MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, M.T., appeals from the order of a judge of the Boston Municipal Court, dated October 21, 2022, extending a harassment prevention order issued in favor of the plaintiff, L.C., pursuant to G. L. c. 258E, § 3. Because we are satisfied that the evidence credited by the judge was sufficient to support the order, and because we discern no basis for the defendants claim that the judge was biased in favor of the plaintiff, we affirm.
1. Background. After issuing an ex parte harassment prevention order in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, the judge scheduled a two-party extension hearing with notice to the defendant. See G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (e). On the hearing date, both parties appeared and testified; the defendant was represented by counsel. The plaintiffs testimony, which the judge explicitly credited, included her account of the defendants making repeated telephone calls to her in which the “screaming” defendant threatened to come to the plaintiffs house, an incident in which the defendant initiated a verbal conflict in a supermarket then followed the plaintiff through the parking lot and blocked the plaintiff from getting to her car, the defendants appearing in the area of the plaintiffs workplace and the defendants driving her white car back and forth past the plaintiffs house.
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Although the defendant testified that none of her calls to the plaintiff were threatening,
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disputed the characterization of the supermarket incident, testified that she was on the workplace property to conduct banking business unrelated to the plaintiff, and claimed to be unable to identify photos of the white car because they did not show the vehicles license plates, the judge explicitly discredited the defendants testimony.
2. Discussion. The defendants brief lacks citation to the record or to legal precedent, and so does not rise to the level of appellate argument. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019). Likewise, the defendant has not complied with the rules governing the content and format of the record appendix. See Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019). These are serious missteps. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A); Lynn v. Thompson, 435 Mass. 54, 56 n.4 (2001) (“[t]he requirement that a party provide ‘an appropriate and accurate record reference’ for each and every fact set forth in the brief ․ is not an idle technical requirement”); Jordan v. Superior Court, 426 Mass. 1019, 1020 (1998) (litigants who rely on nonconforming papers “do so at their peril”).
Putting those deficiencies to one side, however, we are not persuaded that the evidence credited by the judge failed to support the extension of the ex parte harassment prevention order. When reviewing harassment prevention orders, “we consider whether the judge could find, by a preponderance of the evidence, together with all permissible inferences, that the defendant had committed ‘[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that [did] in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property’ ” (citation omitted). Gassman v. Reason, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 (2016). See G. L. c. 258E, § 1.
The record amply supports the judges finding of three acts of harassment. The judge explicitly credited the plaintiffs testimony that the defendant repeatedly called her on the telephone “screaming” and threatening to come to her home.
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We are satisfied that the judge could have found that these calls included “words ․ that -- taking into account the context in which they [arose] -- cause[d] the victim to fear such [imminent physical] harm,” Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 37 (2016), quoting OBrien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 425 (2012), and so amounted to “true threats” for the purposes of G. L. c. 258E. See A.R. v. L.C., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 760 (2018). See also A.S.R. v. A.K.A., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 278 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 475 Mass. 554, 567 (2016) (whether particular speech qualifies as “a true threat is a matter to be decided by the trier of fact”). The same is true for the plaintiffs account of the incident at the supermarket in which the defendant yelled at her, followed her into the parking lot as she tried to leave, and blocked her access to her car.
The record likewise supported the judges implicit determination that the defendant intended by these acts to put the plaintiff in fear and the judges explicit finding, based on his acceptance of the plaintiffs testimony as true, that the plaintiff was placed in fear by the defendants calls and other conduct. See A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 535 (2015), quoting OBrien, 461 Mass. at 426 n.8 (“In the determination whether the three acts ‘did in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property,’ it is ‘the entire course of harassment, rather than each individual act, that must cause fear or intimidation’ ”). This evidence was sufficient under G. L. c. 258E to support the judges order.
Finally, we are not persuaded by the defendants claims of bias.
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The hearing transcript reflects the judges evenhanded management of the hearing process, and his consideration of the evidence presented by both sides. It was the judges obligation to make determinations of credibility and although he was not required to detail the bases for those determinations, the judge did so in this case. The limited record before us does not establish any professional tie between the judge and the plaintiff. We are satisfied that the judges review was impartial and fair.
Extension order dated October 21, 2022, affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
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. The plaintiff testified that she videorecorded the car driving past her house. At the hearing, the judge saw a still image of the white car taken from that recording.
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. She testified that she called the plaintiff “in hopes that we could figure out the situation of possibly dating the same person.”
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. The plaintiff testified that the defendant made approximately ten such calls.
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. The claims were not raised in the trial court and so they are waived. Wilhelmina W. v. Uri U., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 641 (2023). Although we need not consider them, we do so to clarify our view that the judge here did nothing to suggest that he was biased for or against either party in this case.