MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] Chad Michael Grimball appeals his three convictions for murder as well as his conviction for Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Grimball raises four issues for our review, which we restate as the following four issues:
1. Whether the trial court violated Grimballs Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
2. Whether the trial court denied Grimball his right to counsel.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded hearsay evidence.
4. Whether Grimball has preserved his other claims of error for appellate review.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Kandy Wamplers apartment in Lebanon was a frequent location for various drug-related activity. On September 8, 2021, shortly after 6:00 p.m., Wampler came home to her apartment from work. As she entered the apartment, she found Brannon Martin dead of an apparent gunshot wound to the head.
[4] Wampler ran to the apartment of her neighbor, Caitlyn Kouns. Kouns went to Wamplers apartment, found Martins body, and also found the bodies of Grace Bishop and Larry Stogsdill, Jr., both of whom also had apparent gunshot wounds to the head. Kouns called 9-1-1.
[5] Wampler and another person who had been at the apartment earlier that day informed investigating officers that they had seen a man they did not know with a neck tattoo at or near the apartment around 6:00 p.m. After seeing pictures of Grimball, they both identified him as the man they had seen. Forensic analyses of the gunshot wounds demonstrated that each victim had been shot in the head with a forty-caliber round fired from the same gun.
[6] Investigating officers met with Alicia Duff, Grimballs girlfriend. Duff informed the officers that on the day in question Grimball had driven Duff to a location near Wamplers apartment, where he parked the car and got out to “go talk to somebody.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 233. Duff stayed in the car, and Grimball returned fifteen to thirty minutes later. But Grimball was acting differently when he returned, and while he usually “babied” his Cadillac, he drove it aggressively. Id. at 236. After having driven some distance, Grimball told Duff, “if anybody found out he would know [Duff] was the one who told.” Id. at 238. Duff did not ask Grimball what he was talking about.
[7] A bit further down the road, Grimball “pulled out” a “forty-caliber” handgun that Duff had recently purchased for Grimball at a local Rural King. Id. at 239. Grimball began “taking [the gun] apart.” Id. He threw “all of the bullets out the window” and into a grassy median. Id. After some more turns, he “started throwing pieces” of the gun itself out of the car window. Id. Grimball eventually drove to the residence he shared with Duff in Thorntown. There, he changed out of his clothes and shoes, gave that clothing to Duff, and instructed her to burn the items in the outside fire pit, which she did.
[8] Investigating officers obtained the Rural Kings security footage, which confirmed that Duff had purchased a forty-caliber handgun. Grimball was not legally allowed to purchase a handgun. Officers also went to Grimballs residence, but the fire pit was no longer there. Further, security footage at the residence from the date in question was also missing. Meanwhile, DNA analysis from cigarette butts found inside Wamplers kitchen indicated that the DNA was “at least one trillion times more likely” to have been Grimballs DNA rather than someone elses. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 185.
[9] After speaking with other witnesses who corroborated various parts of Duffs statements, investigating officers met with Christina Moore. Moore informed the officers that, after Grimball had obtained the forty-caliber handgun, he came to her home to shoot the gun in her backyard. Officers were able to recover two forty-caliber shell casings from Moores property. A forensic analysis demonstrated that those shell casings had been fired from the same firearm that was used to kill Martin, Bishop, and Stogsdill.
[10] In December 2021, the State charged Grimball with three counts of murder and one count of Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. During the course of the pretrial proceedings, Grimball initially sought to represent himself. However, less than two months later, Grimball requested the appointment of counsel. About two weeks after that, Grimball requested the court to withdraw his counsels appearance and to again allow Grimball to proceed pro se, which request the court granted. And about six weeks after that, Grimball again requested the appointment of counsel, which the court again granted.
[11] Meanwhile, Grimball, whether represented by counsel or representing himself, filed numerous, albeit generic, requests for a “speedy trial.” E.g., Appellants App. Vol. 2, p. 116. He also filed, again, both through counsel and pro se, numerous discovery requests and requests for continuances. But at no point prior to his trial did Grimball move for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4. In the spring of 2023, Grimball again requested to proceed pro se, which the trial court again granted. Grimball then filed a significant number of motions that required responses from the State or the trial court.
[12] The court set Grimballs jury trial for October 2023. One month before his trial, the court again appointed counsel to represent Grimball after Grimball had orally represented to the court that he did not waive his right to counsel. The court then held a hearing on that appointment of counsel. There, the court expressly advised Grimball of his right to counsel, the benefits of being represented by counsel, and the risks of waiving that right and proceeding pro se. In response, Grimball made clear that he understood his rights and the risks of waiving them, and he was unequivocal to the court that he desired to waive his right to counsel and to proceed pro se. See Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 31-34. The court accepted Grimballs waiver and permitted him to proceed pro se.
