MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following an evidentiary hearing with the defendant, M.C. (husband), present on January 24, 2023, a District Court judge extended an abuse prevention order. On appeal, the husband contends that the plaintiff, K.P. (wife), failed to prove that she had a reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily harm. Additionally, the husband contends that the hearing judge should not have considered certain documentary evidence. We affirm.
“We review the issuance of a 209A order for an abuse of discretion or other error of law” (quotation and citation omitted). G.B. v. C.A., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 389, 393 (2018). “[A] judges discretionary decision constitutes an abuse of discretion where [the reviewing court] conclude[s] the judge made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision, ․ such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.” Id., quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). Based on these standards and our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion or other error.
The judge credited the wifes testimony about a deteriorating marriage that culminated in an incident that prompted the application for the abuse prevention order. During that marriage, the husband abused alcohol on a regular basis, directed negative language at the wife, destroyed property, punched holes in walls and doors, threw remote devices through glass windows, punched a television near the wife, chased the wife out of the residence, and threw a water bottle that struck the wife. On November 30, 2022, the husband sent the wife the following text message: “I TOLD YOU THE NEXT TIME YOU FORCED ME OUT OF MY HOUSE WOULD BE THE LAST.” On January 12, 2023, the husband agreed to vacate the home through a stipulation filed in the Probate and Family Court. Two days later, starting at 6 A.M. on January 14, the husband sent multiple text messages to the wife, who was at home with their children, ages five and six, and a nanny. He then showed up at a side door of the residence, surprising and scaring the nanny. The wife went to the front porch and saw the husband on the sidewalk, yelling at the wife and approaching the porch. The wife repeatedly told him to stop, but he continued approaching until reaching the porch. After the wife said that she was calling the police, the husband walked to his car in a nearby parking lot in view of the residence. The wife was “scared” and caught “off guard” by the husbands sudden appearance at the residence as he had recently become “unpredictable” due to the pending divorce proceedings.
Based on the “totality of the circumstances of the parties relationship” as presented in the testimony and exhibits, Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 740 (2005), the judge could conclude that the husband placed the wife “in fear of imminent serious physical harm.” G. L. c. 209A, § 1 (b). The evidence showed specific instances of alarming conduct and escalating tension that distinguish this case from a situation where “[g]eneralized apprehension” fails to “rise to the level of fear of imminent serious physical harm.” Szymkowski v. Szymkowski, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 284, 287 (2003).
We disagree with the husbands contention that most of the incidents described by the wife occurred years earlier and cannot justify a fear of imminent serious physical harm at the time the 209A order issued. The husband cites Dollan v. Dollan, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 905, 906 (2002), for the proposition that a 209A order “focuses on preventing imminent serious physical harm, not merely responding to past abuse.” We recently cautioned, however, that this language cannot be construed in a rigid manner that “disregards or minimizes the significance of past abuse.” Vanna V. v. Tanner T., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 555 (2023). The judge here appropriately considered the significance of incidents from the past to provide a “necessary backdrop” for understanding the reasonableness of the wifes fear of the husband returning to the residence, yelling at her, and approaching her despite being repeatedly told to stop. Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 487 (2005).
The husband also claims that the judge should not have admitted his text messages with the wife and repeats the claim made to the judge that the messages are taken out of context and violate the doctrine of completeness. We disagree.
“If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, the court may permit an adverse party to introduce any other part of the writing or statement that is (1) on the same subject, (2) part of the same writing or conversation, and (3) necessary to an understanding of the admitted writing or statement.” Mass. G. Evid. § 106(a) (2023).
When the husbands counsel objected to the text messages, the judge offered counsel the chance to present any text messages that would provide the necessary context. The husbands counsel protested and reported that many text messages were responses to phone calls from the wife. The judge properly overruled the objection because the text messages were admissible, and we note that the judge did not limit the husband from providing context if he chose to do so.
Order dated January 24, 2023, extending abuse prevention order affirmed.