MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following an initial hearing after notice and one-year order, a District Court judge held a renewal hearing and permanently extended a harassment prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (d). The defendant, J.H., appeared at both hearings and opposed both orders. On appeal, he claims that the renewal hearing did not comport with the requirements of due process. He contends that because he never saw two exhibits introduced at the renewal hearing by the plaintiff, J.M., he did not have a meaningful opportunity to defend himself, and the judge failed to consider the totality of the circumstances of the parties relationship. We affirm.
After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the defendant failed to raise this due process claim below and has consequently waived that claim on appeal. At the hearing in the District Court, the defendant did not raise any objection to the plaintiffs presentation or to the procedure employed by the judge. Instead, the defendant denied having any direct or indirect contact with the plaintiff during the prior year and asserted that the plaintiffs allegations amounted to hearsay. When the judge indicated that the order would be extended, the defendant said only, “I will be appealing this. I believe again as I stated at the last [initial hearing], that you have a –- a sexist bias on this.” He made no objection based upon the due process grounds now asserted. “[T]hrough failure to raise this claim in the trial court, the defendant has waived any due process objection to the procedure followed by the judge.” Diaz v. Gomez, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 55, 63 (2012).
Even if the defendant preserved his due process claim for appellate review, we do not discern “an abuse of discretion or other error of law.” Yasmin Y. v. Queshon Q., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 256 (2022), quoting Vera V. v. Seymour S., 98 Mass. App. Ct. 315, 318 (2020). A hearing on a request for a harassment prevention order must comport with fundamental requirements of due process. R.S. v. A.P.B., 95 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 373 n.4 (2019). These requirements include fair notice of the proceedings, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, a right to testify, a right to present evidence, and a right to crossexamine witnesses. Idris I. v. Hazel H., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 784, 788 (2022). “A meaningful opportunity to be heard includes an opportunity to address the material and determinative allegations at the core of a partys claim or defense and to present evidence on the contested facts” (emphasis added). Id.
The record shows that the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to be heard. At the renewal hearing, the plaintiff offered two exhibits, and the judge marked them as exhibits 1 and 2. Exhibit 1 constituted a two-page narrative of events in the prior year that the plaintiff believed warranted an extension of the order. The plaintiff read this narrative aloud in court. Exhibit 2 constituted a three-page timeline of events from the prior year. After hearing this presentation from the plaintiff, the judge asked the defendant, “[W]hat do you want to tell me?” and heard his presentation. At no time did the defendant request to see the exhibits, object to the exhibits, challenge the exhibits through cross-examination, object to the hearing going forward, or request a continuance. Because the defendant was in court when the exhibits were marked, he had an “opportunity to see” them. Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 522 (1995). The hearing record is silent as to whether the defendant actually saw a copy of the exhibits during the hearing, and we have no additional evidence on that subject. Even if the defendant did not look at the exhibits during the hearing, such a forgone opportunity does not constitute a violation of due process. Id. His pro se status does not call for a different result; even where constitutional protections are at issue, pro se litigants are held to the same substantive and procedural standards as represented parties. Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 35-36 (2000).
We disagree with the defendants argument that due process requires “meaningful prior access” to exhibits that may be presented at a hearing under G. L. c. 258E. Such an expansive conception of due process would be at odds with the overall purpose of harassment prevention hearings. As the Supreme Judicial Court noted in the analogous situation of abuse prevention hearings under G. L. c. 209A, the court process “is intended to be expeditious and as comfortable as it reasonably can be for a lay person to pursue. Judges often must deal with large numbers of these emotional matters in busy court sessions. The process must be a practical one.” Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 598 (1995), overruled on another ground by Zullo v. Goguen, 423 Mass. 679, 681 (1996). Prehearing discovery is often not feasible and is “left to the judges discretion.” Idris I., 100 Mass. App. Ct. at 789.
We also disagree with the defendants characterization of the judges conduct. He alleged in his brief that the judge did not “permit[ ]” him to view the exhibits, “denied” him the opportunity to assess the exhibits, did not “permit[ ]” him to ask questions, and “with[e]ld” evidence. Based upon our reading of the renewal hearing transcript, we do not see any suggestion that the judge prohibited access to the exhibits or prevented the defendant from asking questions about the exhibits. Contrast Idris I., 100 Mass. App. Ct. at 786, 789-790 (due process violation where judge “did not respond” to counsels repeated protest that defendant had not seen evidence before court).
Finally, the record does not support the defendants contention that the judge failed to consider the totality of the circumstances of the parties relationship. To the contrary, in addition to hearing the presentations from both parties at the renewal hearing, the judge had a perspective that included evidence from the prior, initial hearing. See Iamele v. Asselin, 444 Mass. 734, 740 (2005) (renewal hearing “judge is to consider the basis for the initial order”). At the initial hearing, the plaintiff followed a remarkably similar presentation to the one she made at the renewal hearing. During the initial hearing, the plaintiff introduced two exhibits –- a narrative and timeline of all communications and contacts –- and read the narrative aloud. We also note that while the harassment prevention order prohibited the defendant from contacting the plaintiff “either in person, by telephone, in writing or otherwise, either directly or through someone else,” the defendant admitted at the renewal hearing that he had contacted the defendants husband. Having the benefit of hearing evidence from both the initial and renewal hearings and having credited the plaintiffs testimony at the renewal hearing, the judge could readily conclude that there was a continuing need for the order: “The [plaintiff] provided evidence of new disturbing behavior of being impersonated online consistent [with the defendants] prior actions.” Thus, the judge clearly considered the “totality of the circumstances of the parties relationship.” Iamele, supra.
The plaintiffs request for attorneys fees and costs is denied.
Order entered February 17, 2022, permanently extending harassment prevention order, affirmed.