STATE v. HENRY TAYLOR

Minnesota Supreme Court1920-01-02No. No. 21,551

144 Minn. 377

Summary · law.co

Holding. The conviction is reversed because the cross-examination, though addressing collateral credibility matters, was so extensive, remotely connected to actual credibility, and persistently prejudicial that it likely influenced the jury to apply the insinuations against the defendant on the substantive issue rather than for their narrow proper scope, requiring a new trial.

Henry Taylor was convicted of indecent liberties with a female child under 14. The victim testified that an offense occurred, corroborated by her prompt complaint to her mother, though her testimony contained some confusion and contradictions. The defendant denied the charge and presented character witnesses. While the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, the court found reversible error in the trial proceedings.

The primary problem was the scope and nature of the defendant's cross-examination. Approximately one-third of the cross-examination addressed collateral matters unrelated to the core charge, including questions about the defendant's travels between Missouri and Minnesota, his residence history, and particularly his conduct regarding a young woman he allegedly took to Fargo and suggestions about marital troubles and payments to leave his wife. Although not all such questions were permitted and nothing definitive was proven, the cumulative effect of these persistent insinuations was to portray the defendant as a man of bad character in his dealings with women and domestic relations, thereby suggesting he was more likely to commit the alleged crime.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Scope of cross-examination on collateral matters affecting credibility
Prejudicial effect of character insinuation on defendant's right to fair trial
Whether cross-examination questions exceeded proper bounds despite trial court discretion

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his conviction for indecent liberties with a child under 14 years of age.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Dibell, J.

The defendant was convicted of faking indecent liberties with a female child under 14 years of age, and appeals.

The conflict in testimony is positive. - The girl affirms that an offense was committed and the defendant denies it. The girl is corroborated by the fact of a prompt complaint made to her mother. Her testimony is in some respects confused and she contradicts herself materially. The defendant produced several character witnesses. The evidence, though not entirely free of doubt, is sufficient to sustain the verdict.

The cross-examination of the defendant was all upon collateral matters. • It tended to show that he had been something of a wanderer, going back and forth for a number of years from Missouri to Minnesota. He had lived on a farm in the county for three yealrs, or at least that was his claim. At the time of the offense alleged he had some sort of a shoe and harness shop in Foxhome.

As much as one-third of the cross-examination was directed to the alleged conduct of the defendant in taking a young woman of the vicinity to Fargo, the plain implication being that he did so for improper pur- poses, and to questions suggesting that his wife had given him $500 or some other sum to leave her. Not all of such questions were permitted and nothing very harmful was actually proved, hut the constantly pressed insinuation was that the defendant was a bad man in his association with this woman and that he had trouble in his domestic relations, and that evidence if admitted would prove it. To one charged with the crime alleged in the indictment it was necessarily prejudicial. It would give the jury the notion that a man such as he was suggested by innuendo to be was more likely to commit such a crime. The extent to which testimony may be received to affect credibility, though upon collateral matters, is largely for the trial court. Gardner v. Kellogg, 23 Minn. 463; State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 112 N. W. 409; State v. Phillips, 105 Minn. 375, 117 N. W. 508; 3 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. and 1916 Supp. § 10348. The questions asked and persistently urged so remotely affected the defendant’s credibility and were so likely to be applied by the jury unfavorably to him in their consideration of the issue involved and not restricted to their proper scope that a new trial should be had- Malone v. Stephenson, 94 Minn. 222, 102 N. W. 372; Howard v. Farr, 115 Minn. 86, 131 N. W. 1071; State v. McCoy, 112 Minn. 424, 128 N. W. 465; Petruschke v. Kamerer, 131 Minn. 320, 155 N. W. 205; 3 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. and 1916 Supp. § 10348.

In reaching this conclusion we note the trial court’s view that the defendant was guilty, .and but for the persistent and prejudicial questioning we would not disturb the result. The trial court was entirely fair, and it was eommendably careful of the defendant’s rights when the time for sentence came. There was a suggestion then that the defendant at times, was mentally affected. The interests of justice will be subserved by a new trial.

Judgment reversed.

dissent opinion

Hallam, J.

(dissenting).

In my opinion the conduct of the county attorney in asking questions was not such misconduct as to warrant a reversal. See State v. Quirk, 101 Minn. 334, 112 N. W. 409; State v. Johnson, 114 Minn. 493, 131 N. W. 629.