{¶ 1} Appellant, John F. Boyle Jr., appeals the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of mandamus. Boyle sought a writ of mandamus compelling appellees, Annette Chambers-Smith, the director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, and the departments Bureau of Sentence Computation (collectively, “ODRC”), to reduce his jail-time credit. Boyle asserted that he was incorrectly credited with 162 days of jail-time credit.
{¶ 2} The Tenth District granted ODRCs motion to dismiss Boyles claim, finding that he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and that ODRC had no clear legal duty to provide the relief he sought. We affirm the Tenth Districts judgment on the basis that Boyle had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 3} In 1990, Boyle was sentenced by the Richland County Common Pleas Court to a prison term of 20 years to life for aggravated murder and a consecutive term of 18 months for abuse of a corpse. See State v. Boyle, 1991 WL 208063, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4703 (5th Dist. Sept. 26, 1991). In January 2022, Boyle filed a motion for jail-time credit with the sentencing court, arguing that his sentencing entry did not award him credit for the days he served in pretrial incarceration. The sentencing court denied the motion, finding that it was moot because Boyle had finished serving the stated prison term over ten years ago and was currently serving an indefinite term at the discretion of the Ohio Parole Board.
{¶ 4} Boyle appealed the sentencing courts decision on his motion to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. Applying a plain-error analysis, the Fifth District affirmed the sentencing courts decision. State v. Boyle, 2022-Ohio-3417, 2022 WL 4493114, ¶ 16-18, 24 (5th Dist.). The court noted that Boyles 1990 sentencing hearing and sentencing entry were procedurally deficient because jail-time credit was not addressed at the hearing and no determination of jail-time credit was included in the entry. Id. at ¶ 19-20. Although jail-time credit was not included in Boyles sentencing entry, the Fifth District nonetheless determined that Boyle had failed to show plain error because ODRC had applied 162 days of credit to his 18-month sentence based on a letter from the county sheriff. Id. at ¶ 11, 20-21. This amount was slightly more than the 150 days Boyle claimed he served prior to sentencing. Id. at ¶ 21. This court declined to accept jurisdiction over Boyles appeal from that judgment. State v. Boyle, 2022-Ohio-4617, 200 N.E.3d 264.
{¶ 5} In October 2022, Boyle petitioned the Tenth District for a writ of mandamus. Boyle asked the Tenth District to order ODRC to (1) remove his jail-time credit, (2) contact his sentencing court about the absence of jail-time credit from his sentencing entry, and (3) cease their attempts to resentence Boyle “outside those sentences imposed on the sentencing judgment entry.” Boyle argued that ODRC incorrectly credited him with 162 days of jail-time credit because this determination was based on a letter from the county sheriff and not from his sentencing entry. Citing ODRC Policy 52 RCP 01, Boyle argued that his sentencing entrys lack of jail-time credit was an “inaccuracy” and that ODRC had a duty to contact his sentencing court about it.
{¶ 6} ODRC filed a motion to dismiss Boyles mandamus petition. Citing the sentencing courts denial of Boyles jail-time-credit motion and his subsequent appeal to the Fifth District, ODRC argued that Boyles claim failed because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and that his claim was barred by res judicata. ODRC also asserted that because Boyles minimum sentence had expired, Boyles jail-time credit had no further impact on the length of his sentence and the jail-time-credit issue was therefore moot.
{¶ 7} Boyle filed a response to ODRCs motion and his own motion for default judgment. In both filings, he argued that ODRC had “defaulted” because they did not file an answer to his petition, which is required to assert an affirmative defense like res judicata. ODRC filed a joint reply in support of their motion to dismiss and response to the default-judgment motion, arguing they had not defaulted and reasserting the arguments from their motion to dismiss.
{¶ 8} A magistrate appointed by the Tenth District issued a decision recommending that the court grant ODRCs motion to dismiss, deny Boyles motion for default judgment, and dismiss the case. The magistrate found that Boyles mandamus claim failed because he could—and did—raise issues about his jail-time credit in an appeal. The magistrate also rejected Boyles argument that ODRCs policy created a duty for ODRC to contact an inmates sentencing court if there are any inaccuracies in the inmates sentencing entry.
