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ADOPTION OF UMI v. << (2024)

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.2024-07-08No. 23-P-940

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The Department of Children and Families (department) filed a care and protection petition in November 2020 and was granted temporary custody of Umi. After a 2022 trial, a Juvenile Court judge found the mother and the father unfit, terminated their parental rights, and approved the departments plan of adoption. The mother and the father separately appeal. The mother argues that the judge erred in finding that she was currently unfit to parent Umi and that her unfitness was likely to continue indefinitely, and that it was error to accept the departments proposed adoption plan because the department did not provide substantive information regarding the proposed adoptive resources. The father argues that the judge erred in finding the mother unfit, and further that the judge abused her discretion in concluding the mother would continue to be unfit into the foreseeable future and by ordering no postadoption visitation.

2

Concluding that the judge did not err or abuse her discretion in her decision, we affirm.

1. Background. We recount the relevant, mostly undisputed facts, reserving certain details for later discussion. The department has been involved with the family since Umis birth, when a report pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 51A, was filed alleging that Umi was born methadone exposed in 2020. The department has had temporary custody of Umi since her birth. The mother and the father have been in a relationship since 2019. The mother has been suffering from substance misuse beginning, at the latest, in 2018, when she was living in Florida and abusing oxycodone. The mother has been involved, in varying degrees, in treatment and is screened for substance use once a month at her methadone treatment program. Despite being in treatment since 2019, the mother tested positive for fentanyl and cocaine in 2019, and continued to test positive for fentanyl throughout 2022, with her last positive screen occurring in March 2022 when the trial began. In addition to substance screens, the mother also receives counseling and group therapy. In her relapse prevention plan, she has identified that being around people who use drugs is a trigger for her.

The father also suffers from substance misuse. At the time of trial, he had been receiving methadone treatment for seventeen months in an effort to stop using heroin, which he claims he last used in December 2019. At the trial, the father initially refused to answer questions about his fentanyl use, but subsequently admitted that he continued to use fentanyl. He testified that he purchased the drugs, brought them into the home, and got the mother to use them with him. The father has been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and depression. The father has an extensive criminal history and has been convicted of multiple crimes, including theft and violent felonies.

Umi has never lived with the mother or the father. When she was discharged from the hospital after her birth, Umi was placed with her preadoptive family, the mothers aunt and uncle. She is healthy and developmentally on target. Umi lives in a two-bedroom home and has her own room. There are no other children in the home, but the preadoptive parents young grandchildren visit frequently and enjoy playing with Umi.

2. Discussion. a. Termination of parental rights. The central question in an action to terminate parental rights is whether a parent is unfit, and if so, whether termination is in the best interests of the child. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. 53, 59 (2011). Findings to support a termination of parental rights must be by “clear and convincing evidence, based on subsidiary findings proved by at least a fair preponderance of evidence.” Adoption of Darlene, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 696, 702 (2021), quoting Adoption of Jacques, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 606 (2012). “Parental unfitness ․ means more than ineptitude, handicap, character flaw, conviction of a crime, unusual life style, or inability to do as good a job as the childs foster parent. Rather, the idea of parental unfitness means grievous shortcomings or handicaps that put the childs welfare much at hazard.” Adoption of Darlene, supra, quoting Adoption of Leland, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 580, 584 (2006). The mother claims that her substance misuse was “de minimis” and that the judge improperly discredited certain testimony from the mother and the father. “Evidence of alcohol or drug abuse is ․ relevant to a parents willingness, competence, and availability to provide care.” Adoption of Anton, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 667, 676 (2008). In considering the fitness of a childs parent, the judge must consider whether the substance misuse issues render the parent “unlikely to provide minimally acceptable care of the child.” Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. 24, 33 (2006), quoting G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c) (upholding findings of parental unfitness despite evidence of “significant strides toward permanent sobriety” by mother). The judge appropriately took into consideration that the mothers continued drug use throughout the years prevented her from parenting Umi as well as her continued use of opiates during the majority of her open case. Additionally, the mother acknowledged that being around people who abused drugs is a trigger for her. Despite this, she failed to separate from the father who was actively using fentanyl.

