 2023-0176 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/21/23), 376 So.3d 869, 877. As the defendant admitted to Detective Lindsey his possession of heroin during the process of this lawful weapons frisk, the trial court did not err in denying the defendants motion to suppress.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. Miranda warnings are not required when officers conduct preliminary, noncustodial on-the-scene questioning to determine whether a crime has been committed, unless the accused is subjected to arrest or a significant restraint short of formal arrest. An individuals responses to on-the-scene and non-custodial questioning, particularly when carried out in public, are admissible without Miranda warnings. Although an individual detained in an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion has his freedom of movement curtailed in a significant way, until an arrest actually occurs, these Fourth Amendment seizures do not constitute custody for Miranda purposes. See State v. Shirley, 2008-2106 (La. 5/5/09), 10 So.3d 224, 229-30.
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. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (“We need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ”).
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. Probable cause is defined as “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” State v. Warren, 2005-2248 (La. 2/22/07), 949 So.2d 1215, 1224. “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within an officers knowledge, and of which he has reasonable and trustworthy information, are sufficient to justify a person of average caution in the belief that the accused has committed an offense.” State v. Wells, 2008-2262 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577, 582-83.
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. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 215.1(B) (“[w]hen a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this Article and reasonably suspects that he is in danger, he may frisk the outer clothing of such person for a dangerous weapon. If the law enforcement officer reasonably suspects the person possesses a dangerous weapon, he may search the person.”
WOLFE, J.