UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Jack SPADA, Petitioner-Appellant

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit1964-05-15No. No. 419, Docket 28715

331 F.2d 995

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the denial of Spada's § 2255 motion because the indictment adequately described the offenses and essential elements, and Spada's guilty plea waived any non-jurisdictional defects in the charging document.

Jack Spada pleaded guilty to three counts of heroin trafficking in 1961 and was sentenced accordingly. Nearly two years later, he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate his conviction on the ground that the indictment was defective because it failed to identify the purchasers of the heroin, did not adequately specify the crimes charged, and omitted the locations where the offenses occurred.

The court rejected Spada's challenge. Under established law, an indictment may only be attacked collaterally on grounds of jurisdiction or constitutional violation. The indictment here adequately set forth the essential elements of the offenses, the dates of commission, and the venue. An indictment phrased in the language of the statute itself is sufficient when the statute includes all necessary elements. The names of buyers need not appear in an indictment, and Spada's guilty plea constituted a waiver of any non-jurisdictional defects. Because Spada did not challenge the indictment at trial or on direct appeal, and because he admitted guilt, he suffered no prejudice from the alleged omissions.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an indictment may be collaterally attacked under § 2255 for failure to name purchasers and specify crime locations
Whether an indictment phrased in statutory language satisfies constitutional requirements
Whether a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional indictment defects

Procedural posture

Spada appealed the district court's denial of his pro se § 2255 motion to vacate his 1961 conviction for heroin trafficking, filed nearly two years after sentencing.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order denying the appellant’s pro se motion made pursuant to § 2255, 28 U.S.C., to vacate a judgment of conviction.

On September 27, 1961, Spada was indicted under a three-count indictment charging him with violation on August 26 and 29, 1960, and September 19, 1960, of Sections 173 and 174 of Title 21, United States Code, in receiving, concealing, selling and facilitating the transportation, concealment and sale of specified quantities of illegally imported heroin. Upon Spada’s plea of guilty to the indictment, he was sentenced on December 26, 1961, on all three counts. On October 24, 1963, nearly a year and ten months later, Spada filed his § 2255 motion alleging that the indictment which was phrased in the words of the statute, was fatally defective in that it failed to set forth (1) the identity of the purchasers; (2) the crimes charged, and (3) the places where the crimes occurred.

It is well settled that an indictment may not be collaterally attacked under § 2255 except for lack of jurisdiction or an infringement of defendant’s constitutional rights. Fiano v. United States, 9 Cir., 291 F.2d 113, cert. denied, 1961, 368 U.S. 943, 82 S.Ct. 380, 7 L.Ed.2d 340; Killebrew v. United States, 5 Cir., 275 F.2d 308, cert. denied, 1960, 364 U.S. 841, 81 S.Ct. 79, 5 L.Ed. 2d 65. The test employed is whether the indictment contains sufficient information to enable the defendant to prepare his defense and to plead the judgment as a bar to further proceedings. Martin v. United States, 10 Cir. 1960, 285 F.2d 150, cert. denied, 1961, 365 U.S. 853, 81 S.Ct. 818, 5 L.Ed.2d 816. A plea of guilty to an indictment is an admission of guilt and a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects. Lockhart v. United States, 8 Cir. 1961, 293 F.2d 314, cert. denied, 1962, 368 U.S. 1003, 82 S.Ct. 636, 7 L.Ed.2d 541; United States v. Parker, 6 Cir. 1961, 292 F.2d 2. Where, as here, the statute sets forth all the necessary elements to constitute the crime, it is sufficient if the indictment is pleaded in the words of the statute, United States v. Cimino, 2 Cir. 1963, 321 F.2d 500, cert. denied, 1964, 374 U.S. 974, 84 S.Ct. 491, 11 L.Ed.2d 418, and an indictment not questioned at trial or on direct appeal will be upheld unless so defective as to obviously fail to set forth the offense charged. Palomino v. United States, 9 Cir., 318 F.2d 613, cert. denied, 1963, 375 U.S. 932, 84 S.Ct. 335, 11 L.Ed.2d 264. Here the indictment clearly states the essential elements of the crimes, the dates when they were perpetrated and the fact that they occurred within the Southern District of New York. The names of the buyers need not be mentioned in the indictment. Moreover, since Spada admitted his guilt, it is difficult to comprehend how he can be prejudiced by their absence. If Spada is again charged with the same offense, he will be in a position to set up the bar of double jeopardy. The cases of United States v. Hess, 1888, 124 U.S. 483, 8 S.Ct. 571, 31 L.Ed. 516, and Larkin v. United States, 7 Cir. 1901, 107 F. 697, relied upon by Spada are inapposite.

Affirmed.