In this proceeding for judicial review of an administrative adjudication proceeding, the plaintiffs, Bankers Insurance Company, First Community Insurance Company, American Surety Company, Allegheny Casualty Company, International Fidelity Insurance Company, Accredited Surety And Casualty Company, Inc., Blairs Bail Bonds, Inc., Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., New Orleans Bail Bonds, LLC, and Safety National Casualty Corporation (collectively “the plaintiff sureties”), appeal a judgment of the district court affirming the decision of the Division of Administrative Law (“DAL”), which dismissed the administrative proceeding as moot. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to La, R.S. 22:2(A), the commissioner of insurance administers the provisions of the Louisiana Insurance Code. The commissioner of insurance has the authority to make “reasonable rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, to enforce, carry out, and make effective the implementation of the [Louisiana Insurance] Code.” La. R.S. 22:2(E). Pursuant to this authority, on February 20, 2019, James J. Donelon, in his official capacity as the commissioner of insurance (“the Commissioner”), issued Directive 214 to all licensed bail bond producers and commercial sureties. Therein, the Commissioner stated that he had been presented with evidence that the bail bond industry in Orleans Parish had been over-charging premiums. More specifically, the Commissioner stated that many of the criminal bail bond producers and commercial sureties had been charging a 13% premium rate, which was not permissible because the premium rate for criminal bail bonds written in Orleans Parish was set at 12% pursuant to La. R.S. 22:144s.
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According to the Commissioner, the bail bond producers and commercial sureties may have been erroneously informed that they could charge a 13% premium. In sum, this erroneous information was based upon an improper interpretation of La. R.S. 22:822, as amended by 2005 La. Acts, No. 350 (“Act 350”), which increased the criminal bail bond annual license fee for Orleans Parish commercial surety underwriters from 2% of liability to 3% of liability, and Act 350s effect (or lack thereof) on La. R.S. 22:1443.
Consequently, in Directive 214, the Commissioner directed that all licensed bail bond producers and commercial sureties writing criminal bail bonds in Orleans Parish refund all persons to whom they charged an excessive premium since 2005 (when La. R.S. 22:822 was amended by Act 350). Those licensed bail bond producers and commercial sureties were also directed to “make every effort to identify customers who may have been overcharged during [the specified] period, to “document these efforts to identify and locate impacted customers,” and to “document the actual refunds they issue for potential review” by the Louisiana Department of Insurance (“LDI”). In addition, a thirty-day refund requirement for consumers who presented evidence of being overcharged was imposed, as well as outlining the examination that LDI would pursue upon receipt of evidence of an unreimbursed overcharge. Finally, Directive 214 provided that if, after June 1, 2019, LDI found that an overcharge was not refunded, it would order a refund be paid within thirty days of the date of that order pursuant to La. R.S. 22:855(C) and (E) and that anyone found not to have refunded the excessive premium would be subjected to the provisions of La. R.S. 22:855(F) and (G).
In March 2019, pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 22:2191(A)(2), which grants the DAL jurisdiction to hold a hearing upon written demand of “any person aggrieved by any act, [or] order of the [C]ommissioner” of insurance, the plaintiff sureties requested an adjudication hearing before the DAL to challenge the validity of Directive 214. Jerome Morgan, a consumer that claimed he had been overcharged by one of the plaintiff sureties, was subsequently allowed to intervene in the proceedings before the DAL. However, shortly after commencing the proceeding before the DAL, the Louisiana Legislature addressed the subject matter contained in Directive 214 by passing 2019 La. Acts, No. 54 (“Act 54).
Act 54, which was approved and signed by the Governor on June 1, 2019, amended and re-enacted La. R.S. 22:1443 to provide as follows:
A. The premium rate set for commercial surety underwriters writing criminal bail bonds in the various courts throughout the state of Louisiana shall not be subject to the rates set by the insurance commissioner, but shall be set and adjusted by the legislature. Except as provided in Subsection B of this Section, the rate for all commercial surety underwriters writing criminal bail bonds in the state of Louisiana shall be twelve percent of the face amount of the bond or one hundred twenty dollars, whichever is greater. Any additional fee authorized by R.S. 13:718(1)(2) shall not be included in this premium rate and shall be exclusive of the limit set by this Section. All other provisions of the code relating to enforcement of the rate shall be effective and enforced in accordance with all parts of this Section.
