ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
This is an original petition for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, mandamus, challenging a district court order compelling the production of records in a criminal proceeding. Eighth Judicial District Court. Clark County; Mary Kay Holthus, Judge.
The State charged petitioner Lavonda Winfield with one count of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment resulting in substantial bodily harm arising from the alleged medical neglect of the victim (Winfields son). Winfield moved to continue the trial date citing the need to retain an expert witness, and to review and seek additional medical records of the victim. The State requested all medical records in Winfields possession pertaining to the victim, “whether theyre using them in their case-in-chief or not.”
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The district court ordered Winfield to turn over all medical records regarding the child. Winfield objected on the ground that NRS 174.245(1)(b) does not require the defense to turn over records that are not intended for use in the defendants case-in-chief. The district court disagreed and issued a written order requiring Winfield to turn over all of the victims medical records within her possession. Winfield now petitions for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative mandamus, requesting that we order the district court to vacate its discovery order for overreaching NRS 174.245(1)(b) and violating Winfields Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
Because Winfield challenges the scope of a discovery order, we review the petition as one seeking a writ of prohibition. See Wardleigh v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 111 Nev. 345, 350, 891 P.2d 1180, 1183 (1995) (“[P]rohibition is a more appropriate remedy for the prevention of improper discovery than mandamus.”). A writ of prohibition may issue when a district court acts without or in excess of its jurisdiction. NRS 34.320; Club Vista Fin. Servs., LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 224, 228, 276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012). Writ relief is only available where the petitioner does not have “a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” NRS 34.330. In the context of discovery, “we generally will not exercise our discretion to review discovery orders through petitions for extraordinary relief, unless the challenged discovery order is one that is likely to cause irreparable harm, such as a blanket discovery order.” Club Vista, 128 Nev. at 228, 276 P.3d at 249.
Here, we choose to exercise our discretion and entertain the petition because a later appeal, if there is a conviction, will not effectively provide a remedy for the improper disclosure of information. See Bradley v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 754, 756, 405 P.3d 668, 671 (2017) (entertaining an original petition seeking “to prevent the disclosure of allegedly privileged material”). Accordingly, we now turn to the merits of Winfields petition.
Winfield argues that the district courts order exceeded the bounds of NRS 174.245(1)(b) because it ordered the disclosure of all medical records in Winfields possession. Winfield contends that NRS 174.245(1)(b) limits reciprocal discovery only to evidence intended to be introduced during the defenses case-in-chief. Winfield also argues that compelling her to disclose the victims medical record violates her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The State argues that (1) “its due diligence” justifies ordering Winfield to turn over all medical records in her possession, and (2) Winfield demonstrated her intent to use all of the medical records during trial. We conclude that the States first argument lacks merit because the defendants discovery obligations are governed by NRS 174.245(1), which does not involve any consideration of the States due diligence in seeking to obtain the requested discovery items on their own, and the States second argument is not supported by the record.
Nevada law dictates that criminal defendants must disclose certain evidence to the prosecution. As relevant here, NRS 174.245(1)(b) requires a defendant to allow the prosecution access to “[r]esults or reports of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests or scientific experiments that the defendant intends to introduce in evidence during the case in chief of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the statutory language is clear: the defendant is only required to turn over evidence they intend to introduce during their case-in-chief. See Wyman v. State, 125 Nev. 592, 607-08, 217 P.3d 572, 583 (2009) (“[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, such that it is capable of only one meaning, this court should not construe that statute otherwise.”). We have also previously interpreted the term “case in chief,” in the context of NRS 174.245(1)(a), as referring to “either partys initial presentation of evidence, in contrast to eithers presentation of rebuttal evidence.” Floyd v. State, 118 Nev. 156, 168, 42 P.3d 249, 257 (2002), abrogated on other grounds by Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 119-20, 178 P.3d 154, 160-61 (2008) (holding that the State must provide notice of an expert rebuttal witness, abrogating Floyd).
Here, the prosecution explicitly asked Winfield for the medical records of the victim “whether theyre using them in their case-in-chief or not,” and the district court obliged. Although Winfield must turn over any of the victims medical records that she intends to introduce during her case-in-chief, she is not statutorily required to turn over all medical records. Notably, the district court did not err in ordering the immediate disclosure of medical records given that the trial was set to begin within 30 days. See NRS 174.285(2) (requiring parties to comply with lawful discovery requests “not less than 30 days before trial”); NRS 174.295(2) (providing sanctions for failing to comply with the duty to disclose). Rather, the district courts error was in failing to limit its order only to records that Winfield intended to introduce during her case-in-chief. Therefore, we conclude the district court erred in ordering Winfield to turn over all medical records pertaining to Winfields son as the order exceeded the requirements under NRS 174.245(1)(b). Thus, we need not consider Winfields constitutional argument. See White v. Warden, 96 Nev. 634, 637 n.1, 614 P.2d 536, 537 n.1 (1980) (“This court will avoid consideration of constitutional questions when such consideration is unnecessary to the determination of an appeal.”); see also Caruso v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 82362, 2022 WL 1584695, at *1 (Nev. May 18, 2022) (Order Denying Petition) (stating that we would not reach the merits of a separation-of-powers issue because this court avoids constitutional issues when unnecessary to resolve the case).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT TO ISSUE A WRIT OF PROHIBITION instructing the district court to vacate its discovery order requiring Winfield to disclose records in excess of NRS 174.245(1)(b).
Cadish, C.J.
Stiglich, J.
Herndon, J.
Parraguirre, J.
Pickering, J.
Lee, J.
Bell, J.
FOOTNOTES
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. We note that the States request was a general reciprocal discovery request and no expert witnesses had been noticed by the defense at the time the district court made the ruling being challenged in this writ petition.