DECISION & ORDER
In an action for a renewal judgment pursuant to CPLR 5014, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Terry Jane Ruderman, J.), dated August 6, 2020, and (2) a renewal judgment of the same court dated August 12, 2020. The order granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint and to strike the defendants answer and, in effect, denied the defendants motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. The renewal judgment, upon the order, in effect, is in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the total sum of $66,552.58.
ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the renewal judgment is reversed, on the law, the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint and to strike the defendants answer is denied, the defendants motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint is granted, and the order is modified accordingly; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.
The plaintiff commenced this action on October 3, 2019, pursuant to CPLR 5014 to extend an unsatisfied money judgment (hereinafter the original judgment) as the alleged assignee of that judgment. The original judgment was entered on February 1, 2000, in favor of Chase Manhattan Bank USA, N.A. (hereinafter Chase), and against the defendant, upon his default, in the total sum of $23,142.05.
The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the complaint and to strike the defendants answer. The defendant opposed the motion and moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. In an order dated August 6, 2020, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs motion and, in effect, denied the defendants motion. On August 12, 2020, a renewal judgment was entered upon the order, in effect, in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the total sum of $66,552.58. The defendant appeals.
The appeal from the order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the renewal judgment (see Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248, 383 N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the renewal judgment (see CPLR 5501[a][1]).
In support of its motion, the plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to a renewal judgment, as it did not submit evidentiary proof that it was the assignee of the original judgment creditor, Chase, prior to the commencement of this action (see CPLR 5014[1]; Premier Capital, LLC v. Best Traders, Inc., 88 A.D.3d 677, 678, 930 N.Y.S.2d 249; see also Cadle Co. v. Biberaj, 307 A.D.2d 889, 889, 763 N.Y.S.2d 751). An examination of an affidavit of the plaintiffs president submitted in support of the motion reveals that it fails to establish the date and circumstances of the assignment, if any, of the original judgment.
In support of his motion, the defendant established that the plaintiff lacked standing to commence this action, since the assignment of judgment was executed on October 16, 2019, subsequent to the commencement of this action, even though the assignment contained a retroactive effective date of July 10, 2000. To commence an action, the plaintiff must have a legal interest in the debt (see Katz v. East–Ville Realty Co., 249 A.D.2d 243, 672 N.Y.S.2d 308). “Where the plaintiff is the assignee of the [judgment] at the time the ․ action was commenced, the plaintiff has standing to maintain the action” (Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Youkelsone, 303 A.D.2d 546, 546–547, 755 N.Y.S.2d 730). Here, the plaintiff lacked standing to commence this action because it was not the assignee of the original judgment on October 3, 2019, the day the action was commenced (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 69 A.D.3d 204, 207, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615). “While recognizing that in some circumstances parties to an agreement may bind themselves retroactively, ‘the fiction of retroactivity ․ should not be applied to affect adversely the rights of third persons’ ” (id. at 210, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615, quoting Debreceni v. Outlet Co., 784 F.2d 13, 20 [1st Cir.]). Thus, a retroactive assignment cannot be used to confer standing upon the assignee in an action commenced prior to the execution of the assignment (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Marchione, 69 A.D.3d at 208, 887 N.Y.S.2d 615; LaSalle Bank Natl. Assn. v. Ahearn, 59 A.D.3d 911, 875 N.Y.S.2d 595).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the complaint and to strike the defendants answer and granted the defendants motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.
The defendants remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.
CONNOLLY, J.P., IANNACCI, GENOVESI and LOVE, JJ., concur.