B. (1) In any parish having a population of more than three hundred thousand and fewer than four hundred thousand persons according to the latest federal decennial census, to the extent an additional one percent has been collected under color of the provisions of [Act 350], no repayment of overcollections as determined by the commissioner shall be required nor shall such actions be considered a violation of [La.] R.S. 22:855 or this Section.
(2) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, in no parish covered by the provisions of this Subsection shall the fee provided for in R.S. 22:822 be more than two dollars for each one hundred dollars worth of liability underwritten by the commercial surety.
“As enacted ․, [La.] R.S. 22:1443(B)(1) clarifie[d] the procedure and interpretation of [Act 350] and [has] retroactive effect.” 2019 La. Acts, No. 54, § 2.
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Thereafter, the DAL advised the parties that it was, sua sponte, issuing a rule to show cause why the adjudication proceeding should not be dismissed as moot based on the passage of Act 54. At the hearing, both Mr. Morgan and the Commissioner/LDI agreed that the DAL proceeding was moot and should be dismissed; however, the plaintiff sureties argued that a justiciable controversy remained. After a hearing on the matter, the DAL issued a decision and order dated March 29, 2022, wherein it concluded that the request for a hearing by the plaintiff sureties as to the validity of Directive 214 was moot because La. R.S. 22:1443, as amended and re-enacted by Act 54, effectively overruled Directive 214 such that no grievances remained to be decided. It further concluded that without any justiciable grievances, the DAL was without jurisdiction to proceed. Consequently, the DAL dismissed, as moot, the plaintiff sureties’ request for a hearing on the matter.
Pursuant to the provisions of La. R.S. 22:2205 and La. R.S. 49:964, the plaintiff sureties filed a petition for judicial review in the district court. Therein, they claimed that the DALs decision to dismiss, as moot, their request for a hearing as to the validity of Directive 214 was erroneous because the Commissioner had not rescinded Directive 214 and there was no reasonable assurance that he would not attempt to enforce the provisions of Directive 214, particularly those provisions not explicitly obviated by Act 54.
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Mr. Morgan intervened and the Commissioner and LDI responded, arguing that the DAL properly dismissed the proceedings as moot and that the DALs decision and order should be affirmed.
After a hearing on the petition for judicial review, the district court concluded that the DALs decision to dismiss the proceedings as moot was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of law. Therefore, on March 7, 2023, the district court signed a judgment, affirming the March 29, 2022 decision and order of the DAL, dismissing the administrative proceedings as moot. From this judgment, the plaintiff sureties have appealed.
DISCUSSION
Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:978.1
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provides, in pertinent part as follows:
A. (1) ․ [A] person who is aggrieved by a final decision or order in an adjudication proceeding is entitled to judicial review under this Chapter whether or not he has applied to the agency for rehearing, without limiting, however, utilization of or the scope of judicial review available under other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law. ․
* * *
G. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or
(6) Not supported and sustainable by a preponderance of evidence as determined by the reviewing court ․
Following judicial review of a decision by an administrative agency in the district court, an aggrieved party may seek review of same by appeal to the appropriate appellate court. Our Lady of Lake Roman Catholic Church, Mandeville v. City of Mandeville, Planning and Zoning Commission, 2013-0837 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/3/14), 147 So.3d 186, 189. On review of the district courts judgment, no deference is owed by the court of appeal to the factual findings or legal conclusions of the district court, just as no deference is owed by the Louisiana Supreme Court to findings or conclusions of the court of appeal. Id. Thus, an appellate court sitting in review of an administrative agency reviews the findings and decision of the administrative agency and not the decision of the district court. Id.
In this case, the decision of the administrative agency—the DAL—was that the adjudication proceeding before it relative to the validity of Directive 214 was rendered moot by the passage of Act 54. It is well-settled that Louisiana courts will not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot controversies, or render advisory opinions with respect to such controversies. Ulrich v. Robinson, 2018-0534 (La. 3/26/19), 282 So.3d 180, 186. These same principles apply to administrative proceedings. See generally Khosravanipour v. Department of Transp. and Development, 93-2041 and 93-2042 (La. App. 1st Cir. 10/7/94), 644 So.2d 823, 826-827, writ denied, 94-2729 (La. 1/6/95), 648 So.2d 930. To avoid deciding abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions, cases submitted for adjudication must be justiciable, ripe for decision, and not brought prematurely. See Ulrich, 282 So.3d at 186. In relation to declaratory relief, a “justiciable controversy” connotes, in the present sense, an existing actual and substantial dispute, as distinguished from one that is merely hypothetical or abstract, and a dispute which involves the legal relations of the parties who have real adverse interests, and upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate through a decree of a conclusive character.” Id.
