Moore v. Dugas et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1928-06-12No. No. 6506

166 Ga. 493

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court properly refused to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the ordinary and contestant from proceeding with the mayoral election contest, because injunction is not a permissible method for trying title to public office and the statutory grounds for ordinary disqualification do not include partisan bias or prejudice absent a defined interest or relationship.

The case addresses the proper procedures and legal standards governing contested municipal elections in Georgia. The City of Dahlonega's charter establishes specific requirements for election managers to count ballots, prepare documentation, and file records with both the county clerk and city council. When a mayoral election is disputed, the county ordinary (a judicial officer) has authority to hear and decide the contest following the same procedures used for gubernatorial commission contests. The city council's declaration of election results is not final; a losing candidate may still pursue a formal contest before the ordinary.

The court clarified that an ordinary's disqualification is governed exclusively by statute and is limited to circumstances involving financial interest, family relationships within the fourth degree, prior counsel involvement, or review of the ordinary's own prior rulings. Neither partisan support for a contestant nor general prejudice or bias—absent a statutory ground—disqualifies an ordinary from presiding. Additionally, injunctive relief cannot be used as a substitute method for resolving disputes over public office titles; the proper avenue is the statutory contest procedure.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Authority and procedures for contesting municipal mayoral elections
Statutory grounds for disqualification of county ordinaries in election contests
Whether partisan bias alone disqualifies a judicial officer from hearing an election dispute
Availability of injunctive relief in public office title disputes

Procedural posture

The trial judge refused to grant an interlocutory injunction, and the plaintiff appealed that denial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Hines, J.

1. By section 6 of the charter of the City of Dahlonega, the managers of an election for mayor in that city are required to count the ballots, consolidate the returns of said election, and certify the same. They are required to keep two lists of voters, and two tally-sheets, and to make certificate of the result on each tally-sheet, and place one of said lists of voters and one oí said tally-sheets, together with the ballots, in an envelope or box, and seal the same and deposit it with the clerk of the superior court of Lumpkin County. They are required to file the other list of voters and tally-sheet with the clerk of the city council, for delivery to and inspection by said city council, who shall meet within five days after said election is held, and declare the result of the same. Acts 1899, p. 146 et seq. .

2. Whenever any contest arises over an election of a mayor of a municipality, the same shall be filed with and heard and determined by the ordinary of the county wherein such contest may arise, under the same rules and regulations as to the mode of procedure as prescribed in contests where commission is issued by the Governor. Civil Code, § 125.

3. The declaration by the city council of the result of an election for mayor of the City of Dahlonega, under the above provision of its charter, is not final and conclusive, and does not prevent the defeated candidate from contesting the election of a rival candidate under the above provision of the Civil Code. Low v. Towns, 8 Ga. 360; McCants v. Layfield, 149 Ga. 231 (99 S. E. 877); Bennett v. Public Service Commission, 160 Ga. 189 (127 S. E. 612).

4 No ordinary can sit in any cause or proceeding in which he is pecuniarily interested, or related to either party within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, nor of which he has been of counsel, nor in which he has presided in any inferior judicature when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the consent of all the parties in interest. Civil Code, § 4642.

(а) The above statutory grounds of disqualification of an ordinary are exhaustive, and the fact that the ordinary is a partisan of the contestant does not disqualify such oifieer from presiding in the contest of the mayor’s election. Elliott v. Hipp, 134 Ga. 844 (68 S. E. 736, 137 Am. St. R. 272, 20 Ann. Cas. 423).

(б) Prejudice or bias, not based on interest, will not disqualify the ordinary from presiding in such a contest. Tibbs v. Atlanta, 125 Ga. 18 (53 S. E. 811) ; Beavers v. Armistead, 156 Ga. 833 (5) (120 S. E. 526).

5. The writ of injunction can not be made directly or indirectly the method of trying the title to a public office. Tupper v. Dart, 104 Ga. 179 (30 S. E. 624).

6. Applying the above principles, the trial judge did not err in refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the ordinary and the contestant from proceeding with the contest.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Wheeler & Kenyon, for plaintiff. Jones & Reid, for defendants.