DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mario F. Mattei, J.), rendered June 24, 2019, convicting him of attempted kidnapping in the second degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, and endangering the welfare of a child (five counts), after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendants contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of attempted kidnapping in the second degree is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendants guilt of that count beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinders opportunity to view the witnesses, hear testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to the counts of attempted kidnapping in the second degree and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
Contrary to the defendants contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying his application for substitution of counsel. “ ‘The right of an indigent criminal defendant to the services of a court-appointed lawyer does not encompass a right to appointment of successive lawyers at [the] defendants option’ ” (People v. Graham, 188 A.D.3d 909, 909, 135 N.Y.S.3d 410, quoting People v. Washington, 25 N.Y.3d 1091, 1095, 13 N.Y.S.3d 343, 34 N.E.3d 853; see People v. McCloud, 222 A.D.3d 662, 662, 201 N.Y.S.3d 173). “Whether substitution of counsel is permitted is ‘within the discretion and responsibility of the trial judge,’ and a ‘complaining defendant must make specific factual allegations of serious complaints about counsel’ ” (People v. McCloud, 222 A.D.3d at 662, 201 N.Y.S.3d 173, quoting People v. Fulgencio, 168 A.D.3d 1094, 1095, 92 N.Y.S.3d 370 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Porto, 16 N.Y.3d 93, 99–100, 917 N.Y.S.2d 74, 942 N.E.2d 283). “ ‘Where a seemingly serious request is made, the trial court is obligated to conduct at least a minimal inquiry to determine the nature of the conflict and a possible resolution’ ” (People v. Parker, 194 A.D.3d 847, 848, 143 N.Y.S.3d 899, quoting People v. Graham, 188 A.D.3d at 910, 135 N.Y.S.3d 410; see People v. McCloud, 222 A.D.3d at 662, 201 N.Y.S.3d 173). Here, “ ‘even assuming, arguendo, that [the] defendants complaints about defense counsel suggested a serious possibility of good cause for a substitution of counsel requiring a need for further inquiry ․ the [Supreme Court] afforded [the] defendant the opportunity to express his objections concerning defense counsel’ ” and subsequently, reasonably concluded that his objections were without merit (People v. McCloud, 222 A.D.3d at 663, 201 N.Y.S.3d 173, quoting People v. Milonovich, 215 A.D.3d 764, 765–766, 185 N.Y.S.3d 713; see People v. Bethany, 144 A.D.3d 1666, 1669, 42 N.Y.S.3d 495).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
CONNOLLY, J.P., GENOVESI, DOWLING and VENTURA, JJ., concur.