LOUIS BUNDY v. J. M. VOELKER AND ANOTHER. NIC MEYER, APPELLANT

Minnesota Supreme Court1920-01-23No. No. 21,575

145 Minn. 19

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court reversed the judgment, holding that the question of whether the contract for the third carload was a separate and independent transaction should have been submitted to the jury for determination, as the evidence raised a genuine factual issue on that point.

Plaintiff contracted to sell cabbage to defendant Meyer, with an agreed price of $1.05 per hundred pounds. The parties initially executed a transaction for two carloads, which defendant accepted and paid for in full. Approximately two to three weeks later, plaintiff loaded a third carload and attempted to deliver it on the same terms. Defendant refused this third carload, asserting he had notified plaintiff that he would accept no more cabbage after discovering that the first two carloads contained unmarketable product.

The central dispute was whether the third carload sale was part of a continuous transaction with the first two carloads or constituted a separate, independent contract. Defendant argued that if separate, the oral contract for the third carload violated the statute of frauds because it involved property worth more than $50 with no partial performance or payment. The trial court instructed the jury that the statute of frauds would not apply if the third carload was loaded before defendant's rejection notice was received, effectively removing from jury consideration the question of whether the two transactions were independent.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an oral contract for goods over $50 in value falls within the statute of frauds
Whether two cabbage sales separated by two to three weeks constituted a single transaction or separate contracts
Whether partial performance or acceptance of goods in an initial transaction can satisfy statute of frauds requirements for a subsequent transaction

Procedural posture

Defendant Meyer appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial after a jury verdict in his favor was entered at trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Taylor, C.

The complaint alleges that defendants employed plaintiff to buy cabbage for them and agreed to pay him $1.05 per hundred pounds for all that he should purchase and deliver in cars on track at Winona, that he purchased and delivered on track a carload which defendants refused to receive or pay for, and demands judgment for the agreed price. The separate answer of defendant Meyer denies employing plaintiff and alleges that on September 25, 1918, defendant contracted to buy from plaintiff two carloads of good marketable Holland cabbage; that plaintiff delivered two carloads of. cabbage on track and defendant paid him in full therefor; that on October 15, 1918, defendant informed plaintiff that he would take more cabbage on the same terms and conditions as before; that immediately thereafter he learned that unmarketable cabbage had been placed in the two caploads previously delivered, and at once notified plaintiff that he would receive no more cabbage from him; that disregarding this notice plaintiff loaded another ear with inferior cabbage; that defendant refused to accept it, and that this is the carload for which plaintiff seeks to recover. The answer further alleged that the contract for this carload was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of defendant Voelker and against defendant Meyer who will be designated as defendant hereafter. Defendant made a motion for a new trial and appealed from an order denying his motion.

Notwithstanding the form of the complaint the action was tried and submitted to the jury, on the theory that plaintiff was the seller of the cab- bage in controversy. Plaintiff asserted that he had procured a ear and loaded the cabbage into it before he received notice that defendant would not accept the cabbage, and the court instructed the jury that the statute of frauds, "would not enter into this case if you find the third ear was loaded before the defendant was notified that they would not accept the cabbage.” Defendant assigns this instruction as error.

That defendant bought two carloads of cabbage from plaintiff and accepted and paid for them is undisputed, and plaintiff contends that the sale of those two carloads and of the carload in controversy were parts of the same transaction, and that the acceptance of the first two carloads satisfied the requirements of the statute of frauds. Defendant testified that the original contract was for two carloads and no more, and that the arrangement under which the third car was loaded was made two or three weeks later and was a separate and independent transaction. The instruction given by the court ip effect withdrew from the jury the question as to whether the contract for the third carload was a separate and independent transaction. If it was a separate and independent transaction, it was within the statute of frauds and unenforceable, for it was an oral contract to buy property of the value of more than $50, no part of which was ever received or accepted and for which none of the purchase money had been paid. Section 4, e. 465, Laws 1917; Russell v. Wisconsin, M. & P. Ry. Co. 39 Minn. 145, 39 N. W. 302; Fontaine v. Bush, 40 Minn. 141, 41 N. W. 465, 12 Am. St. 722; Waite v. McKelvy, 71 Minn, 167, 72 N. W. 727.

The evidence made a question for the jury on this issue and it should have been submitted to them. As this conclusion leads to a reversal it is not necessary to consider the other questions.

Order reversed.