[13] At Grimballs ensuing jury trial, the State presented substantial evidence against Grimball. Following the close of the States case-in-chief, Grimball moved to dismiss the States charges, in relevant part, on the theories that his right to a speedy trial and his right to counsel had been violated. The court denied Grimballs motion to dismiss, and the jury found him guilty on the three counts of murder as well as the Class A misdemeanor charge. The court then entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Grimball.
[14] This appeal ensued.
1. The trial court did not violate Grimballs Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
[15] We first address Grimballs argument that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In reviewing speedy-trial claims, “we review factual findings for clear error and questions of law de novo.” Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 614 (Ind. 2020).
[16] As our Supreme Court has made clear:
When evaluating whether a defendants [Sixth Amendment 1] constitutional speedy trial right has been infringed, we use the balancing test announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972)․
* * *
․ This constitutional guarantee primarily protects three interests of criminal defendants: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. ․
The Barker test weighs the conduct of the government against the conduct of the defendant. This requires an examination of four nonexclusive factors: (1) was the delay uncommonly long; (2) who is more responsible for the delay; (3) did the defendant assert their right to a speedy trial; and (4) did the defendant suffer prejudice because of the delay. No individual factor is a necessary or sufficient condition for a speedy trial violation; instead, each inquiry is related and must be considered together in the context of a particular case. This analysis provides a framework by which courts can preserve the integrity of this constitutional right—one that has been described as “slippery” and “amorphous.”
Id. at 614, 616 (citations and some quotation marks omitted).
[17] Here, the State charged Grimball in December 2021, and the trial court held his jury trial approximately twenty-two months later in October 2023. “Delays approaching one year generally” are considered to be “presumptively prejudicial.” Id. at 617. But this “does not necessarily indicate [a] ‘statistical probability’ of prejudice”; rather, it “simply marks the point at which the Barker inquiry is triggered.” Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ind. 1999).
[18] Although the delay here was approximately twenty-two months, the reasons for the delay are attributable largely to Grimball. He repeatedly requested counsel, dismissed his counsel, and requested to proceed pro se. He filed, both through counsel and pro se, numerous requests for continuances and discovery. Although he repeatedly requested a speedy trial, he also repeatedly caused his trial to be delayed. Further, he does not demonstrate on appeal that the delay caused him “to lose any evidence or witnesses.” Id.
[19] Balancing the Barker factors, we conclude that the trial court did not violate Grimballs Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
2. The trial court did not violate Grimballs right to counsel.
[20] We next address Grimballs assertion that the trial court denied him his constitutional right to counsel. As our Supreme Court has stated:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal trial speaks “an obvious truth.” Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). It marks the very “foundation for our adversary system,” ensures “fundamental human rights of life and liberty,” and promotes our “universal sense of justice.” Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2012); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461 (1938); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 476, 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L. Ed. 1595 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). But through the looking glass of Gideon stands a corollary right—a constitutional paradox—to waive the assistance of counsel and “to conduct ones own defense in propria persona.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). Indeed, despite their common constitutional foundation, the right to counsel and the right to self-representation serve distinct and often conflicting interests—the latter protecting a defendants personal autonomy, the former guarding the integrity of our criminal justice system. ․
Wright v. State, 168 N.E.3d 244, 252 (Ind. 2021). Further:
The trial court is uniquely situated to assess whether a defendant has waived the right to counsel. Poynter v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1122, 1128 (Ind. 2001) (citation omitted). And when that court “has made the proper inquiries and conveyed the proper information,” and then “reaches a reasoned conclusion about the defendants understanding of his rights and voluntariness,” an appellate court, after a careful review of the record, “will most likely uphold” the trial courts “decision to honor or deny the defendants request to represent himself.” Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 254-55.
[21] As we understand Grimballs argument on this issue, the trial court purportedly violated his right to counsel when it required him either to represent himself or to have counsel appointed to represent him. According to Grimball, there was a third option that the trial court should have employed here: a right to “hybrid” representation where Grimball controlled his defense while appointed counsel provided him with assistance in the execution and presentation of that defense. Appellants Br. at 36-40.
[22] “The Sixth Amendment does not require a trial judge to permit hybrid representation.” Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind. 1999) (discussing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984)). Although the right to self-representation “does allow the trial judge to appoint standby counsel even over the defendants protest,” the defendant must “retain[ ] actual control over his defense” so that “his appearance before the jury as a pro se defendant is not undermined.” Id. (emphasis added).
