Gillespie v. Ellis, administrator, et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1929-07-12No. No. 7139

168 Ga. 790

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed that the conveyance created a vested remainder in the grandson's favor, not a contingent estate, because the appointment of a trustee to manage the property and the provision for the grandson's maintenance and education before reaching age twenty-one demonstrated the grantor's intent to vest the interest immediately upon delivery of the instrument, with possession postponed only until he reached that age.

This case addresses when a property interest granted to someone in the future becomes vested (owned) versus contingent (dependent on a condition). The court established that when property is transferred to take effect upon a future age or event, the vesting of the right depends on the grantor's intent. If the document shows income or support is to be provided to the beneficiary in the interim, or if a trustee is appointed to manage the property for the beneficiary's benefit, this indicates the interest vests immediately even though physical possession is delayed.

Applying these principles, the court examined a trust deed conveying real estate to a company as trustee. The deed provided that income would support the grantor's son during the grantor's lifetime, then support and educate the grantor's grandson until age twenty-one, at which point the trustee would transfer the property to the grandson. The court determined this arrangement created a vested remainder in the grandson's favor rather than a contingent estate. The trustee's appointment, combined with the provision for the grandson's maintenance and education before reaching twenty-one, indicated the grantor intended the interest to vest immediately upon the deed's delivery, with only possession and enjoyment postponed until maturity.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a future property interest is vested or contingent based on grantor intent
Effect of provisions for interim income and support on vesting of remainder interests
Role of trustee appointment in determining whether an interest vests immediately
Distinction between postponement of vesting versus postponement of possession and enjoyment

Procedural posture

The judgment of the lower court was appealed and affirmed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Hines, J.

1. Where real estate is granted to a person when or as soon as he shall attain a given age, or when an event shall happen which may never occur at all, or at, or upon, or from and after his attaining such age, or the happening of such event, and there are no other words indicative of an intent to confer a vested interest, and nothing in the form of a limitation itself to indicate an intent merely to delay the vesting in possession or enjoyment, and no disposition of the intermediate income, the interest of the grantee will be contingent until he attains the age specified, or the event described has happened. If futurity is annexed to the substance of the gift, the vesting is suspended; but if it appears to relate to an intent merely to delay vesting in possession or enjoyment of the grant, the grant vests instanter. Cogburn v. Ogleby, 18 Ga. 56, 58; Bowman v. Long, 23 Ga. 243; Allen v. Whitaker, 34 Ga. 6; In re Paxon’s Estate, 241 Pa. 452 (88 Atl. 673, L. R. A. 1915C, 1009, and note).

2. But where income by way of maintenance, education and support, of otherwise is given to the grantee in the meantime, the grant, notwithstanding the gift appears to be postponed, vests immediately upon the execution and delivery of the instrument creating it.

3. The appointment of a trustee for the infant grantee is one of the main facts in favor of the vesting of the grant. Bromstrom v. Wilkerson, 7 Ves. Jr. 421; Bowman v. Long, supra.

4. A grantor conveyed to a company as trustee, “its successors and assigns, in fee simple,” certain parcels of real estate, in trust that “the net income from the entire trust estate, after paying all necessary charges and expenses in maintaining said estate,” including the compensation of the trustee, the payment of an encumbrance on one of the parcels of land conveyed, and the payment of a named fee due by the grantor to her attorney, “shall be paid over to J. C. Porter . . for and during his natural life, and after the death of said J. C. Porter the net income shall be used for the maintenance, education, and support of J. C. Porter Jr., until he shall have arrived at the age of 21 years, and at that time said property shall be conveyed to him” by the trustee “or its successors in trust.” Under this conveyance a vested remainder was created in favor of J. C. Porter Jr., with its management lodged in the trustee until he arrived at twenty-one years of age, with the possession and enjoyment of .the corpus postponed until that time, when the trustee was to convey the estate to him; and not an estate contingent upon his reaching that age, with reversion in favor of the grantor upon his death before reaching that age, there being no provision for reversion in case he died before that age. Goodtitle v. Whitby, 1 Burr. 229, 97 Eng. Rep. (Reprint) 287, King’s Bench Book, 26; Jackson v. Jackson, 1 Ves. Sr. 217, 27 Eng. Rep. 992; Fulton Trust Co. v. Phillips, 215 N. Y. 573 (113 N. E. 558, L. R. A. 1918E, 1070); Stevens v. Carroll, 64 Or. 417 (129 Pac. 1047, L. R. A. 1918E, 1095, and note 1112).

No. 7139.

July 12, 1929.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Winfield P. Jones and John B. McCollum, for plaintiff in error.

Mitchell & Mitchell and Anderson, Rountree & Crenshaw, contra.