An issue is “moot” when a judgment or decree on that issue has been “deprived of practical significance” or “made abstract or purely academic.” Id. In other words, a case is “moot” when a rendered judgment or decree can serve no useful purpose and give no practical relief or effect. Id. If the case is moot, then there is no subject matter on which the judgment of the court can operate. Id.
Nevertheless, subject matter jurisdiction, once established, may abate if a case becomes moot during the litigation. Id. Thus, the requirements of justiciability must not only be satisfied when the suit is initially filed, but must also remain throughout the course of the litigation up to the moment of final disposition. Id. When a challenged article, statute, or ordinance is subsequently amended or expired, mootness may result if the change corrects or cures the condition complained of or fully satisfies the claim. Id. Also, if the new legislation was specifically intended to resolve the questions raised by the controversy, a court may find that the case or controversy is moot. Id. In such a case, there is no longer an actual controversy to address, and any judicial adjudication on the matter would be an impermissible advisory opinion. Id.
However, legislative changes to challenged legislation do not moot the controversy if an exception to the mootness doctrine applies. Id. When a challenged article, statute, or ordinance is amended or repealed to cure any alleged constitutional defects, a reviewing court should consider two exceptions to the mootness doctrine to determine whether they should dismiss the case as moot. Id. First, the court should consider whether the defendants voluntary cessation of the alleged violation has mooted the case because the legislative body has eliminated the challenged provisions. Id. at 186-187. Second, the court should consider the nature of the case and determine whether the curative changes leave unresolved collateral consequences. Id. at 187.
With these principles in mind, we now turn to the question of whether the DALs determination that La. R.S. 22:1443, as amended and re-enacted by Act 54, effectively overruled Directive 214 such that no grievances remained and rendered moot the plaintiff sureties’ request to have Directive 214 declared invalid, was arbitrary and capricious, or in violation of law. In arguing that the DALs determination was arbitrary and capricious and in violation of law, the plaintiff sureties claim that they remain aggrieved by Directive 214 because it imposes affirmative continuing obligations on them irrespective of enforcement that expose them to potential sanctions, fines, or loss of licensure, i.e. there are provisions of Directive 214 not related to the refunds, which were the subject of Act 54.
However, the DAL determined that a review of Directive 214 and Act 54 revealed no such additional obligations. The DAL found that all of the duties Directive 214 sought to impose on the bail bond producers and commercial sureties were so intrinsically connected to the issuance of refunds for overcharges that only an unreasonable interpretation of Directive 214 would conclude that the purported additional obligations or provisions survived the passage of Act 54. More specifically, the DAL pointed out that directing the bail bond producers and commercial sureties to “make every effort to identify customers who may have been overcharged during [the specified] period,” to “document these efforts to identify customers,” and to “document the actual refunds they issue” served no purpose in the context where the bail bond producers had been statutorily relieved of the obligation to issue refunds.
The DAL also found that the argument that “potential sanctions, fines, or loss of licensure” remained after the passage of Act 54 lacked merit. In this regard, the DAL pointed out that, while Directive 214 provided that “[a]nyone found to not have refunded said excessive premium may also be subject to the provisions of [La.] R.S. 22:855(F), (G),” which imposes criminal and civil penalties, by enacting Act 54, the legislature expressly codified the opposite, i.e., that “no repayment of overcollections as determined by the [Commissioner shall be required nor shall such actions be considered a violation of [La.] R.S. 22:855 or this Section.”
The DAL further determined that to the extent the plaintiff sureties claim that the Commissioner might attempt to enforce statutory provisions or penalties, mandate fines, or suspending of an insurers license for its failure to comply with Directive 214, this position presupposed that additional obligations continued to exist after Act 54 became effective, which the DAL found did not.
