FRED C. HOLMAN v. W. N. S. IVINS

Minnesota Supreme Court1921-11-10No. No. 22,460

150 Minn. 285

Summary · law.co

Holding. The right-of-way statute applies where one street opens onto another only on one side, as there exists a space common to both streets where intersection occurs. The trial court properly submitted the statute to the jury, and the judgment in plaintiff's favor was affirmed.

Plaintiff and defendant collided at the point where Mackubin Street enters Summit Avenue from the north. Plaintiff was traveling westbound on Summit Avenue while defendant was traveling eastbound on the same avenue. Defendant turned north onto Mackubin Street, and the vehicles collided. Plaintiff sued for damages and prevailed at trial. Defendant appealed, arguing that a right-of-way statute did not apply because Mackubin Street terminates at Summit Avenue rather than crossing it completely.

The court rejected defendant's argument. Even though Mackubin Street does not continue south of Summit Avenue, there exists a space common to both streets where they meet. When defendant turned north onto Mackubin Street, he entered this shared space from a position to plaintiff's left, making plaintiff the vehicle approaching from defendant's right. Under the applicable right-of-way statute, defendant was required to yield to plaintiff. The court reasoned that the need to observe right-of-way rules is even more important in this situation than at conventional intersections.

The court also addressed defendant's secondary argument that other statutes governing turning movements and speed in making turns might override the right-of-way statute. The court held that these statutes are complementary rather than contradictory, and a driver turning into an intersecting street must comply with all applicable requirements simultaneously.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether right-of-way statute applies when a street terminates at another street rather than crossing it
Definition of intersection for purposes of right-of-way rules
Compatibility of multiple traffic statutes governing turning movements, right-of-way, and speed

Procedural posture

Plaintiff recovered judgment at trial for damages from a vehicle collision; defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Holt, J.

Summit avenue runs east and west and has a 55-foot driveway for some distance on both sides of where Mackubin street enters it from the north. The latter street goes no -further south than to Summit. Plaintiff was driving his automobile westerly on Summit avenue approaching Mackubin street, when defendant, driving easterly on that avenue, was nearing the same street. The latter turned to go north upon Mackubin street, but the right front spring of plaintiff’s car caught in the right rear wheel of defendant’s, and both vehicles were considerably damaged. Plaintiff sued to recover the damages resulting to him from the collision, and defendant answered, denying responsibility and counterclaiming for the damages he sustained. Plaintiff recovered. Defendant appeals from the order denying a new trial.

The only error assigned questions thepropriety of submitting for the jury’s consideration the statute reading: “The driver of any vehicle approaching or crossing a street or highway intersection shall give the right of way to any other vehicle approaching from his right on the intersecting street or highway, and shall have the right of way at such crossing over any vehicle approaching from his left on such intersecting street or highway.” (Section 2552, G. S. 1913, as amended by the addition of subdivision 2 in section 22, e. 119, p. 164, Laws 1917).

The claim of defendant is that the statute does not apply because Mackubin street ends at Summit avenue, and does not continue on to the south. At places where two streets cross there is a space common to both, on which space the traveler must yield the right of way to anyone approaching on his right. So we think there is a space in common to both streets where one street opens pnto another only on one side. The space to the north of the center line of Summit avenue and within the east and west line of Mackubin street extended, is such a space. As soon as defendant turned towards this space, plaintiff was approaching to defendant’s right, and the latter’s duty was to yield the right of way. Again plaintiff traveling on Summit avenue westerly, and on the north half thereof, was bound to give the right of way to one driving south on Mackubin street into Summit avenue. There is an intersection, at least as to the northerly half of the space in common there would have been, had Mackubin street continued to the south. We are of the opinion that the north half of Summit avenue must be held to be intersected by Mackubin street, and hence the statute quoted was properly applied. Indeed, the situation calls for the observance of the rule of the statute even more urgently than where both streets pass on beyond.

The fact that there is a statute, section 2634, G. S. 1913, requiring vehicles in turning into an intersecting street, or in making a turn at an intersection to keep to the right of the center thereof, does not suspend the operation of the right of way statute while the turn is made. In turning the driver of the vehicle must heed the requirements of both statutes mentioned, as well as the one found in section 2635, G. S. 1913, relating to the speed in turning a corner. They are not contradictory, and may all be applicable in a given case.

The order is affirmed.