Gilbert, J.
1. “Where an instrument in the form of and attested as a deed contains a clause that it is ‘to go into effect at the’ signer’s death, and where there is no other indication as to the intention of the signer, and the paper is duly delivered, it will be construed to be a deed postponing possession.” Collier v. Carter, 146 Ga. 476 (91 S. E. 551, 11 A. L. R. 1); Crawford v. Thomas, 150 Ga. 435 (104 S. E. 211).
2. The deed is unambiguous. It was the duty of the court and not of the jury to construe the instrument.
3. It is conceded that on the question of mental capacity the evidence was conflicting, and that the verdict was authorized.
4. The grounds of the motion for new trial complaining of certain remarks of the court when a recharge was requested by the jury, when considered in connection with the entire recharge, do not show error.
5. The verdict was supported by evidence, and the court did not err in refusing to grant a new trial.
Deeds, 18 C. J. p. 272, n. 94; p. 443, n. 19.
New Trial, 29 Cyc. p. 824, n. 41.
Trial, 38 Cyc. p. 955, n. 35; p. 1316, n. 35.
Wills, 40 Cyc. p. 1085, n. 43; p. 1086, n. 49; p. 1087, n. 51, 52.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
It was contended on the trial that • the above paper was of testamentary character; and that its maker not being of sound and disposing mind at the time of its execution, the paper should be canceled, and the beneficiary therein, Rebecca Aldridge, a daughter of the maker, decreed to be an heir at law to the property along with petitioners. The jury found a verdict for the defendants, the suit being also against the husband of Eebecca Aldridge. The plaintiffs filed a motion for new trial on general and special grounds. One ground complained that the court refused to allow evidence introduced to show the above paper to be testamentary, and in holding as a matter of law that it was a deed; the point of movants being that “the instrument did not pass any title until the death of the grantor,” and that evidence showed no consideration was actually paid the grantor. Another ground complained that the court failed to charge the jury that plaintiffs contended the instrument was in the nature of a will,’ and not effective as a deed; and still another that the court charged the jury that “it is both a deed and a contract.” A ground also complained that the court confused the jury in a recharge on the question of mental capacity, by saying: “Well, let’s see; This deed was made to Mrs. Eebecca Aldridge. What was really said was this: I expect that it is understood all right by you gentlemen,” in connection with the charge on mental capacity, when a juror had told the court the jury wanted recharging on the effect of the maker of the instrument becoming of sound mind after he made it, and for the court to say lie expected the jury understood it was calculated to leave an erroneous impression as to the law on their minds, if they had received one from the first charge. Other grounds assign error upon the court’s “not answering the questions the jury wanted answered on the recharge.” The court overruled the motion for new trial, and the plaintiffs excepted.
Wade E. Watson and J. B. Moore, for plaintiffs.
Q. E. Parker and Eighsmith & Eighsmith, for defendants.