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The judges finding of unfitness was not clearly erroneous.

The mother further argues that even if unfit, there is no credible evidence to suggest that her unfitness is permanent. We are not persuaded. “[C]onsideration of the future is a necessity. The natural bond between parent and child should not be permanently severed unless the childs present or future welfare demands it.” Adoption of Carlos, 413 Mass. 339, 350 (1992). The mother has been involved in substance misuse counseling and should be commended for her efforts. However, despite her attempts, the mothers sobriety has been short lived. “Because childhood is fleeing, a parents unfitness is not temporary if it is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged or indeterminate period.” Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 60. Where a parent suffers from a “condition which is reasonably likely to continue for a prolonged indeterminate period, such as alcohol or drug addiction,” it is unlikely that the parent will be able “to provide minimally acceptable case of the child.” Adoption of Elena, 446 Mass. at 31, quoting G. L. c. 210, § 3 (c) (xii). A judge does not abuse his or her discretion or err in terminating parental rights where, as here, there is clear and convincing evidence of a parents unfitness and the likelihood that the unfitness will continue indefinitely. See Adoption of Elena, supra at 31-34.

The father suggests mother should have been given more time to have sustained sobriety in order to show that her unfitness was temporary. Once parental unfitness is established, the decision whether to terminate parental rights is whether it is in the childs best interest. Adoption of Hugo, 428 Mass. 219, 225 (1998). We disagree with the fathers position that more time was required. It is not in Umis best interests to “wait for an unknown additional period ․ in the hopes that” the mother might eventually become fit. Adoption of Nancy, 443 Mass. 512, 517 (2005).

b. Adoption plan. The mother argues that there was insufficient information presented to evaluate the departments plan for adoption. A judge must consider potential placement options and select the option that furthers the childs best interests. See Care & Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 714 (1984). The adoption plan must be “sufficiently detailed to permit the judge to evaluate the type of adoptive parents and home environment proposed and consider whether the proposal is best suited to meet the specific needs of the child.” Adoption of Varik, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 762, 770 (2019). A judge may consider any evidence regarding “unfitness and the child[ ]s best interests,” in addition to the departments written plan. Adoption of Willow, 433 Mass. 636, 653 (2001).

Umi has lived her entire life with her preadoptive parents and they meet all her needs, and she is healthy and developmentally on target. Her home is suitable and, although there are no other children living there, the preadoptive parents grandchildren visit frequently and enjoy playing with Umi. The preadoptive parents also ensure frequent contact between Umi and her older half-siblings.

c. Visitation. The father argues that the judge abused her discretion by declining to order posttermination or postadoption visitation between Umi and her mother. “The decision to order posttermination or postadoption visits is left to the judges discretion.” Adoption of West, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 238, 247 (2020). An order of postadoption contact is generally reserved for circumstances where the primary “parent-child relationship in the childs life remains with the biological parent” and other adults have not fully assumed that role. Adoption of Vito, 431 Mass. 550, 564 (2000). “The purpose of such contact is not to strengthen the bonds between the child and [her] biological mother or father, but to assist the child as [s]he negotiates, often at a very young age, the tortuous path from one family to another.” Id. at 564-565.

Here, since the time she was born, Umis biological parents have not been the primary parental figures her life. Umi therefore will not be transitioning to a new family, but instead will remain living with adoptive parents who have cared for her since birth. The judge therefore acted well within her discretion in not ordering postadoption contact with the mother. See Adoption of Ilona, 459 Mass. at 64-66.

Decrees affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

2

.   The father does not contest the finding of unfitness as to him or the termination of his parental rights.

3

.   The mother and the fathers “dissatisfaction with the judges weighing of the evidence and [her] credibility determinations” furnishes “no basis for disturbing the judges view of the evidence.” Adoption of Quentin, 424 Mass. 882, 886 n.3 (1997).