DECISION & JUDGMENT
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board dated November 30, 2021, affirming a determination of an administrative law judge dated May 18, 2021, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and revoked his driver license.
ADJUDGED that the determination dated November 30, 2021, is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.
The petitioner was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (hereinafter ALJ) determined that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 by refusing to submit to a chemical test and imposed the mandatory revocation of the petitioners driver license. Thereafter, the ALJs determination was affirmed by the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board (hereinafter the Appeals Board). The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the Appeals Boards determination. In an order dated July 18, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).
Contrary to the petitioners contention, substantial evidence supports the determination revoking the petitioners driver license for refusing to submit to a chemical test (see Matter of Schoonmaker v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 33 N.Y.3d 926, 928, 99 N.Y.S.3d 760, 123 N.E.3d 244; Matter of McCaul v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 179 A.D.3d 803, 804, 117 N.Y.S.3d 692). The petitioners contention that his request to speak to an attorney should not be construed as a refusal to consent to a chemical test is without merit (see Matter of Clemens v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 178 A.D.3d 921, 922, 115 N.Y.S.3d 399; Matter of Lamb v. Egan, 150 A.D.3d 854, 855, 54 N.Y.S.3d 100). Moreover, the evidence adduced at the hearing did not support a finding that the petitioner made a specific and unequivocal request for an attorney, as he suggests (cf. People v. Mitchell, 2 N.Y.3d 272, 276, 778 N.Y.S.2d 427, 810 N.E.2d 879). In sum, the evidence adduced at the hearing demonstrated that after the petitioners arrest, an officer gave the petitioner sufficient warning of the consequences of refusing to submit to a chemical test and that the petitioner refused the officers request to submit to the chemical test (see Matter of Clemens v. New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 178 A.D.3d at 922, 115 N.Y.S.3d 399; Matter of Vasquez v. Egan, 174 A.D.3d 811, 812–813, 107 N.Y.S.3d 44).
The petitioners remaining contentions are without merit.
IANNACCI, J.P., GENOVESI, DOWLING and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.