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Last, the DAL concluded that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine existed. With regard to voluntary cessation, the DAL found that in light of Act 54, it cannot be said that the Commissioner “voluntarily ceased” any conduct related to Directive 214, and further, in light of DALs finding that no additional obligations or enforcement provisions existed following the passage of Act 54, there was no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur. As to whether there were collateral consequences, the DAL noted that Act 54 was expressly intended by the legislature to have retroactive effect, and thus, this exception was also not applicable.
Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we cannot say that the DALs determination that La. R.S. 22:1443, as amended and re-enacted by Act 54, effectively overruled Directive 214 such that no grievances remained to be decided in the adjudication proceeding, and thus rendered moot the plaintiff sureties’ request to have Directive 214 declared invalid, was arbitrary and capricious or in violation of law. Therefore, the March 7, 2023 judgment of the district court, affirming the March 29, 2022 decision and order of the DAL and dismissing the administrative proceedings as moot is affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the above and foregoing reasons, the March 7, 2023 judgment of the district court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed to the plaintiffs, Bankers Insurance Company, First Community Insurance Company, American Surety Company, Allegheny Casualty Company, International Fidelity Insurance Company, Accredited Surety And Casualty Company, Inc., Blairs Bail Bonds, Inc., Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc., New Orleans Bail Bonds, LLC, and Safety National Casualty Corporation.
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
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. At the time, La. R.S. 22:1443 set the premium rate for commercial surety underwriters writing criminal bail bonds at 12% of the face amount of the bond, or $120.00, whichever was greater. This statute also provided for an additional .5% fee in Jefferson Parish, as provided in La. R.S. 13:718(1)(2).
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. Although not contained in the record of this proceeding, the plaintiff sureties allege and the DAL noted in its subsequent decision and order that: (1) Mr. Morgan subsequently filed a proceeding in the Civil District Court (“CDC”) for Orleans Parish, challenging the constitutionality of La. R.S. 22:1443, as amended by Act 54 (“the CDC proceeding”); and (2) on February 25, 2021, the district judge in the CDC proceeding issued a judgment referring the determination of the validity of Directive 214 to the DAL, reasoning that the determination as to the validity of Directive 214 was a necessary predicate to any constitutional challenge to Act 54.The plaintiff sureties also allege that as to these issues, Mr. Morgan sought review of those rulings with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and the Louisiana Supreme Court; however, that relief was denied. See Morgan v. Blairs Bail Bonds, 2021-00983 (La. 11/3/21), 326 So.3d 891.
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. The plaintiff sureties also contended that the DALs decision to dismiss their request for a hearing as moot was erroneous because the district judge in the CDC proceedings had rendered judgment determining that the validity of Directive 214 was a necessary predicate to Mr. Morgans constitutional challenge to Act 54, and that in denying writs, both the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with this determination. Notwithstanding the absence of this judgment from the CDC proceedings in the record herein, we also note that a writ denial by an appellate court or the supreme court is not precedential for any purpose; it is merely a statement that the court is declining to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to review the issues addressed at that time. Nabors Offshore Corporation v. Caterpillar Inc., 2016-0003 (La. App. 4th Cir. 11/30/16), 204 So.3d 1068,1071. Furthermore, in general, the denial of supervisory writs does not bar a different conclusion or reconsideration of the same issue argued in the writ application when an appeal is taken from a final judgment. Id. at 1072.
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. Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:978.1 was re-designated from La. R.S. 49:964 by 2022 La. Acts, No. 663, § 1.
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. The DAL also pointed out that the plaintiff sureties argued that the validity of Directive 214 was not mooted by Act 54 because the district judge in the CDC proceedings had referred the determination as to the validity of Act 54 to the DAL, reasoning that the determination of the validity of Directive 214 was a necessary predicate to any constitutional challenge to Act 54 and that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal and Louisiana Supreme Court had implicitly approved that referral. The DAL found no merit to this argument, noting that there was no known substantive law or procedural device by which a district court could “refer” a legal determination to the DAL, that an attempt to create jurisdiction to rule on an issue that otherwise lacked justiciability would require an express legislative pronouncement, and that a writ denial had no precedential value. See footnotes 2 and 3.Notwithstanding the absence of the judgment from the CDC proceedings in the record, we find the DALs conclusion in this regard was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law.
WELCH, J.