MEMORANDUM DECISION
Statement of the Case
[1] More than one month after Nicole Harris ended her month-to-month tenancy of a house she rented from Bill Clements, Clements brought an eviction action against her in small claims court. The small claims court entered judgment in favor of Clements and awarded him $696.04 in damages. Harris now appeals, raising two issues for our review:
1. Whether Clements had standing to bring the eviction action; and
2. Whether the trial court erred by awarding Clements $694.04 in damages.
[2] We reverse and vacate.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In June 2021, Harris, as lessee, and Clements, as lessor, executed a lease agreement for a house in Richmond, Indiana (the “Rental Property”). The lease was for a one-year term beginning on June 14, 2022. When Harris moved into the Rental Property, she did not receive keys because the lock on the front door was broken, and there was other preexisting damage. After the lease ended in June 2023, Harris continued paying monthly rent for the Rental Property. In fall 2023, the Rental Propertys furnace began “shooting out” fire. Tr. Vol. II at 7. As a result, Harris moved out of the Rental Property by November 6, 2023, and she informed Clements that she was moving out due to the unsafe furnace. Harris also paid November 2023s rent through November 15, 2023. In late November 2023, Harris confirmed with Clements that she had left some personal property at the Rental Property, including a safe, but that she no longer wanted it, in part “because of the black mold and rat problem.” Ex. Vol. I at 9.
[4] On December 28, 2023, Clements filed a notice of claim in small claims court, seeking possession of the Rental Property, requesting to evict Harris therefrom, and claiming Harris owed one months rent for November 15 through December 15, 2023. On January 16, 2023, the small claims court held a possession hearing, at which Harris appeared pro se. Clements appeared by counsel only and did not present any evidence; instead, the smalls claims court questioned Harris about Clementss claims against her. After the hearing, the small claims court issued its order in which it concluded that Harris “has already surrendered possession of the premises” and set a damages hearing. Appellants App. Vol. II at 6. After the damages hearing, the small claims court entered judgment in favor of Clements and awarded him $696.04 in damages. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
1. Clements Did Not Lack Standing to Bring an Eviction Action Against Harris
[5] Although Clements filed this eviction action in small claims court, the small claims courts judgment is “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules and statutes,” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). Accordingly, because Clements chose not to file an appellees brief, we will reverse the trial courts judgment if Harriss brief presents a case of prima facie error. See Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014)). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (quoting Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at 758).
[6] Harris argues that Clements lacked standing to bring an eviction action against her. “[S]tanding is a legal question we review de novo.” Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner, 212 N.E.3d 1234, 1238 (Ind. 2023) (citing City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022)). Generally, standing “determines whether a litigant is entitled to have a court decide the substantive issues of a dispute.” Id. (quoting Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216 (Ind. 2022)). “Indiana courts have recognized four types of standing: (1) common-law standing, sometimes referred to as judicial standing or constitutional standing; (2) public standing; (3) the related concept of taxpayer standing; and (4) statutorily defined standing.” Lockerbie Glove Co. Town Home Owners Assn, Inc. v. Indianapolis Historic Pres. Commn, 194 N.E.3d 1175, 1181 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Serbon v. City of E. Chicago, 194 N.E.3d 84, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)).
[7] Harris contends that Clements lacked statutory standing to bring an eviction action against her pursuant to Indiana Code section 32-31-11-2(2). That statute defines “eviction action” as “(A) an action for possession of the rental premises ․ , including a petition for an emergency possessory order under IC 32-31-6; or (B) an action to evict the tenant from the rental premises ․” Ind. Code § 32-31-11-2(2). A “tenant” is “an individual who occupies a rental unit: (1) for residential purposes; (2) with the landlords consent; and (3) for consideration that is agreed upon by both parties.” I.C. § 32-31-3-10; see id. § 32-31-11-2(1) (“For purposes of this chapter[,] the definitions in IC 32-31-3 apply ․”) To “occupy” in this context is to “possess, control, dwell, or reside.” Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 176 (Ind. 2019).
[8] In particular, Harris argues that she was neither in possession nor a tenant of the Rental Property when Clements filed the eviction action against her, so he lacked standing to do so. Harris argues that she abandoned that personal property when she moved out. Because the question of whether Harris was still in possession of the Rental Property due to her personal property left therein was outstanding when Clements instituted this case, we cannot say that Clements lacked standing here. See I.C. § 32-31-4-2(b), (d). We thus conclude that Harris has not made a prima facie showing that Clements did not have standing to bring an eviction action against her in December 2023.
2. The Trial Court Erred by Awarding Clements Damages
[9] Next, Harris argues that Clements did not prove Harris was liable for damages. We need not address this argument, however, because Clements did not prove that Harris was in possession of the Rental Property. In particular, Harris alleges the small claims court improperly shifted the burden of proof at the possession hearing. Although a trial in small claims court is “informal” and generally is not “bound by the statutory provisions or rules of practice, procedure, pleadings or evidence,” S.C.R. 8(A), the informality of small claims court is not limitless, Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of S. Bend, 204 N.E.3d 940, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. not sought. “[D]espite the informality of the proceedings, the parties in a small claims court bear the same burdens of proof as they would in a regular civil action on the same issues.” Id. (citing Martin v. Ramos, 120 N.E.3d 244, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)). At the possession hearing, Clements had the burden of proving that Harris was in wrongful possession of the Rental Property after November 6, 2023. Yet the small claims court did not request any evidence from Clements and instead immediately began questioning Harris about Clementss allegations. Tr. Vol. II at 5–12. This was improper burden shifting. See Harris v. Lafayette LIHTC, LP, 85 N.E.3d 871, 876–78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
[10] To be clear, Clements did not present any evidence tending to show that Harris was in possession of the Rental Property. The evidence Harris presented at the possession hearing shows that in November 2023, she texted Clements that she was leaving a safe and other things at the Rental Property, in part due to “the black mold and rat problem,” Ex. Vol. I at 9, that “whatever is left Im going to leave it,” id., and that she “was done with the house,” id. at 11. A reasonable person would conclude from these messages that Harris had abandoned the personal property she left at the Rental Property. See I.C. § 32-31-4-2(b).
[11] The uncontroverted evidence Harris presented at the possession hearing shows that she moved out of the Rental Property on or before November 6, 2023, and that her tenancy ended on or before November 15, 2023. That is, Harris was neither in possession nor a tenant of the Rental Property on or after November 15, 2023. Because Clements did not present a scintilla of evidence to rebut Harris’ testimony, it was error to conclude that Harris remained in possession of the Rental Property. We thus conclude that Harris has made a prima facie showing that Clements failed to meet his burden of proving that Harris was in wrongful possession of the Rental Property on or after November 15, 2023. Because Clementss claim for damages was based on Harris allegedly having possession of the Rental Property after November 15, 2023, and we have already determined that the ruling on possession was in error, we must conclude that the trial courts decision regarding damages was unfounded.
Conclusion
[12] In sum, Clements had standing to bring the eviction action against Harris, but he failed to prove that she was in wrongful possession of the Rental Property. We therefore reverse and vacate the small claims courts order of possession
1
and damages order.
[13] Reversed and vacated.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Because we reverse and vacate the trial courts entry of the possession order, Harris may seek to have this cause sealed pursuant to Indiana Code section 32-31-11-3.
Felix, Judge.
Judge Kenworthy and Senior Judge Riley concur.
Kenworthy, J., and Riley, Sr. J., concur.