{¶ 9} Boyle objected to the magistrates decision, asserting (1) ODRCs motion to dismiss should not have been considered because they incorrectly asserted an affirmative defense, (2) the decision was contrary to established law regarding ODRCs clear legal duties, (3) ODRCs counsel was required to file a notice of appearance, and (4) the magistrate failed to consider Boyles evidence. The Tenth District overruled Boyles objections, adopted the magistrates decision, and denied the writ. Regarding Boyles objection that the magistrates decision was contrary to established law, the court rejected his argument that ODRC was prohibited from awarding jail-time credit if the credit was not stated in a sentencing entry. The court also held that ODRCs policies provide guidance to prison officials but confer no rights on inmates or duties on officials.
{¶ 10} Boyle filed this as an appeal of right.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 11} To dismiss a claim under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the relator can prove no set of facts warranting relief, after all factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in his favor. State ex rel. Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn., Ohio Conference v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs., 83 Ohio St.3d 179, 181, 699 N.E.2d 64 (1998). This court reviews de novo the court of appeals’ dismissal of Boyles petition. State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum, 152 Ohio St.3d 284, 2017-Ohio-9141, 95 N.E.3d 365, ¶ 10.
{¶ 12} To state a claim for a writ of mandamus, the relator must allege facts showing (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Love v. ODonnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378, 2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.
{¶ 13} On appeal, Boyle asserts four propositions of law. This court need only address two of them to affirm the Tenth Districts judgment.
A. Adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law
{¶ 14} The Tenth District overruled Boyles objections to the magistrates decision and adopted it as the decision of the court. The magistrate determined that Boyles mandamus claim failed because his right to appeal his jail-time-credit award constituted an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, citing State ex rel. Sands v. Culotta, 165 Ohio St.3d 172, 2021-Ohio-1137, 176 N.E.3d 735, ¶ 12 (“Alleged errors regarding an award of jail-time credit are not cognizable in mandamus,” because an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law exists through either a direct appeal or a postsentence motion to correct jail-time credit under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(g)(iii)). Boyle argues under his fourth proposition of law that he had no adequate remedy because of a “conflict” between the Fifth Districts decision in State v. Boyle, 2022-Ohio-3417, 2022 WL 4493114 (5th Dist.)—which was the appeal of the decision on his jail-time-credit motion—and the Tenth Districts decision in State ex rel. Corder v. Wilson, 68 Ohio App.3d 567, 589 N.E.2d 113 (10th Dist. 1991). He also argues that his filing of the jail-time-credit motion with his sentencing court and his subsequent appeals “exhausted all of his available remedies at law.”
{¶ 15} Boyle may not appeal this aspect of the Tenth Districts decision, because he did not object to that portion of the magistrates decision, which the court ultimately adopted. Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) provides:
Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the courts adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
This rule applies to direct appeals to this court, and a partys failure to raise an objection to a magistrates decision adopted by an appellate court waives any argument about that portion of the recommendation on appeal. State ex rel. Franks v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 159 Ohio St.3d 435, 2020-Ohio-711, 151 N.E.3d 606, ¶ 10.
{¶ 16} Boyle objected to only the magistrates factual findings and legal conclusions about ODRCs “clear legal duty,” the effect of ODRCs incorrectly raised affirmative-defense argument and their failure to file a notice of appearance, and the probative value of his evidence. He did not object to the magistrates conclusion about an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. As such, Boyle waived any argument related to that aspect of the Tenth Districts decision.
B. Res judicata
{¶ 17} In his third proposition of law, Boyle argues that ODRCs motion to dismiss must be dismissed, stricken, or disregarded because it asserted the affirmative defense of res judicata. He generally argues that such a motion is prohibited and that ODRCs inclusion of the res judicata argument in their motion to dismiss invalidated the entire motion and thus the Tenth District erred in considering it. The Tenth District rejected this argument, finding that the improper raising of res judicata did not prevent it from considering the motions other arguments.
{¶ 18} Boyle cites no authority to support his contention that ODRCs including a res judicata argument in their motion to dismiss prevented the Tenth District from considering other parts of the motion. Moreover, the Tenth District did not dismiss Boyles claim based on res judicata; dismissal was granted because the court found that ODRC had no clear legal duty to provide Boyle the relief he sought and that he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to address his jail-time-credit claim.
{¶ 19} Accordingly, we find no merit in this argument.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 20} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing Boyles mandamus claim.
Judgment affirmed.
Per Curiam.