DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Karen B. Rothenberg, J.), dated February 3, 2022. The order granted the motion purportedly made on behalf of the deceased defendant, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss the complaint for failure to timely substitute a representative for the deceased defendant and denied the plaintiffs cross-motion, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 1021 to substitute the deceased defendants daughter as a representative for the deceased defendant.
ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as granted the motion purportedly made on behalf of the deceased defendant, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss the complaint for failure to timely substitute a representative for the deceased defendant is dismissed, without costs and disbursements, and that portion of the order is vacated; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by adding thereto a provision stating that the plaintiffs cross-motion, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 1021 to substitute the deceased defendants daughter as a representative for the deceased defendant is denied “with leave to renew upon service on persons interested in the estate of Monserrate Acosta, deceased”; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed, without costs or disbursements.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident against Monserrate Acosta (hereinafter the decedent). After answering the complaint, the decedent died in June 2017. In December 2018, the plaintiff was sent a copy of the decedents death certificate.
Thereafter, the plaintiff moved, among other things, to substitute the decedents attorneys for the decedent. In November 2019, the Supreme Court denied the motion and directed the plaintiff to proceed to the Surrogates Court to have an administrator appointed.
In March 2021, the decedents former attorneys moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss the complaint based upon the plaintiffs failure to timely substitute a representative for the decedent. The plaintiff opposed and cross-moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 1021 to substitute the decedents daughter as a representative for the decedent. The Supreme Court granted the motion purportedly made on the decedents behalf and denied the plaintiffs cross-motion. The plaintiff appeals.
“The death of a party divests the court of jurisdiction and stays the proceedings until a proper substitution has been made pursuant to CPLR 1015(a). Moreover, any determination rendered without such substitution will generally be deemed a nullity” (Vapnersh v. Tabak, 131 A.D.3d 472, 473, 15 N.Y.S.3d 131 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Vicari v. Kleinwaks, 157 A.D.3d 975, 976, 70 N.Y.S.3d 532). “The death of a party terminates his or her attorneys authority to act on behalf of the deceased party” (Vicari v. Kleinwaks, 157 A.D.3d at 976, 70 N.Y.S.3d 532). Although the determination of a motion pursuant to CPLR 1021 made by the successors or representatives of a party or by any party is an exception to a courts lack of jurisdiction, here, the motion, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 1021 to dismiss the complaint was made by the former attorneys for the decedent purportedly on behalf of the decedent. Since the former attorneys lacked the authority to act, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion (see Vicari v. Kleinwaks, 157 A.D.3d at 977, 70 N.Y.S.3d 532; Vapnersh v. Tabak, 131 A.D.3d at 474, 15 N.Y.S.3d 131). Accordingly, so much of the order as granted the motion purportedly made on behalf of the decedent is a nullity.
Further, any motion pursuant to CPLR 1021 requires that notice be provided to persons interested in the decedents estate (see Feurtado v. Page, 163 A.D.3d 926, 83 N.Y.S.3d 89; Barnabas v. Boodoo, 134 A.D.3d 970, 971–972, 22 N.Y.S.3d 508). Here, the plaintiff failed to provide notice to persons interested in the decedents estate. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiffs cross-motion with leave to renew upon service on persons interested in the decedents estate.
The plaintiffs remaining contentions are without merit.
BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., MILLER, MALTESE and LOVE, JJ., concur.