MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After receiving a citation for speeding while driving on Route 3 in Burlington, the plaintiff brought an action in the Superior Court challenging the validity of the speed limit on which his citation was based and asserting claims for violation of his civil rights. The defendants moved successfully to dismiss the complaint, and the plaintiff appealed from the resulting judgment. We affirm.
For purposes of our review we assume, without deciding, that the plaintiff has standing to challenge the validity of the speed limit that formed the basis of his citation for speeding.
3
The authority of the Department of Transportation (department) to establish speed limits is established by G. L. c. 90, § 18, which provides (inter alia) that the department “may make ․ special regulations as to the speed of motor vehicles” on ways subject to its jurisdiction.
4
In 1996, the department adopted an emergency regulation, special speed regulation #7659 (SSR 7659), establishing a speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour on a number of roads, including the applicable stretch of Route 3. The plaintiff contends that SSR 7659 was invalid ab initio, because (i) at the time of its adoption a department requirement related to the establishment of speed limits required that any speed limit be supported by a traffic engineering study, and (ii) the department did not conduct a traffic engineering study before adopting SSR 7659.
As a threshold matter, we note that nothing in G. L. c. 90, § 18, requires that a special speed regulation established thereunder be supported by a traffic engineering study. Though the plaintiff asserts that department procedures require such a study antecedent to the establishment of any special speed regulation,
5
the requirement the plaintiff cites is expressed in the departments “Procedures for Speed Zoning on State Highways and Municipal Roads” (Procedures), and those procedures reside at a sub-regulatory level and are not a regulation.
6
In addition, the department enjoys broad latitude to enact regulations consistent with the governing statutory framework. See, e.g., Berrios v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 411 Mass. 587, 595-596 (1992). The record reflects that the speed limit set forth in the emergency speed regulation established by SSR #7659 in 1996 included the certification required by G. L. c. 90, § 18, that it “is consistent with the public interests.”
Moreover, though G. L. c. 85, § 2, incorporates the departments manual of procedures concerning speed limits by reference, for purposes of posting highway signs,
7
the same statute also authorizes the department to “make, alter, rescind or add to rules and regulations relative to such signs,” giving the department discretion to depart from guidelines generally applicable to speed limits as incorporated in the traffic signs it installs.
8
We discern no improper exercise of the departments regulatory discretion in its decision, in 1996, to enact SSR 7659 as an emergency regulation to maintain speed limits on a number of highways at the same speed (fifty-five miles per hour) as they had been before the repeal of Federal legislation previously in effect.
9
The plaintiffs claims for violation of his civil rights against the individual defendants were properly dismissed based on qualified immunity, for the reasons explained in the motion judges written memoranda of decision, included in the Appellants record appendix at 493-494 and 497-498. Similarly, as explained by the motion judge, “[a]n agency of the Commonwealth is not a person subject to suit for money damages under § 1983,” Laubinger v. Department of Rev., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 598, 601 (1996), and the plaintiffs § 1983 claims against the department were likewise properly dismissed.
Judgment affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
3
. The defendants continue to insist that the plaintiffs lack standing, though they have not identified who would have standing to question the validity of the speed limit, or in what circumstances.
4
. The parties do not appear to dispute that Route 3 is subject to the departments jurisdiction for such purposes.
5
. The version of the Procedures included in the record (which included the requirement for an engineering study) bears a date of 2017. However, the plaintiffs complaint asserts that the same requirement was included in the version in effect in 1996, when SSR 7659 was adopted, and the department does not appear to contest that assertion. In any event, for purposes of reviewing the plaintiffs claim on a motion to dismiss, “the allegations of the complaint, as well as such inferences as may be drawn therefrom in the plaintiffs favor, are to be taken as true.” Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 625 n.7, quoting Nader v. Citron, 372 Mass. 96, 98 (1977).
6
. Nothing in the plaintiffs complaint, or otherwise in the record, identifies a basis to conclude that the procedures were adopted as a regulation pursuant to statutory directive or delegation.
7
. In pertinent part, the statute directs the department to “erect and maintain on state highways ․ such direction signs, warning signs or lights, curb, street or other traffic markings, mechanical traffic signal systems, traffic devices or parking meters as it may deem necessary for promoting the public safety and convenience and shall likewise install and maintain in accordance with the departments current manual on uniform traffic control devices, such curb, highway, street or other traffic markings as conditions may require.” G. L. c. 85 § 2.
8
. We note as well that, with specific reference to speed control signs, § 2 states that “[n]otwithstanding the foregoing, speed control signs may be established only in accordance with the provisions of section eighteen of chapter 90.” G. L. c. 85, § 2. As we have observed, nothing in G. L. c. 90, § 18, requires a traffic engineering study for the establishment of a special speed regulation established thereunder, and we are aware of no reference in any other statute stating or implying that the procedures set forth in the manual are mandatory or inalterable.
9
. We note that, though not in effect at the time the citation issued in the present case, by amendment to G. L. c. 90, § 18, effective on April 2, 2023, upon rescission of any special speed regulation enacted pursuant to that section, the fifty mile per hour speed limit established by G. L. c. 90, § 17, would govern. See St. 2022, c. 358, § 13.