[23] Thus, the trial court had no constitutional obligation to provide Grimball with standby counsel or other “hybrid” representation, and insofar as Grimballs argument on appeal might be interpreted to be that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not appoint such counsel, we disagree. The court made Grimball aware of the two choices it was giving him: exercise his right to counsel or exercise his right to proceed pro se. Grimball knowingly and voluntarily chose to proceed pro se and to waive his right to counsel. There is no error on this issue.
3. The trial court did not err in excluding hearsay evidence.
[24] We next consider Grimballs argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded hearsay evidence that Grimball sought to admit during trial. The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review those decisions only for an abuse of that discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial courts decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
[25] During his trial, Grimball sought to admit hearsay evidence through Stogsdills father and Stogsdills brother. Stogsdills father would have testified that he had heard a rumor from others that “somebody was there” at Wamplers apartment on the date of the murders. Tr. Vol. 6, p. 99. Stogsdills brother would have testified that Stogsdill had said, about two or three weeks before his murder, that he “owed somebody some money for some drugs” and was scared. Id. at 234.
[26] Grimball does not dispute that this evidence was hearsay. Rather, he asserts that, notwithstanding that the evidence was hearsay, it was admissible under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the trial court refused to allow the defendant to call three witnesses, each of whom would have testified that a man named McDonald had confessed to them that he had committed the crimes with which the defendant had been charged. The trial court also refused to allow the defendant to call McDonald himself.
[27] The Supreme Court held that, hearsay rules notwithstanding, the circumstances surrounding McDonalds out-of-court statements “provided considerable assurance of their reliability.” Id. at 300. And the Court noted that, even if there were “any question about the truthfulness of the extrajudicial statements,” the defendant “could have cross-examined” McDonald directly. Id. at 301. Thus, the Court held that “the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled with the States refusal to permit [the defendant] to cross-examine McDonald, denied him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process.” Id. at 302.
[28] Grimballs circumstances have no meaningful similarities to the circumstances at issue in Chambers. First, Stogsdills fathers putative testimony—the repeating of a rumor from an unknown source—has no indicia of reliability and, thus, was properly excluded. Second, the putative testimony of Stogsdills brother would have relayed alleged statements made to him by Stogsdill two to three weeks prior to his murder. And, while Stogsdills alleged out-of-court statements, if true, would have been against Stogsdills penal interests, that timeframe coupled with the absence of any other corroborating circumstances makes the putative testimony of his brother readily distinguishable from the constitutional issues in Chambers. We therefore conclude that the trial court properly excluded Grimballs hearsay evidence.
4. Grimball has not preserved his other alleged errors for appellate review.
[29] We briefly address various other assertions in Grimballs brief on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court violated his speedy-trial rights as provided for by Indiana Criminal Rules 4(B) and 4(C). However, to preserve appellate review under Rule 4(B), the defendant must move for discharge or dismissal “prior to trial.” Parker v. State, 965 N.E.2d 50, 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Grimball made no such motion, and he has therefore not preserved his alleged error under Rule 4(B) for our review. Further, his alleged error under Rule 4(C) is not supported by cogent reasoning. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We therefore do not reach the merits of Grimballs arguments under Rules 4(B) and 4(C).
[30] Grimball also asserts that States Exhibit 74, a police-compiled photo-lineup of possible suspects, which investigating officers showed to one of the witnesses who had seen a man matching Grimballs description at Wamplers apartment near the date and time of the murders, should have been suppressed as impermissibly suggestive. We conclude that Grimballs argument on this issue is not supported by cogent reasoning and is therefore waived. See id. That waiver notwithstanding, Grimball also has not advanced any argument as to how any error on this issue may have amounted to reversible error, and his argument fails for that reason as well. See id.
Conclusion
[31] For all of these reasons, we affirm Grimballs three convictions for murder and his conviction for Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license.
[32] Affirmed.
FOOTNOTES
1
. Although Grimball references Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution as well, he does not suggest an analysis different from the Sixth Amendment analysis applies under the Indiana Constitution. We therefore do not consider his state constitutional claim. Further, in Watson, our Supreme Court considered a defendants pro se and generic demands for a “speedy trial” to be sufficient to enable appellate review of a Sixth Amendment claim. 155 N.E.3d at 618-19. We therefore also reach the merits of Grimballs Sixth Amendment claim.
Mathias, Judge.
Chief Judge Altice and Judge Bailey concur.
Altice, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.